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1 


2 


3 


1 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND 
AMERICAN  POLICIES 


ATLANTA     4AM  nUMrUCO 

CMCvm 


TOUUaOLLAN 


JAPANESE  EXPA.,^ON  AND 


JAMES  FRANC  "abbott  P„  n 


THE  MACMaiS  COMPAW 
1916 
'•^^^  rigbu  nstrvid 


Hit 


 OoFTwowr.  1916, 

Bt  TBS  lUOMIUjur  OOlCPAMT 


-3 


PREFACE 

In  this  little  book.  I  have  attempted  to  give  the  facto 
upon  which  X  base  my  opinion  that  war  between  Japan 
and  America  <i«ri„g  the  present  generation  i.  .  mp« 
unlikely  contingency.  The  fact  that  such  a  war  i.  not 
an  impossibility  is  the  chief  reason  why  the  American 
people  should  inform  themselves  thoroughly  regarding 

Japan  and  our  relations  with  that  Empire.  Forifilir 
comes.  It  will  be  largely  our  own  fault. 

Americans  know  that  in  1914  the  absence  of  any 
Pewonal  animosity  whatever  between  the  different  peo- 
of  warring  Europe  had  no  weight  in  p«venting 

^«ed  to  consider  the  long  historic  friendship  be^ 
Japan  and  America  from  any  other  than  a  cyn- 
^  viewpoint  Accordingly,  while  giving  due  weight 
to  this,  ao  to  speak,  academic  factor  and.  in  particukr. 
to  the  prmie  necessity,  on  our  part,  of  cultivating  mich 
•Japanese  friendship.  I  have  tried  to  base 
mem  upon  the  more  concrete  and  matter^f.f^,  .1^ 

The  first  three  chapters  I  have  devoted  to  »  brief 


PUBFACB 

hiitoric  ri»vuao6»  in  order  that  the  reader  may  orient 
hinielf  with  respect  to  the  whole  problem.  The  next 
four  chapter!  deal  with  the  material  upon  whitih  it 
based  the  central  conchuion  of  ^  book— that  war 
with  America  woold  be  natkxial  aiiidde  for  Ji^an. 
The  hut  two  chapters  are  an  i^peal  to  Americani  to 
recognize  Japan's  aspiration*  u  an  Oriental  power,  hi 
the  belief  that  it  will  be  to  ottr  own  advantage  to  do  la 

J.F.A. 

Washington  Uirivasiiy, 
St.  Louii,  Ma, 

October,  1915. 


i 


'J 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

TjU  BACXflMOlIB  .,       .  I 

CHAPTER  II 

CHAPTER  lU 

jArAK  Corns  OP  Acs  »     m     .  39 

CHAPTER  IV 

Akbica,  jAtAKt  Am  tuM  pBumms      r     M    »    n.  7S 

CHAFrER  V 

Jafan's  Economic  EmunoM  .     ...  107 

CHAPTER  VI 

TBS''yiuowPBuL"ur  A^WsntllA.  .  Couimnr'*     .  149 

CHAPTER  Vn 

Tn  CsAMOtt  or  Wa!  194 

CHAPTER  Vin 
Jafam's  Diumma  .21$ 

yti 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IX 
Tn  M OMMB  Docnnm  East  and  West 

CHAPTER  X 
Some  Guesses  as  to  thx  Fvtuib 


rAci 

MM  .348 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND 
AMERICAN  POLICIES 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND 
AMERICAN  POLICIES 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  BACKGROUND 

"  Japan  will  make  China  a  vassal  and  will  militarize 
its  millions.  Then  it  will  be  for  your  country  [America] 
to  look  out.  Admiral  Togo  once  said  to  a  European, 
'Next  will  come  a  general  European  war,  then  will 
come  a  great  war  in  ^ivhich  my  race  will  be  against 
yours.'  ** 

Such  were  the  statements  credited  in  the  press  last 

December  to  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  the  chief  of  the 

German  navy.   It  is  unlikely  that  Admiral  von  Tirpitz 

said  this;  it  is  highly  improbable  that  Admiral  Togo 

did.   Yet,  in  a  way,  it  does  not  make  any  difference 

whether  they  did  or  not.    So  long  as  such  statements 

are  published  periodically  all  over  America  and  so  long 

as  hundreds  of  thousands  of  readers  never  dream  of 

questioning  their  accuracy  or  authenticity  thqr  might 

as  well  be  true  as  oUierwise. 

t 


»  TAPANESE  expansion; 

Repeatedly  during  the  past  ten  years  have  similar 
remarks  been  made  and  similar  fears  been  expressed. 
And  not  always  so  crudely,  nor  through  the  channel  of 
an  anonymous  newspaper  reporter.   Public  men,  both 
in  Congress  and  elsewhere,  have  essayed  the  role  of 
Cassandra,  in  season  and  out.   Bankers,  globe-trotters, 
merchants,  and  editors  have  enlightened  us  with  their 
views  until  we  have  reached  a  state  of  mind  in  which  the 
notion  that  "  we  are  going  to  have  trouble  in  the  Pacific 
one  of  these  days  "  has  become  almost  an  obsession. 
Said  the  Hon.  James  R.  Mann  of  Illinois  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  October  i,  1914:1  «We  who  are 
legishting  now,  who  do  not  bear  in  mind  the  inevitable 
conflict,  commercial  or  otherwise,  which  we  will  meet  in 
the  Far  East,  have  forgotten  the  principles  that  ought 
primarily  to  actuate  us.    [Applause.]    I  have  no  doubt 
Hiat  it  is  as  v-rtain  as  that  the  sun  will  rise  tomorrow 
morning  that  a  conflict  will  come  between  the  Far  East 
and  the  Far  West  across  the  Pacific  Ocean;  all  01  that 
which  has  taken  place  in  the  world  during  the  history  of 
the  human  race  up  to  now  teaches  us  that  the  avoidance 
of  this  conflict  is  impossible.    I  hope  that  the  war  will 
not  come;  I  hope  that  there  will  be  no  conflict  of  arms. 
But  I  have  Mttle  faith  that  in  this  worid  of  ours  people 
and  races  are  able  to  meet  in  competition  for  a  long 
^CongreMioiial  Record,  63d  Congrew,  p.  1746& 


THE  BACKGROUND  3 

period  of  time  without  an  anned  conflict  A  fight  for 
commercial  supremacy  in  the  end  kads  to  a  fight  with 
arms  because  that  is  the  final  arbiter  among  Nations. 
iWe  command  the  Pacific  Ocean  today  with  the  land  that 
we  have  on  this  side,  with  tae  islands  which  we  possess 
in  the  sea  and  with  the  Philippines  on  the  o6er  side. 
Will  we  surrender  our  command?  I  say  no,  never.** 
[Applause.] 

A  few  y^iars  earlier  Mr.  Hobson  said  on  the  .ioor  of 
the  same  chamber: »  «  We  are  short  on  providing  equi- 
librium in  the  Atlantic  and  we  have  not  a  single  battle- 
ship in  the  PSMafic  and  our  relative  naval  strength  is 
steadily  declining.  War  is  therefore  a  physical  cer- 
tainty." "  I  wiU  tdl  you  frankly  that  in  my  judgment 
you  can  count  ahnost  on  the  fingers  of  your  two  hands 
twice  around,  the  number  of  months.  In  my  judgment 
war  will  come  before  the  Ftoama  caaal  is  completed! " 

"  Ever  since  this  Nation  weot  into  the  Hawaiian  Is- 
lands the  Japanese  nation  servixl  notice  that  they  woi^ 
never  acquiesce.  Ever  since  1898  when  we  went  into 
the  Philippines,  and  Japan  asked  us  to  let  her  go  in  there 
with  us  and  we  refused;  ever  since  her  citizens  have 
come  to  this  country  in  great  numbers  and  our  people, 
following  the  natural  law  of  segregation  of  races,  ha^ 
not  given  them  the  treatment  that  they  thought  tht^ 
^Congresrioaal  Record,  Feb.  ait,  1911,  p.  agB^ 


4  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

ought  to  have,  they  have  been  preparing  for  war.  .  .  . 
I  repeat,  in  my  judgment,  war  is  inevitable  and  not  far 
off.  .  .  .  It  will  be  humiliating,  of  course,  for  us  to 
see  the  Philippine  Islands  occupied  practically  without 
a  struggle.  All  we  can  hope  to  do  there  will  be  to  hold 
out  at  Corregidor.  Hawaii,  Guam,  Samoa,  the  Aleutian 
Islands,  Alaska,  and  I  have  already  mentioned  Panama, 
San  Francisco  and  the  Puget  Sound  region  the  whole 
Pacific  Coast  will  be  occupied  without  serious  opposi- 
tion on  our  part." 

The  prospect  of  a  hostile  nation  "occupying"  a 
stretch  of  coast  line  (with  its  hinterland)  7000  miles 
long  and  5000  miles  from  her  home  base,  to  say  nothing 
of  the  Philippines  1000  miles  away  in  a  different  direc- 
tion, is  sufficiently  startling,  but  more  than  one  writer  has 
pointed  out  precisely  how  it  is  to  be  done.  One  of  the 
most  detailed  of  these  programs  is  that  of  Homer  Lea's 
extraordinary  book, "  The  Valour  of  Ignorance."  *  But 
military  men  also  have  discussed  the  invasion  of  Cali- 
fornia so  often  that  a  share  of  the  public  has  grown  to 
accept  it  as  an  inevitable  coming  event. 

1  Not  the  least  extraordinary  feature  of  Lea's  work  is  the  ap- 
parent .eriousness  with  which  it  has  been  considered.  WiUiam 
James,  Norman  Angcll,  and  others  have  discussed  his  theses  as  if 
they  r^resented  the  opinions  of  an  expert  militarist.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  "  General "  Lea  was  an  adventurer  who  never  had  any 
real  position  in  China  nor  any  real  military  training. 


THE  BACKGROUND  5 

On  October  18,  1912,  Gaieral  Leonard  Wood  is  re- 
ported to  have  stated  that  it  would  be  "  very  easy  for 
an  enemy  to  land  in  for(»  in  San  Francisco  unless  we 
had  a  west-coast  army  of  450,000  men."   (The  regular 
United  'States  army  today  is  between  8o.oo«j  and  85,000 
men,  and  En^d  had  but  250,000  men  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  European  war  of  1914.)   Of  course  such  an  in- 
vading army  could  not  be  other  than  Japanese.  Says 
another  aq>ert : » "  If  200,000  fighting  men  of  any  first- 
class  hostile  power  should  be  landed  on  our  Pacific 
Coast  tonight,  we  should  have  no  course  save  regret- 
fully to  hand  over  to  a  foreign  nation  the  rich  Empire 
west  of  the  Rockies,  with  its  cities,  its  harbors,  and  the 
wealth  of  its  valleys  and  mountains." 

Now  the  American  of  influence  is  a  hard-headed  man 
of  affairs,  endowed  with  a  sense  of  humor  and  not  given 
to  panic  He  has  taken  the  dire  prophecies  with  a 
grain  of  salt.  When  the  Panama  canal  was  finished 
without  a  Japanese  war,  he  recaUed  Mr.  Hobson  and 
smiled. 

For  many  years  we  have  grown  accustomed  to  proph- 
ecies of  wars,  particularly  of  the  certainty  of  war  in 
Europe.  We  have  treated  them  all  in  the  same  tolerant 
fashion.  We  are  an  optimistic  people  and  not  easily 
alarmed.  We  thought  that  Europe  hsd  too  much  to 
»Wheeter,  -  Are  We  Ready?"  New  York,  1915. 


JAFANBSB  EXPANSION 


TTtaj  cnie  the  ctadyan  of  August.  ,9,4,  «rf  ^ 

it  comTT*  has  its  Imritation. 

P  had  vociferously  predicted  4. 

E««ro|«n  conflict  and  realised  that  the  l^T^ 
"•od  coo.  into  his  own.        "«»     J*"?**  for  floce 

■c^uomic,  we  recall  once  more  the  foretellin«. 

the  nZZr   \  1      ^  *"  """"K  ™  ">a««  away 


the^'i^t!  ZT^'i- 1  »f 

»«  to  left  rts  nark.   Subconsciously  we  have 


THB  UCKGMXJMD  j 
*wri  «wiy  in  the  back  of  our  minds  tags  and  ends  of 
antHj^MMK  rtatements.  the  while  we  have  repudiated 
tt-CMdarioM  Used  upon  then,.  There  is  no  question 
M  «  nation  our  former  rather  sentimental 
fr^ship  toward  the  Sunrise  Kingdom  has  cooled. 
Not  taowmg  the  best,  we  suspect  the  worst,  and 
^^J^Jo«nd  for  a  national  sentiment  i.  dowly 

We  might  regain  some  peace  of  mind  if  we  wei« 
T  P""""-"  those 

tho*  wluch  hold  »ch  a  one  to  be  mettly  p,„b.bl. 
or  poMiUe. 

Tfce  write,  doe.  not  think  such  a  war  is  probable,  but 
tot  a  a  purel,  p.r«,«al  opinion,  worth  only  what  it  will 
tan*.  Thft'ofcawarispossiblecannotbequestioned. 
^O^tog  „  pcdue  in  international  politics.  AU 
^"hm  an  economic  basis,  but  most  of  a,em  have  a 

Hardly  a  more  striking  example 
o«M  be  fomrf  than  our  own  most  recent  conflict  with 

ten,^^.  "IX""  or  later  we  should  have  drifted 
into  war  m  1898  „  not  worth  discussing.  What  did 
plunge  n»  mto  war  predpitately  was  the  blowing  up 
of  the  Ua^.  And  the  wave  of  unreasoning  paLn 
that  swept  over  the  United  States  took  no  he^  of  c^° 
<=<™»t»nce»  nor  of  conseqaaces. 


8  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

Now  if  during  some  rwaal  controversy,  in  aiifomia, 
sncli  u  mi^  attend  the  passage  of  a  new  and  drastic 
alien  land  law,  after  Ae  press  of  both  countries  had  been 
filled  with  acrimonious  discussions,  a  Japanese  cruiser 
should  be  anchored  in  San  Francisco  harbor,  or  an 
American  manK)f-war  in  Yokohama  harbor,  and  either 
should  be  Mown  up.— no  matter  from  what  cause- 
war  would  not  only  be  possible  but  very  likely  inevitable. 
And  this,  in  sjttte  of  the  fact  that  the  explosion  might 
be  entirdy  accidental.   Such  an  accident,  or  some  other 
of  the  same  sort,  might  happen  at  any  time,  and  happen- 
ing by  chance  at  a  critical  time,  might  have  the  direst 
consequences.  Yet  change  the  scene  a  little.  Suppose 
that  such  a  thing  should  happen  to  either  a  Japanese 
or  an  American  warship  in  the  harbor  of  Buenos  Ayres. 
War  with  Argentine  on  account  of  it,  in  the  absence  of 
any  evidence  of  hostUity,  would  be  absurd.   And  why? 
Because  there  would  be  lacking  the  background  of  sus- 
piaon  and  irritatior.  which  gives  the  mob-mind  a  chance 
to  coalesce  and  overwhehn  the  rational  thought  and 
judgment  of  a  nation. 

Now  it  b  precisely  the  constant  reiteration  of  fears 
and  suspicions  of  a  foreign  nation,  of  speculations  as  to 
her  designs  upon  us  and  of  anxiety  as  to  the  future,  tiiat 
spins  the  tissue  of  such  a  background.  Nothing  is 
harder  to  confute  than  vague  accusations  and  aspersions 


THE  BACKGROUND  9 

of  motives.  Nothing  is  more  pefiiitcnt  than  a  false- 
hood that  is  welcomed  by  the  hearer.*  The  hmoccnt 
victim  of  a  libel  discovers  that  no  amount  of  damages 

will  compensate  him  or  entirely  wipe  out  the  memory 
of  the  falsehood  in  the  minds  of  his  feUows.  We  have 
found  it  necessary  to  provide  » libel  law  to  protect  die 
individual.  Let  us  hope  that  the  time  will  come  when 
libels  upon  nations  may  be  brought  to  some  sort  of  an 
international  bar  of  justice.   The  old  English  bw  appli- 
cable to  sovereigns  stated,  "  The  greater  the  truth,  the 
greater  the  libel."  Whatever  opinion  we  may  have  of 
that  with  regard  to  individuals,  it  is  worthy  of  con- 
sideration in  the  present  case.   Suppose  that  we  have 
grievances  and  that  Japan  has  also.  Nations  are  no 
more  perfect  than  the  people  that  compose  them.  Let 
us  not  talk  about  them  too  much.   We  have  our  ap- 
pointed official  representatives  ttpon  whose  shoulders 
rests  the  responsibility. 

»A  shining  example  is.  the  oft-repeated  statement  that  the 
Japanese  are  so  dishonest  that  they  cannot  trust  one  another  to 
handle  bank  funds,  but  are  forced  to  enip%  the  more  trastwortfay 
Chinese.  As  a  matter  of  fact  Chinese  are  employed  to  a  very 
limited  extent  m  Japanese  banks  and  then,  not  because  of  their 
superior  honesty,  but  because  they  are  skiUed,  through  long  ex- 
perience, m  detecting  the  multitude  of  counterleit  coins  that  drca-  ~ 
late  through  the  Orient 

Japan  to  be  mployed  m  banks  are  not  the  employees  of  Jaoanese 
at  all.  but  are  the  employees  of  Chinese  and  other  foJ^J 


10  JAPANESE  EZPAN8I0K 

I  would  not  favor  a  muzzled  press  nor  a  blind  com- 
l^oency  and  an  indifference  to  what  goes  on  in  the 
world,  nor  should  I  care  to  see  our  national  interests 
flouted  nor  our  national  pride  humiliated.  But  at  least, 
let  us  save  our  excitement  for  what  does  happen,  not 
what  we  fear  might  happen.  And  let  us  allow  the  dust 
cloud  of  suspicion  to  settle  instead  of  constantly  stirring 
it  up. 

Wise  old  Francis  Bacon  said,  long  ago,*  "  There  is 
nothing  that  makes  a  man  suspect  much  more  than  to 
know  little;  and  therefore  men  should  remedy  suspi- 
ci<»i  by  procuring  to  know  more  and  not  to  keep  their 
suspicions  in  smother." 

Americans  are  little  given  to  keeping  "  their  suspicions 
in  smother,"  but  the  remedy  of  "procuring  to  know 
more  "  is  open  to  all.  And  nothing  is  more  apt  to  dissi- 
pate the  cloud  of  war  or  render  conflict  unlikely.  Na- 
tions that  know  one  another  well  are  much  less  likely 
to  get  to  fighting  than  if  the  reverse  is  true.  And  the 
cost  of  a  battleship  would  pay  for  much  national 
education. 

lEmya,  XXXI,  "On  Suipicioa" 


CHAPTER  U 


7AFAN  GK  PIOlATlOir 

The  earliest  inhabitants  of  Japan,  according  to  the 
archaeologists,  were  a  race  of  pygmies  perhaps  related 
to  the  Philippine  Nigritos,  who  lived  in  caves  or  pits 
in  the  ground  and  are  known  in  Japanese  (or  rather 
Ainu),  as  Koropokguru.  These  were  succeeded  by  a 
fierce  and  warlike,  very  hciry  race,  known  nowadays  as 
Ainu,  who  occupied  the  main  island  until  after  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Christian  era.  The  Ainu  never  got  b^ond 
the  ttone  age  nor  achieved  a  written  language. 

About  the  fifth  century  b.c.  there  came  an  entirely 
aUen  race,  or  rather  two  of  them,  in  two  migrations. 
One  of  these  migrations  was  by  way  of  the  northwest 
and  the  immigrants  were  Mongolian  or  Turanian.  The 
other  was  by  way  of  the  south,  origmating  doubtless 
from  India  and  hence  of  Aryan  origin,  although  without 
question  mixed  with  Malay  and  other  elements  on  the 
way.  These  two  streams,  almost  as  unlike  in  racial 
characteristics  and  physiognomy  as  Italians  and  North 
Germans  are  unlike,  have  nevertheless  mingled  together 
in  harmony,  and  constitute  the  Japanese  people  we  know 

» 


12 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


today.   On  the  other  hand,  inherent  radal  prejudice 
has  prevented  intermarriage,  and  the  different  types  are 
today  very  obvious  to  the  casual  observer.   The  Mon- 
golian element  outnumbers  the  other,  twenty  to  one, 
and  omstitute  the  heimin  or  common  people.  The 
southern  element  is  the  ruling  caste  and  has  been  for 
centuries.  Its  members  are  known  as  shizoku  ( samurai) 
or  gentry.  The  officials  of  modem  Japan,  the  politi- 
cians, the  officers  of  the  army  and  navy,  the  educated 
classes  generally,  who  represent  Japan  to  the  world  and 
absolutely  control  her  internal  and  foreign  affairs, — 
these  are  mostly  all  shisoku.   The  farmers,  laborers, 
coolies,  and  incidentally  the  bulk  of  Japanese  emigrants 
to  other  Countries,  are  heimin.   The  gulf  between  these 
dass^,  although  perhaps  not  recognized  officially,  is 
certainly  recognized  socially,  and  the  distinction  between 
the  two  is  never  lost  in  the  Japanese  mind.   For  Ameri- 
cans to  fail  to  make  this  same  distinction  (and  most 
of  them  do  so  fail)  inevitably  creates  confusion  of  mind 
and  judgment.   The  resident  of  Boston,  whose  acquaint- 
ance with  the  Japanese  is  confined  to  students  and 
officials,  quite  misapprehends  the  point  of  view  of  the 
Califomian,  whose  acquaintance  with  them  is  confined 
in  the  main  to  members  of  the  heimin  class.  Each 
thinks  the  attitude  of  the  other  is  perverse.   In  Japan 
the  very  language  takes  account  of  the  difference.  For 


JAPAN  ON  PROBATION  13 

an  ordinary  laborer  to  address  a  gentleman  with  the  same 
personal  pronouns  and  verbal  conjugations  that  the 
latter  does  him  would  be  the  height  of  calculated  insult 
This  caste  distinction  is  largely  a  relic  of  feudalism,  and 
there  are  many  such  relics  persisting  in  the  modem 
Japanese  social  system.  It  is  gradually  breaking  down 
today  with  the  rise  of  the  commercial  middle  class,  but 
nevertheless  it  is  still  a  powerful  factor  in  Japanese 
life. 

The  incoming  Japanese  found  the  Ainu  occupying 
the  land  and  disputing  their  advance.  The  presence  of 
a  common  foe  welded  the  invaders  together  into  a  na- 
tion. The  Ainu  were  gradually  driven  north,  until 
today  only  a  few  hundred  of  them  remain  in  the  north- 
ernmost island  of  Hokkaido. 

Chinese  missionaries  introduced  the  Chinese  written 
language,  art,  and  culture  about  the  sixth  century,  and 
the  Island  Kingdom  flourished  under  the  rule  of  the 
Mikados.  Japan  at  this  time  was  an  absolute  mon- 
archy. Early  in  Japanese  history  the  absolutism  of  the 
Emperor  began  to  crumble  and  various  powerful  fami- 
lies occupied  the  role  of  "king-maker."  Toward  the 
close  of  the  twelfth  century  a  feudal  system  similar  to 
that  of  Europe  appeared.  The  actual  rule  was  then 
usurped  by  subordinates  who  with  the  title  of  Sh^un 
held  sway  until  1868.  The  real  Emperor  was  never 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


actually  done  away  with,  but  was  kept  a  helpless  prisoner 
in  Kyoto  while  the  Shoguns  ruled  in  Yedo  (the  modem 
Tokyo). 

During  the  eight  centuries  of  feudalism  Japan  was 
divided  up  into  fiefs,  each  ruled  by  a  clan  chief  called 
the  daimyo  (literally,  "great  name").  The  daimyo 
owed  allegiance  to  the  Shogun  alone.  Within  their 
own  borders  they  were  supreme,  like  the  Barons  of 
Europe,  and  their  knijhts  were  subject  to  them.  The 
heimin  did  the  work  and  supported  the  military  caste. 
Some  of  these  families  of  daimyo  were  obscure,  others 
were  almost  as  great  and  powerful  as  the  Shogun  him- 
self. This  clan  spirit,  persisting  today,  has  been  an 
important  factor  in  modem  Japanese  politics.  Two  of 
these  clans  attained  great  power  toward  the  end  of  the 
feudal  era.  One,  the  clan  of  Satsuma,  had  its  seat  at 
the  southernmost  end  of  the  country;  the  other,  the 
Choshu,  had  its  seat  near  the  western  entrance  to  the 
"  Inland  Sea."  The  combination  of  the  two,  called  in 
Japan  the  "  Sat-Qio "  group,  has  largely  controlled 
governmental  affairs.  The  army  today  is  officered 
chiefly  by  Choshu  men,  the  navy  by  Satsuma  men. 

It  is  important  to  remember  how  very  recent  the 
feudal  system  is  in  Japanese  history.  Japan  has  today 
a' constitutional  govemmeiit  wi^h  a  parliament,  but  this 
doesnot  necessarily  imply  the  b«me  things  that  are  true 


JAPAN  ON  PROBAHON  15 

of  England  «>d  be,  govanmat,  aiy  aore  than  the 
fartthat  Venemel.  i.  .  .,p„biic  ^  ^j^j, 
Wween  her  govemment  and  that  o{  the  United  States. 
Eight  eentories  oi  fetrialism  cannot  be  wiped  out  of 
«™fence  in  a  generation,  no  matter  what  verbal  changes 
may  be  inaugurated. 

Intercourse  with  the  Occident 
In  IS42  the  Portuguese  discovered  Japan,  and  Mven 
years  later  the  famous  misaionaiy  St  Francis  Xavier 
armed.  His  proselyting  was  very  auccessfnl  Bofli 
nobles  and  common  people  accqited  die  Faith  by  the 
thousands,  and  the  land  was  in  a  fair  wayto  b«™>e  . 
Onsuanon^        A*  "iwionaries  were  overzeataa 
and  attempted  to  combine  tonporal  with  qrfritual  power 
In  consequence,  the  Japanese,  fearing  for  thdr  natiomd 
existence  turned  on  the  foreigner  and  their  religion, 
forbade  the  practice  of  the  Christian  faith,  expelW 
—anes.  and  closed  up  the  cou«,yrf«d^,.  i„ 
domg  30  |hey  had  the  active  assistance  of  the  D«ch. 
This  was  m  .624.  For  over  two  hundred  ye^,  Japan 
mamtamed  her  seclusion.   Only  the  Drtch  aliowrf 
to  have  a  trading  post  at  Nagasaki,  who,  were 
c<»npelled  to  pay  am,ual  tribute  to  the  Shfigun  airf  wer. 
subject  to  very  humiliating  restrictions. 
But  the  later  generationa  of  Shagnns  did  not  have 


i6 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


the  strength  of  the  earlier  ones.  Their  authority  crum- 
bled. Japanese  historians  began  to  investigate  the 
history  of  their  country  and  to  call  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  Emperor,  the  Son  of  Heaven,  was  the  real  ruler, 
whereas  the  Shoguns  were  usurpers.  There  grew  up 
also  a  restless  element  in  the  large  cities  that  was  ripe 
for  revolt. 

Accordingly,  when  Commodore  Perry  of  the  United 
States  navy  appeared  in  Tokyo  bay  in  July,  1853,  with 
his  little  fleet  of  four  warships,  his  coming  was  the  last 
push  that  sent  the  tottering  structure  of  the  Shogunate 
to  the  ground.  The  watchword  now  became,  "  Restore 
the  Emperor  to  his  full  power."  The  Shogun  and  his 
staff  were  between  two  fires.  The  Americans  were  fol- 
lowed by  the  English,  Russians,  and  French,  and  insur- 
rection in  the  name  of  the  true  Emperor  broke  out 
against  the  Shogun's  party,  that  had  opened  the  gate 
to  the  hated  foreigner.  In  1866  the  reigning  Shogun 
died.  The  next  year  the  old  Emperor  died,  and  in  1868 
the  young  Emperor  came  to  the  throne  which  he  was  to 
occupy  until  1912. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  think  that  Perry,  as  it  were,  "  hap- 
pened upon  "  Japan  at  a  fortunate  time  to  negotiate. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  Americans,  officially  and  unofficially, 
had  made  previously  several  futile  attempts  to  enter 
into  relations  with  the  proud  and  warlike  Japanese. 


JAPAN  ON  PROBATION  17 
R'ussii,  Englana,  and  France  Had  also  made  fruitless 
efforts.  In  1797  an  American  vessel  had  visited  Naga- 
saki, chartered  by  the  Dutch,  who  were  the  only  people 
the  Japanese  would  permit  to  trade.  When,  a  Httle 
later,  the  captain  of  the  same  ship  tried  to  trade  on  his 
own  account,  he  was  sent  away. 

In  1837  an  daborate  expedition  was  fitted  out  with 
the  avowed  purpose  of  returning  to  Japan  a  number  of 
shipwrecked  Japanese  who  had  been  picked  up  adrift 
on  the  open  sea.  This  boat  was  fired  upon  and  driven 
away  both  from  Tokyo  and  KagosWma,  the  seat  of  the 
Satsuma  dan.  History  does  not  record  that  the  ship- 
wrecked Japanese  ever  saw  their  native  land  again. 

In  1845  another  attempt  was  made  to  return  to  Japan 
some  Japanese  castaways,  twenty-two  in  all  This  time 
the  Japanese  were  aUowed  to  land,  but  not  the  Ameri- 
cans  The  next  year  an  official  expedition  was  dis- 
patdied  under  Commodore  Biddle.  This  embassy  was 
contemptuously  received  and  was  entirdy  misuccessful. 

These  attempts  had  been  made  in  the  interest  of 
furthering  American  trade,  a  v«y  Intimate  one,  of 
course.  But  it  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  State 
Department  soon  after,  that  another  reason  existed  for 

t'T^T °' ""^"'^^^  J«I«n.  rhe 
North  Pacific  at  this  time  was  full  of  American  whalera 

who  not  infrequentiy  suffered  shipwredc.   When  tiiese 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

shipwrecked  sailors  were  cast  up  on  the  inhospitable 
shores  of  Japan,  their  plight  was  a  pitiable  one.  They 
were  imprisoned  and  treated  with  great  cruelty,  even 
sutjected  to  torture.  Some  of  these  sailors  were  rescued 
in  1849  by  an  American  ship  of  war  dispatched  for  the 
purpose. 

Perry's  expedition  was  the  culmination  of  these 
various  attempts.  Every  effort  was  made  to  give  it  a 
dignified  and  official  character.  A  personal  letter  of 
President  Fillmore  to  the  Japanese  Emperor »  was  in- 
closed in  a  magnificent  case.  All  sorts  of  valuable 
presents  were  carried,  including  a  miniature  railway 
with  engine  and  cars,  telegraph  instruments,  champagne, 
and  "  many  barrels  of  whisky." 

Perry's  squadron,  the  first  steam  vessels  ever  seen  by 
the  Japanese,  went  up  Tokyo  bay  against  a  head  wind, 
with  black  smoke  belching  from  the  funnels,  and  carried 
consternation  and  dismay  to  the  people  on  land,  although 
the  panic  was  somewhat  allayed  when  the  threatened 
invasion  did  not  occur. 

The  Japanese  tried  the  same  tactics  they  had  adopted 
on  previous  occasions,  but  Perry  insisted  upon  treating 
with  no  one  but  a  high  official,  and  while  showing  every 
consideration  and  a  consummate  tact,  yet  demanded 

*  In  reality,  the  Shogun ;  the  Americans  did  not  appreciate  the 
true  utuaUon  with  regard  to  t^-e  Japanese  aovereign. 


19 


JAPAN  ON  PROBATION 
the  resp«t  und  dignity  due  to  the  personal  ambassador 
of  one  of  the  great  nations  of  the  earth.   The  Japanese 
made  a  virtue  of  necessity  and  finally  consented  to  re- 
ceive the  President's  letter,  contrary  to  their  own  laws 
as  they  said.   They,  however,  professed  themselves' 
quite  unwiUmg  to  grant  the  American's  request  to  con- 
clude a  treaty.   Wisely  refraining  from  pressing  the 
matter  too  far  or  provoking  hostilities  which  would  have 
defeated  the  purpose  of  the  mission.  Commodore  Perry 
departed,  with  the  reminder  that  he  would  return  with 
a  larger  squadron  in  the  spring  for  his  definite  answer. 

The  Americans  "fdt  highly  gratified  at  what  had 
been  accomplished.  They  had  received  different  treat- 
ment from  any  foreigners  who  had  visited  Japan  for 
two  centuries.  They  had  commanded  respect  and 
secured  intercourse  upon  the  basis  of  equality.  They 
he  d  direct  communication  witi,  the  highest  imperial 
authorities  without  tiie  intervention  of  the  Dutch  at 
Nagasaki.^   They  disregarded  or  caused  to  be  with- 

We  ma,  wdl  bdi.„  tbu  TS^'^^^  ''^ 


«>  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

drawn  local  regulations  which  were  derogatory  to  the 
dignity  of  their  nation.    On  the  other  hand,  while  ex- 
hibiting firmness  as  to  their  rights,  they  showed  the 
utmost  regard  for  the  sovereignty  and  rights  of  the 
Japanese.   The  crews  of  the  vessels  were  not  pe  nnitted 
to  go  on  shore.    No  native  was  insulted  or  maltreated; 
no  woman  was  outraged;  no  property  was  taken;  no 
police  regulation  was  violated  —  practices  quite  com- 
mon on  the  part  of  the  crews  of  other  foreign  ships."  » 
It  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  this  attitude  of  the 
Japanese  toward  foreigners.   A  proud,  self-satisfied 
people,  with  an  extraordinarily  complex  and  subtle  code 
of  etiquette,  which  was  of  course  a  sealed  book  to  the 
Westerner,  could  not  help  but  look  upon  the  outsider  as 

the  sune  visit  the  Emperor  condescended,  for  the  edification  of 
his  ladies,  and  Kaempfer  relates  that  "he  ordered  us  to  take  off 
our  Cappa  or  Qoak,  being  our  Garment  of  Ceremony,  thea  to 
stand  upright  that  he  might  have  a  full  view  of  us;  again  to  walk, 
to  stand  still,  to  compliment  each  other,  to  dance,  to  jump,  to  play 
the  drunkard,  to  speak  broken  Japanese,  to  read  Dutch,  to  paint, 
to  sing,  to  put  our  cloaks  on  and  off.  Meanwhile  we  obeyed  the 
Emperor  s  commands  in  the  best  manner  we  could,  I  join'd  to  my 
dance  a  love  song  in  High  Germaa  In  this  manner  and  with  in- 
numo^ble  such  other  apish  tricks  we  must  suffer  ourselves  to 
contnbute  to  the  Emperor's  and  the  Court's  diversion."  One  is 
reminded  of  thelgorrotes  in  the  Filipino  village  at  the  St  Louis 
Worlds  Fair.  The  Japanese  idea  of  this  may  be  gatherea  from  a 
remark  made  to  Kaempfer  by  the  Governor  of  "Osacca"  to  the 
effect  that  "it  was  a  singular  favour  to  be  admitted  mto  the 
anperor's  presence,  that  of  all  nations  in  the  world  ujly  the 
Dutch  were  allowed  this  honor." 
» Foster,  "American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient,"  Boston,  1903. 


JAPAN  ON  PROMTION  ai 
a  hopeless  barfanriao,  ignorant  of  everything  that  in  the 
Japanese  mind  distinguished  a  cultured  man  from  an 
i^orant  boor.  It  camiot  be  gainsaid  that  the  actions 
of  sailors,  traders,  and  others  with  whom  they  had  pre- 
viously  come  in  contact  had  gone  far  to  confirm  this 
impression.   The  dignity  and  restraint  of  Perry  was  in 
sharp  contrast  to  the  demeanor  of  some  of  the  foreigners 
that  had  come  to  Japan,  and  this,  together  with  the 
suggestiwi  of  hidden  powers  revealed  by  his  steamboats, 
impressed  the  Japanese  dignitaries  favorably  in  spite 
of  their  fears.   The  Dutch  they  frankly  despised.  That 
they  granted  a  measure  of  «  equality  "  to  the  Americans 
a  great  concession,  however  absurd  it  may  have 
ovwiiied  to  the  hitter. 

In  Februaiy.  ,854,  tr«t  to  his  promise,  Commodore 
Perry  returned  with  a  s,«ad,»n  of  ten  warships  and 
earned  through  the  somewhat  delicate  negotiations  in- 
volved m  making  fte  treaty.  Free  trade  in  open  ports 
was  not  obtained  at  once,  but  many  concessions  were 
gained;  the  best  of  feeling  seemed  to  prevafl  between 
the  Japanese  and  American  officials,  and  PenVj  m:- 
cessful  conclusion  of  his  difficult  mission  was  acclaimed 
at  home  and  abroad. 

At  once  the  United  States  to<*  advantage  of  its 
newly  gamed  tmty  rights  to  send  a  consul  to  Japan. 
The  man  chosen  was  Townsend  Harris.  The  name  of 


22 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


Harris  deserves  as  enduring  a  pUce  in  national  memory 
as  that  of  Perry.   Unsupported  by  a  powerful  fleet, 
living  for  over  a  year  in  fact  without  communication 
with  his  home  country,  apparently  forgotten  in  Wash- 
ington ( for  Webster  who  had  planned  the  Perry  expedi- 
tion was  dead),  in  the  midst  of  a  semi-anarchy  attendant 
upon  the  dissolution  of  the  Shogunate  and  the  restora- 
tion of  the  Emperor,  Harris  nevertheless  maintained 
a  steadfastness  of  purpose,  and  displayed  a  tact  and 
ability  that  deserve  the  highest  praise.   Every  sort  of 
obstruction  was  placed  in  his  way  by  the  Japanese,  but 
in  the  end  he  won  his  way  through  to  the  conclusion  of 
a  treaty,  so  skiUfuUy  drawn  that  it  served  as  the  model 
for  aU  subsequent  treaties  entered  into  by  Japan  with 
other  foreign  nations.   Indeed  it  served  as  the  basis  of 
Japan's  foreign  relations  until  1899.   Harris  refused  to 
crawl  upon  his  hands  and  knees  before  the  Shogun,  and 
that  monarch  respected  his  prejudices  in  the  matter. 

While  the  name  of  Townsend  Harris,  almost  unknown 
in  America  today,  is  highly  respected  by  the  Japanese, 
that  of  Perry  is  nearly  as  well  known  in  Japan  as  that  of 
any  of  their  national  heroes.  In  1901  a  monument  was 
dedicated  to  the  memory  of  Perry  on  the  spot  where  he 
had  landed,  and  this  was  made  the  occasion  of  striking 
and  impressive  ceremonies  in  which  representatives 
both  of  the  governments  of  Japan  and  the  United  States 


JMAS  ON  HOBAtm  13 

mw  ^hd,  jhe  empire  took  its  fir,,       „„  reor- 
u  .  modern  nation.   There  exist,  also  in 
*^^P««e  mind  .  subtler  reason  for  venerating  tl,e 
"•"■onr  o*  the  American  commodore.   Perrv  fLeH 

to«  Um  to  «ta.,  u,e  hated  foreigners.   To  so  admit 
coi-Kfcred  by  the  daimyo  a  betrayal  of  U,e 
r^'f,  to«  there  rallied  about  the  true  Emperor 
of  oppo^„o„ shogun  which  ca«se"the 
rV^^^  "tter  and  the  restoration  of  the  Mi- 
^  R«P«  for  their  Emperor  amounts  ahnost  to 
^m^with  the  Japanese.   Since,  therefore,  P^', 
ZrT^  Urgdy  to  the  ..storation  of  iheZ 
P^.  t«e  have  «  additional  reason  to  venerate 

^^^-reo^r^c^i;,— 

It  was  i^table  that  in  the  disturbed  political  con 

t^ZTT"    *^  clashesluld  Z 

taween  the  fbretgner,  ^  f^^^. 

iZ'Z^  Some  of  the  clans  refused  t  bide 
by  ««  deacon  to  admit  th.  foreigners,  and  numerou 


^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

note  ind  inti-foreign  demonstrations  occurred.  The 
Secretary  of  the  American  Consulate  was  murdered  and 
•n  Englishman  named  Richardson  was  cut  a  wn  while 
attempting  to  break  through  the  ceremonial  procession 
of  the  Daimyo  of  Satsuma.   The  English  government 
took  cognixance  of  this  and  demanded  an  indemnity 
of  the  Shagunate,  which  was  paid,  and  another  of  the 
Prince  of  Satsuma,  which  was  refused,  whereupon 
K««odiima.  the  capital  of  the  province,  was  bombarded  ^ 
and  bamt   A  litUe  later  the  American  legation  was 
burned  by  a  mob,  and  all  the  foreign  representatives 
were  forced  to  leave  Tokyo  and  take  refuge  in  Yoko- 
hama under  the  guns  of  their  warships. 

The  cuhnination  of  these  disturbances  was  what  is 
known  as  the  "  Shimonoseki  affair."   The  straits  of 
Shimonoseki  communicate  between  the  Inland  Sea  and 
the  western  waters  between  Japan  and  Korea.   It  was 
bordered  by  the  Umds  of  the  Prince  of  Oioshu,  a  very 
powerful  and  anti-foreign  daimyo  who  refused  to  ac- 
knowledge the  sovereignty  of  the  Shogun  in  concluding 
treaties  with  the  foreigners.   He  clo5«d  the  straits  and 
fired  upon  passing  vessels,  American,  Frtrch,  Dutch, 
and  English.   Representations  were  made  to  the  Sho-' 
gun,  but  the  latter  confessed  himself  helpless  to  control 
the  actions  of  the  lord  of  Choshu.    So  a  combined  fleet 
of  the  four  nations  involved,  consisting  of  seventeen 


JAPAN  ON  PROBATION  15 

warships,  descended  jpon  Shimonoseki  and  demon- 
strated  to  the  Prince,  with  gunpowder,  the  futihty  of 
attempting  independently  to  rule  his  own  domain.  As 
our  Civil  War  was  in  progress  at  the  time  there  was  no 
American  fleet  in  Japanese  waters,  and  the  Federal 
Government  chartered  a  vessel  from  the  Dutch  in  order 
to  participate  in  the  chastisement  of  the  bumptious 
<Wniyd.   After  the  affray  the  four  nations  demanded 
an  indemnity  of  the  Shogun's  government  in  the  amount 
of  $3,000,000,  an  enormous  sum  for  the  impoverished 
treasury  to  pay.   The  booty  was  divided  into  four  parts 
one  fourth  to  each  nation,  although  the  United  States' 
had  but  one  gunboat  in  the  fleet.   This  $750,000  rested 
rather  heavily  on  Uncle  Sam's  conscience,  and  twenty 
years  later,  by  act  of  Congress,  it  was  returned,  with 
mterest.  to  Japan,  where  it  was  gratefully  accepted 
and  used  in  improving  Yokohama  harbor.   This  ex- 
ample  of  altruistic  endeavor  has  never  been  followed 
by  Ae  other  nations  invol  ed,  although  England  later 
used  her  siiare  in  a  very  questionable  exchange. 

A  great  deal  of  interest  attaches  to  the  Shimonoseki 
^a,r  m  the  light  of  recent  events.  The  control  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  over  the  actions  of  the 
governor  and  legislature  of  California  is  as  defective  as 
was  Aat  of  the  ShSgun  over  the  Prince  of  Choshu. 
and  ,f  at  the  passage  of  the  Webb  Act  (debarring  Jap- 


a6  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

anese  from  owning  land  in  California)  the  American 
government  had  been  poor  and  helpless,  and  the  Jap- 
anese, with  a  powerful  fleet  in  the  Potomac  River,  had 
chosen  to  press  their  grievances,  the  exaction  of  an 
indemnity  of  Washington  would  have  been  on  all  fours 
with  the  Shimonoseki  levy.* 

It  is  to  the  credit  of  our  public  officials,  and  a  matter 
of  much  satisfaction  to  American  citizens,  that  our 
dealings  with  foreign  countries,  particularly  in  the 
Orient,  have  been  characterized  in  the  main  by  a  generous 
feeling  and  a  sense  of  equity  rather  rare  in  international 
relations.  It  is  true  that  in  some  matters  nearer  home, 
such  as  those  of  Texas  and  California,  our  motives 
have  been  somewhat  Jesuitical,  yet  as  a  rule  we  have 
scorned  to  be  sordid. 

In  1856  the  United  States  came  into  armed  conflict 
with  China  or  rather  with  a  Chinese  province.  Colli- 
sions of  various  sorts  finally  led  to  a  joint  expeditionary 
force  which  attacked  Tientsin.  Americans  were  ii - 
volved  along  with  French,  Russians,  and  English.  Va- 
rious losses  to  the  property  of  American  missionaries 
and  merchants  were  met  by  the  payment  of  an  indem- 

1  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  the  well-known  New  Orleans  lynchings 
the  national  government  paid  an  indemnity  to  the  families  of  the 
Italians  killed,  while  at  the  same  time  confessing  to  the  Italian 
Kovernment  its  inability  to  put  any  pressure  upon  the  Louisiana 
authorities  to  punish  the  ringleaders  of  the  mob. 


JAPAN  DN  PROBATION 


27 


nity  to  us  by  China  of  $735,000.  In  1885,  however,  we 
returned  to  China  the  unexpended  balance  of  $453,400. 
The  only  other  time  that  we  came  into  collision  with  an 
Oriental  power  was  in  1900,  at  the  time  of  the  Boxer 
outbreak  Ai  the  conclusion  of  this  brief  campaign  a 
crushing  in  Jemnity  v  as  levied.  Again  in  a  few  years 
the  Ame  c^p  share  of  this  booty,  over  and  above  what 
satisfied  the  actual  damages,  was  returned  to  China. 

Altogether,  during  the  past  century,  our  country  has 
come  into  armed  conflict  with  the  Orient  three  times. 
None  of  the  campaigns  was  of  sufficient  importance 
to  be  called  a  war.  In  each  of  them,  however,  indemnity 
was  exacted, —  in  two  of  the  cases  only  because  the 
foreign  powers  were  associated  together  in  joint  action. 
In  every  case  the  money  was  returned,  except  for  the 
proportion  that  went  to  satisfy  just  claims. 

This  sort  of  action  may  be  styled  "  playing  to  the 
gallery."  The  justice  of  such  a  charge  depends  upon 
the  sincerity  of  the  motive.  I  think  it  cannot  be  ques- 
tioned that  the  American  people  are  overwhelmingly 
opposed  to  keeping  money  that  does  not  belong  to  them. 
Oriental  peoples  have  a  very  keen  sen?.^  of  justice,  and 
it  must  be  confessed  that  this  trait  has  not  been  in  the 
past  a  conspicucus  characteristic  of  the  way  of  an  Occi- 
dental with  an  Oriental.  This  is  particularly  true  of 
China. 


a8  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

But  in  the  case  of  Japan  another  and  very  human 
element  enters  into  the  impression  made  upon  public 
opinion  by  acts  such  as  have  just  been  described.  When 
the  Japanese  knight  or  samurai  was  in  his  glory,  an  im- 
passable gulf  separated  him  from  the  tradesman.  Tven 
the  artisan  and  the  farmer  were  ranked  higher.  The 
tradesmen  occupied  the  lowest  rung  of  the  social  ladder. 
This  accounted  for  a  good  deal  of  the  contempt  which 
was  shown  the  Dutch  at  Nagasaki  during  the  long  years 
of  seclusion.  The  latter  were  there  for  such  money 
as  they  could  make,  and  cared  not  for  social  indignities 
so  long  as  they  could  take  their  profit.  All  foreigners 
were  classed  together  in  this  regard  by  the  Japanese, 
and  accordingly  it  was  held  beneath  the  dignity  of  a 
noble  to  have  intercourse  with  them.  Perry's  attitude 
and  his  dignified  bearing  in  the  negotiations  of  1853 
were  a  surprise  >.o  the  Japanese  and  caused  them  to 
modify  their  original  estimate  of  foreigners  and  perhaps 
to  think  of  Americans  as  somewhat  in  a  class  by  them- 
selves. 

The  feudal  contempt  for  trade  has  passed  away  with 
the  growth  of  commerce  and  industrialism  and  with  the 
entrance  of  men  of  high  lineage  into  the  field  of  business. 
But  the  old  ideas  still  persist  in  part,  particularly  among 
the  gentry.  It  is  not  "  good  form  "  in  Japan  today  to 
pass  money  from  one  to  another  except  when  wrapped 


JAPAN  ON  PROBATION  ^ 

in  white  paper  (shopkeepers,  of  course,  excepted). 
E-  en  your  tip  to  the  landlord  of  the  inn  must  be  wrapped 
up  and  given  with  a  disparaging  remark.  A  Japanese 
gentleman  would  think  it  beneath  his  dignity  to  count 
his  change.  The  writer  once  stirred  up  a  hornet's 
nest  about  himself  by  innocently  checking  over  a  laundry 
list  submitted  to  him  by  a  houseman,  who  turned  out 
to  be  a  samurai  in  very  reduced  circumstances.  Even 
in  America  the  Far  Westerner  who  doesn't  bother  to 
wait  for  his  change  has  a  certain  contempt  for  the  resi- 
dent of  the  Atlantic  seaboard  who  counts  his  pennies. 

Now  the  open-handed  disregard  for  money  for  its  own 
sake,  implied  in  the  remission  of  indemnities  originally 
levied  by  joint  action  of  the  "  Powers,"  produced  in 
the  Japanese  mind  a  more  favorable  reaction  than  it 
would  in  any  other  country,  on  account  of  the  national 
attitude  described  above,  and  has  done  much  to  aid  the 
development  of  a  real  friendship  between  Japan  and 
America. 

In  1879  the  Japanese  people  had  an  opportunity  to 
demonstrate  their  enthusiastic  friendship  for  us.  In 
that  year,  ex-President  Grant  made  a  tour  of  the  world. 
His  travels  in  Japan  were  in  the  nature  of  a  triumph. 
No  foreigner,  hardly  any  national  hero  before  or  since, 
has  had  such  a  spontaneous  demonstration  of  popular  en- 
thusiasm.  Books  describing  Grant's  visit  are  still  sold 


30 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


in  the  bookstalls  in  Japanese  cities.  Grant  was  accorded 
royal  honors  and  acted  with  great  tact  throughout  the 
trip.*  He  was  asked  to  arbitrate  between  China  and 
Japan  with  regard  to  a  controversy  ronceming  the  Riu- 
Kiu  Islands  and  carried  out  the  delicate  commission 
with  success. 

The  United  States  had  yet  one  other  opportunity 
of  demonstrating  its  friendship  for  the  Island  Kingdom 
when  the  time  came  to  revise  the  treaties  that  were 
drafted  at  the  beginning  of  foreign  intercourse.  The 
original  treaties  drafted,  one  might  say  dictated,  by  the 
Western  Powers,  followed  the  precedent  that  had  been 
adopted  in  establishing  relations  with  semi-civilized 
states  in  the  past.  At  the  time  of  the  Restoration,  tor- 
ture was  an  important  feature  of  Japanese  judicial  pro- 
ceuure,  just  as  it  had  been  in  Europe  not  many  centuries 
before.  Under  such  circumstances  it  was  inconceiv- 
able that  Western  nations  should  leave  their  own  na- 
tionals to  the  tender  mercies  of  Japanese  judges,  and 
accordingly  a  dause  providing  for  extraterritoriality 
was  inserted  in  all  the  treaties.  This  prevails  today  in 
a  modified  form  hi  China  and  was  but  very  recently 
abrogated  in  Turkey.   Under  the  working  of  the 

1  Instance  his  refusal  to  cross  the  sacred  bridg:e  at  Nikkd,  a 
privilege  reserved  to  the  Emperor  and  offered  to  a  foreigiicr  for 
the  first  time  in  history  when  Grant  was  invited  to  cross. 


JAPAN  ON  PROBATION 


31 


"  extraterritoria'ity  "  provision,  the  control  of  all  for- 
eigners resident  in  Japan  was  in  the  hands  of  the  foreign 
consuls,  who,  as  judges,  tried  all  cases  involving  foreign- 
ers, from  petty  larceny  to  murder.  American  consuls, 
being  political  appointees,  in  many  cases  had  not  a  ves- 
tige of  legal  training  or  judicial  experience.  Of  course 
the  Japanese  could  not  permit  foreigners  over  whom 
they  had  no  control  to  wander  at  will  through  the  coun- 
try, and  the  right  of  residence  was  therefore  restricted 
to  the  foreign  "  concessions  "  of  the  treaty  ports.  When 
foreigners  traveled  or  resided  outside  these  concessions, 
they  had  to  be  provided  with  police  passports.  This 
situation,  which  was  inevitable  in  the  early  days  of 
intercourse,  soon  became  galling  to  the  proud  Japanese, 
anxious  to  assume  a  place  in  the  family  of  nations. 

Another  clause  of  these  early  treaties  was  even  more 
a  source  of  irritation.  The  Japanese  who  signed  them 
were  wholly  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  modem  inter- 
national relations  and  placed  their  interests  unreservedly 
in  the  hands  of  the  one  they  most  trusted,  the  Ameri- 
can ctmsul-general,  Townsend  Harris.  The  latter  drew 
up  a  tarif!  in  the  best  interests  of  the  Japanese,  with 
foodstuffs  and  raw  materials  on  the  free  list  and  liquors 
at  35  per  cent  ad  veiorem.  Lord  Elgin,  at  that  time 
in  charge  of  British  interests,  negotiated  a  tariff  treaty 
soon  afterwards.  He  utilized  the  English  share  of  the 


32  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

Ipfimonoscki  indemnity  in  a  way  suggestive  of  an  Ameri- 
can "  gold-brick  "  expert,  trading  it  back  to  the  confiding 
Japanese  in  exchange  for  a  reduction  to  5  per  cent  of 
the  import  duty  on  wool  and  cotton  manufactures. 
Now  there  is  a  clause  rarely  omitted  in  international 
treaties,  termed  the  "  most  favored  nation  "  clause,  by 
virtue  of  which  any  concession  made  to  one  nation  is 
of  necessity  shared  by  all  other  treaty  powers.  This 
English  treaty  resulted  therefore  in  a  reduction  to  5  per 
cent  ad  valorem  all  around.   The  Japanese  were  help- 
less in  the  matter,  and  the  good  offices  of  the  American 
representatives  were  unavailing  against  the  rapacity  of 
the  Europeans.   As  cotton  manufactures  in  particular 
constituted  at  that  time  the  bulk  of  the  imports,  and 
was  the  industry  most  in  need  of  "protection,"  this 
resulted  in  a  very  unjust  restriction  upon  Japanese 
commerce.   In  fact,  until  the  treaty  revision  of  1899 
the  customs  receipts  never  reached  four  million  dol- 
lars, the  largest  annual  total  (that  of  1899)  being  but 
$3,  i40,ocx>.   This  sum  barely  paid  the  cost  of  collection. 

The  worst  of  it  was  that  the  Japanese  soon  awoke 
to  the  fact  that  not  only  had  they  bargained  away  to  the 
European  Jacobs  their  rights  of  control  over  foreigners 
in  their  own  dominions  and  the  right  to  fix  their  own 
tariffs,  but  more  than  this,  that  they  had  done  so,  not 
for  a  period  of  years,  but  apparently  in  perpetuity.  At 


JAPAN  ON  PROBATION 


33 


least  when  they  sought  to  improve  their  status,  they 
discovered  that  on  account  of  the  absence  of  a  definite 
date  to  terminate  such  treaties  the  Western  powers 
decided  that  the  agreements  should  remain  in  force 
until  the  said  powers  should  agfree  to  change  them. 

Still  relying  on  the  justice  of  the  nations  of  Christen- 
dom, the  Japanese  in  1871  dispatched  a  special  embassy, 
with  Prince  Iwakura,  then  foreign  minister,  at  its  head, 
to  make  a  tour  of  America  and  Europe,  present  the 
claims  of  Japan  to  recognition  and  sovereignty  and  pave 
the  way  for  a  new  and  more  equitable  revision  of  the 
existing  treaties.  This  embassy  included  some  of  the 
leaders  of  the  New  Japan  and  altogether  comprised  more 
than  one  hundred  persons.  They  came  first  to  America, 
where  they  were  made  the  official  guests  of  the  nation, 
were  entertained  royally,  and  received  the  assurance 
of  the  State  Dq>artment  that  the  United  States  was 
prepared  to  take  up  treaty  revision  on  terms  more  favor- 
able to  Japan.  But  when  the  embassy  reached  Europe, 
they  found  a  very  different  attitude.  Great  Britain 
was  then  the  chief  exponent  of  the  "  mailed  fist "  in  the 
Far  East,  and  English  commerce  profited  too  greatly 
by  the  tariff  with  Japan  to  permit  any  change.  It  is 
but  fair  to  suppose  that  if  American  commerce  had  been 
to  any  degree  comparable  with  that  of  Eng^d  at  the 
time,  the  embassy  might  not  have  found  so  altruistic, 


34 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


not  to  say  avuncular,  an  attitude  displayed  toward  them 
in  this  country. 

The  fact  remains,  however,  that  when  the  Japanese 
returned  to  their  own  land  from  their  fruitless  qucs' 
and  summed  up  the  results  of  their  endeavor,  the  atti- 
tude of  the  United  States  stood  out  in  bold  contrast 
to  that  of  the  European  powers  and  produced  a  pro- 
found impression,  not  only  upon  the  official  classes,  but 
upon  the  mass  of  the  people.   Nothing  was  left,  how- 
ever, but  to  build  up  Japan  to  a  status  upon  which  she 
might  assert  her  independence  and  defend  her  rights. 
This  die  forthwith  bent  every  energy  to  accomplish. 
As  might  be  expected,  the  Japanese  turned  to  America 
for  the  help  which  was  freely  granted.   An  American 
organized  the  efficient  postal  system;  most  institutions 
of  higher  learning  had  Americans  as  professors  in  all 
departments  (except  medicine,  which  was  imported 
bodily  from  Germany,  and  law,  in  which  the  methods  of 
the  French  are  more  congenial  to  Japanese  institutions 
than  those  of  Anglo-Saxondom) ;  the  national  fiscal 
system  was  remodeled  by  officials  from  the  United  States 
Treasury  Dqiartment.   Americans  have  constantly  be  n 
retained  in  the  capacity  of  advisors  to  the  Foreign  Office. 
In  general,  Americans  both  officially  and  privately 
have  been  largely  instrumental  in  shaping  the  externals 
of  New  ]&pan  and  enabling  the  modem  nation  to  get 


JAPAN  ON  PROBATION 


35 


upon  its  feet.    This  relation  has  been  intensified  by  the 
great  number  of  Japanese  students  who  have  come  to 
America  to  study  in  our  colleges  and  universities.  These 
invariably  have  been  shown  every  attention  and  given 
every  opportunity.    Nor  should  we  neglect  to  mention 
the  influence  for  the  past  forty-five  years  of  the  mission- 
aries, most  of  whom  have  been  American.    As  to  the 
success  of  theit  proselyting  there  may  be  two  opinions, 
but  with  regard  to  the  influence  upon  Japanese  public 
opinion  and  thought,  of  the  presence  of  American  fami- 
lies of  the  highest  type  scattered  throughout  the  Empire, 
there  can  be  but  one.    These  missionaries,  broad-minded 
and  catholic  in  thought,  college  graduates  as  a  rule, 
speaking  the  language  fluently,  associating  on  a  plane 
of  equality  with  the  most  influential  of  the  Japanese 
intellectual  and  official  classes,  have  been  as  bits  of 
leaven  scattered  through  the  mass  of  the  Japanese  popu- 
lation, often  unconsciously  and  unintentionally  acquaint- 
ing the  Japanese  with  American  ideas  and  ideals,  and 
removing  the  greatest  of  all  barriers  to  international 
amity,  that  of  prejudice  and  ignorance  of  the  foreigner. 
The  net  result  of  all  these  factors  is  that  the  Japanese 
people,  high  and  low,  know  a  great  deal  more  of  Amer- 
ica and  the  American  people  than  we  do  of  them. 

But  the  Japanese  realized  that  it  was  not  sufficient 
to  remodel  Japan  on  the  basis  of  Western  jurisprudence. 


^1  ■ 

36  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

commerce,  medicine  and  science.  They  liad  been  slow 
indeed  if  they  had  failed  to  take  into  account  the  place 
that  arms  and  force  have  occupied  in  Occidental  diplo- 
macy. Moreover,  it  would  be  too  much  to  expect  that 
a  whole  population  of  professional  warriors,  the  samurai, 
would  find  places  in  an  economic  system  that  did  not 
include  an  army.  Accordingly  they  sought  the  aid  of 
European  drillmasters  and  began  the  not  difficult  task 
of  making  over  the  army  according  to  European  stand- 
ards and  of  establishing  a  modem  navy.  The  use  to 
which  they  have  put  these  adjuncts  to  modern  civili- 
zation will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 

Summory 

Jr«>sin  has  emerged  from  a  condition  of  complete 
feud  jm  into  that  of  a  modem  constitutional  monarchy 
within  the  experience  of  men  now  living.  For  two  cen- 
tm-ies  and  a  half  previous  to  this  change  she  had  shut 
herself  off  from  intercourse  with  other  nations,  jeal- 
ously guarding  agamst  the  entrance  of  any  outside  bar- 
barians and  developing  a  high  degree  of  civilization 
in  which  flourished  the  arts  of  peace  as  well  as  those  of 
war.  By  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  internal 
disintegration  had  paved  the  way  to  revolution,  and 
when  in  1853  the  American  Commodore  Perry  called 
with  his  fleet,  conditions  were  favorable  for  insisting 


JAPAN  ON  PROBATION  37 

upon  the  assumption  of  friendly  relations  with  the  West- 
ern nations. 

Japan  then  signed  treaties,  first  with  America  and 
later  with  other  powers,  in  which  she  yielded  up  the  right 
to  control  foreignei.  within  her  dominions  and  to  fix 
her  own  tariffs.    Being  unable  to  secure  a  change  in 
these  hard  conditions  until  she  should  have  made  over 
her  national  life  upon  Western  models,  she  set  herself 
the  great  task  of  transforming  a  collection  of  eighty-six 
semi-independent  fiefs  into  a  unified  nation  on  Occidental 
lines.   This  she  accomplished  in  a  remarkably  short 
space  of  time  through  the  ability  and  foresight  of  her 
leaders,  the  sterling  qualities  of  her  common  people,  and 
the  devotion  of  all  classes  to  the  Imperial  throne.  In 
all  this  she  received  much  help  from  Western  countries, 
and  particularly  from  the  United  States. 

As  a  whole  and  practically  without  exception,  the 
relations  that  existed  between  Japan  and  America  for 
the  last  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  were  more  than 
friendly.  On  the  side  of  America  they  partook  of  the 
attitude  of  a  proud  teacher  toward  the  exploits  of  an 
apt  pupil  (ignoring  naturally  the  fact  that  the  young 
Empire  had  other  instructors).  In  the  mind  of  Japan 
the  position  of  America  was  that  of  "  elder  brother,"  an 
Oriental  relationship  that  is  hard  to  appreciate  in  the 
Occident,  where  family  connections  are,  by  comparison, 


3«  JAPANESE  EXPANSON 

relatively  insignificant  This  attitude  of  America  was 
in  part  due  to  the  fact  that  until  1897  America  had 
hardly  attained  self-consciousness  as  a  nation  of  the 
world.  Constitutional  America  is  only  about  seventy- 
fiye  years  older  than  constitutional  Japan,  and  to  future 
historians  with  the  perspective  of  a  couple  of  centuries, 
the  transfonnation  of  our  own  nation  during  the  nine- 
teenth century  may  seem  more  wonderful  than  that  of 
Japan.  The  two  nations  are  not  unlike  two  boys  who 
grow  up  together.  And  it  is  a  common  human  experi- 
ence that  two  bosom  companions  of  youthful  days  may 
find  their  paths  diverge  as  maturity  comes,  and  the 
romantic  affections  of  nonage  cool  to  the  more  business- 
like relations  of  men  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  III 


JAPAN  COMBS  OP  AG! 

Whih  the  Japanese  had  reformed  their  judiciary  and 
their  diplomatic  and  postal  services,  had  established  the 
machinery  for  commerce,  remodeled  their  educational 
system,  and,  in  general,  made  over  their  national  gar- 
ments by  an  Occidental  pattern,  they  rather  naturally 
supposed  that  their  years  of  probation  were  ended  and 
that  the  irritating  restrictions  of  extraterritoriality  and 
lack  of  tariff  autonomy  would  U  r  n  Tved  by  the  nations 
that  had  been  so  prominent  in  leading  Japan  from  the 
darkened  chamber  of  feudalism  into  the  hght  of  West- 
ern civilizaticm. 

They  were  doomed  to  a  bitter  disappointment.  In 
the  attempt  to  mitigate  the  more  irritating  of  these 
two  restrictions.  Count  Inouye,  one  of  the  aUest  of 
Japan's  new  leaders,  after  tedious  discussions,  at  last  in 
1886  secured  the  concession  that  Japuiese  judges  should 
be  allowed  to  serve  on  the  bench  m  cases  involving 
aliens.  But  the  foreign  judges  were  to  be  nominated 
by  the  European  diplomats,  were  to  constitute  a  ma- 
jority,  and  to  control  the  rules  of  procedure. 


40 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


This  concession  came  so  near  to  realizing  the 
Japanese  proverb  of  "  pomting  at  a  stag  and  calling  it 
a  horse/'  that  great  public  indignation  was  aroused  and 
the  conferences  were  broken  off.  The  American  minis- 
ter alone  supported  the  Japanese  demands  for  recogni- 
tion in  opposition  to  his  colleagues.  Count  Inouye's 
successor  to  the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Count 
Okuma,  tried  to  revise  the  treaties  by  negotiating  with 
each  nation  separately.  America  had  long  before  ex- 
pressed her  willingness;  Germany,  France,  and  Russia 
were  finally  won  over,  but  Great  Britain  stood  out  to 
the  end  against  any  concession.  This  aroused  such 
public  indignation,  and  the  snub  was  fdt  so  keenly  by 
the  Japanese,  that  Okuma,  who  was  responsible  for  the 
situation,  was  also  forced  to  resign  —  however,  iK>t  be- 
fore a  fanatic  had  blown  off  his  leg  with  a  bomb. 

The  reaction  from  these  disappointments  was  keen 
and  took  the  form  of  an  anti-foreign  sentiment  ex- 
pressed not  so  much  against  foreigners  themselves,  as 
against  foreign  ideas,  dress,  usages,  etc.,  and  the  su- 
periority of  native  institutions  began  to  be  preached. 
The  government,  however,  went  on  with  its  reforms,  and 
in  1889  the  Emperor  promulgated  the  Constitution, 
organizing  a  Diet  and  a  machinery  of  government 
modeled  after  that  of  Prussia. 

But  the  Japanese  were  not  stupid  in  reading  history 


JAPAN  COMES  OF  AGE  41 

nor  in  observing  it.   They  well  knew  that  the  profes- 
sions  of  disinterestedness  on  the  part  of  European 
powers  are  frequently  contradicted  by  their  actions. 
Even  Pt  .  .  's  success  was  in  no  small  part  attributable 
to  his  gunboats.   The  Japanese  realized  that  however 
far  toward  social  perfection  in  the  individual  relations 
the  Western  nations  may  have  progressed,  in  inter- 
national relations  the  law  of  the  jungle  still  holds  good. 
And  they  knew  that  their  motives,  their  cleverness, 
their  positive  achievements  in  art.  letters,  and  science, 
would  continue  to  count  for  little  with  nations  whose 
politics  are  stiU  based  upon  comparative  military  power 
Japan  had  tried  to  gain  her  place  by  achievements  in 
the  arts  of  peace.   She  had  faUed.   She  therefore 
determined  to  qualify  in  the  arts  of  war.   Her  success 
in  the  eyes  of  the  West  has  an  aspect  afanost  ludicrous. 

To  say  that  Japan,  with  a  brand  new  army  and  navy 
was  Itching  to  show  them  off  before  the  world,  and 
was  therefore  only  too  glad  of  an  excuse  to  fight,  would 
be  to  state  something  impossible  to  prove.  There  never 
yet  has  been  a  war  that  was  not  only  whoMy  justifiable  - 
but  really  inevitable  -  to  the  power  that  declared  it 

Unfortunately  for  China,  whenever  any  other  natioo 
wishes  an  excuse  to  fight  her,  she  is  more  than  accom- 
modating. The  attitude  of  the  great  Chinese  Empire 
toward  the  upstart  Japanese,  whom  their  earliest 


4a 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


chronicles  contemptuously  tenn  "dwarfs"  and 
"shrimps,"  has  never  been  one  calculated  to  allay 
irritation.  Nor  has  Korea  behaved  any  better.  In 
fact,  after  the  fall  of  the  Shogunate,  when  Japan  was 
endeavoring  to  remodel  her  government  on  an  Occi- 
dental pattern,  the  Koreans  considered  such  action 
traitorous  to  the  cause  of  the  Orient  and  became  very 
contumacious.  In  1875  they  fired  on  a  Japanese  gun- 
boat and  Japan  was  compelled  to  dispatch  a  squadron 
d  la  Commodore  Perry  to  force  a  treaty  of  "  amity  and 
commerce  "  from  the  defiant  Koreans. 

This  assertion  of  national  independence  on  the  part 
of  the  Hermit  Kingdom  did  not  in  the  least  suit  China, 
who  had  all  along  tried  to  maintain  the  fiction  that 
Korea  was  ^  vassal  state.  And  Chinese  officials  began 
to  exercise  an  influence  in  Korean  aifairs,  directed  in  the 
main  toward  promotion  of  trouble  with  Japan. 

The  history  of  Korea  is  one  long  chronicle  of  corrup- 
tion and  misrule.  As  the  activities  of  Japan  and  her 
ascendancy  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  were  particularly 
odious  to  those  Korean  officials  who  profited  most  by 
the  then  political  condition  of  the  peninsula,  and  as 
China  was  disposed  on  her  own  account  to  Isck  up  the 
latter,  conflicts  and  disputes  between  Korea  and  Japan 
became  frequent.  When  the  latter  country  tried  to 
press  her  own  claims  upon  Korea,  she  was  met  by  the 


JAPAN  COMES  OF  AGE  43 

Chinese  contention  that  Korea  was  a  tributary  state  of 
China,  a  stand  which  China  was  prepared  to  support  by 
arms.  Finally,  in  July,  1894,  insurrection  broke  out  in 
Korea  and  things  came  to  a  crisis. 

Nothing  could  have  suited  Japan  better.  However 
scrupulous  or  fearful  the  statesmen  of  the  rejuvenated 
kingdom  might  have  been,  the  army  and  navy  were 
spoiling  for  a  fight.   Nor  were  the  Japanese  as  a  whole 
averse  to  the  idea  of  "  reforming  "  Korean  institutions. 
No  one  is  so  zealous  as  the  new  convert,  and  certainly 
Korea  has  long  been  in  chronic  need  of  reformation. 
China  feared  that  Japan  was  bent  upon  annexing 
Korea  — a  fear  that  has  been  comnletely  justified  by 
subsequent  events,  although  it  is  doubtful  if  it  were 
justified  at  the  time.   When  war  actuaUy  broke  out, 
the  campaign  was  short  and  decisive.   China  was  pro- 
vided with  battleships  and  Krupp  guns,  and  on  paper 
was  the  better  equipped,  but  the  hopeless  inefficiency 
of  the  Chinese  as  a  fighting  man  was  most  thoroughly 
demonstrated  and  she  was  beaten  in  every  battle. 
The  war  lasted  seven  months  and  the  Japanese  lost 
altogether  1000  men  killed  with  5000  wounded.  China's 
indemnity  was  fixed  at  200,000.000  taels,  and  in  addi- 
tion she  was  forced  to  cede  to  the  victor  the  island  of 
Formosa  and  the  Liao-Tung  peninsula,  with  the  fortress 
of  Port  Arthur. 


44  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

Japan  thrilled  with  her  success.*  At  last  she  was 
become  a  power  in  the  world  and  a  member  of  the 
family  of  nations.  Great  Britain,  long  so  obstinate, 
hastened  to  conclude  treaties  with  her,  abrogating  ex- 
traterritoriality in  five  years  and  granting  to  her  the 
long-sought  tariff  autonomy;  began  the  moves  indeed 
that  eight  years  later  culminated  in  the  Anglo- Japanese 
alliance.  Japan  felt  that  recognition  was  at  last 
achieved. 

This  was  certainly  true,  but  the  recognition  of  Japan's 
prowess  on  the  part  of  the  rest  of  Europe  was  not  at  all 
according  to  the  cards.  European  nations  had  not  been 
so  indifferent  to  Japan's  progress  as  she  had  imagined. 
At  least  one  monarch  had  watched  it  with  misgivings. 
This  was  the  German  Emperor.  With  his  active  imagi- 
nation he  saw  disaster  breeding  from  this  awakening  of 
the  Orient.  Attributing  to  the  Far  East  the  same  mo- 
tives of  aggression  that  have  actuated  the  West,  he  had 
a  vision  of  hordes  of  Orientals  swarming  over  Asia  into 

»  Probably  this  was  one  of  the  most  successful  wars  that  have 
been  fought  in  modern  times.  Mr.  Roosevelt  has  recently  pointed 
to  Japan  ("  America  and  the  World  War ")  as  a  nation  that  has 
"profited"  by  successful  war.  Japan,  in  1896,  published  the  cost 
of  the  Chinese  war  to  be  $97,246,210.  The  indemnity,  therefore, 
represents  a  cash  "profit"  of  about  35  per  cent  The  paradoxical 
consequence  of  this  success,  however,  was  that  military  expenditure 
in  Japan  jumped  from  $6405,000  in  1894  to  $12,059,000  in  1896, 
and  $19471,000  in  1898.  And  the  Japanese  citizen's  taxes  advanced 
accordingljr. 


JAPAN  COMES  OF  AGE  45 

Europe,  wiping  out  European  civilization  with  the  sword 
which  the  short-sighted  West  had  put  into  their  hands 
Such  was  the  "YeUow  Peril"  which  the  Kaiser  was 
to  figure  later  in  his  famous  cartoon. 

The  victory  of  Japan  came  as  an  unpleasant  shock 
to  Germany.   Yet.  if  the  Kaiser  had  read  history  to 
better  purpose,  he  would  not  have  been  so  surprised. 
The  Japanese  have  ever  been  aggressive  and  warlike 
and  are  most  apt  in  imitation.   They  had  merely 
grafted  the  newest  fashions  in  man-killing  upon  ances- 
M  instincts  and  abiUties.   The  ethics,  instincts,  and 
abilities  of  the  Chinese,  on  the  other  hand.  Pre  anti- 
thetical to  war,  in  spite  of  their  unquestioned  bravery 
But  to  the  European  statesman,  at  the  time,  all  Orien- 
tals were  yeUow.  and,  ipso  facto,  a  "  peril "  to  be  antici- 
pated. 

One  way  to  overcome  the  Yellow  Peril  was  to  kiU 
It  before  it  should  become  a  peril,  to  turn  it  back,  as  a 
conflagration  is  stopped  by  backfiring.   That  Japan 
should  get  a  foothold  upon  the  continent  of  Asia  was 
intolerable.   The  peace-treaty  between   China  and 
Japan  should  not  be  aUowed  to  stand.   So  Germany 
stepped  in  and,  havmg  persuaded  Fnwce  and  Russia 
to  back  her  up,  compeUed  Japan  to  cede  back  to  aina 
the  Liao-Tung  penmsula  and  Port  Arthur,  in  order  to 
preserve  the    balance  of  power."  Japan's  interest  in 


4^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

Port  Arthur  was  at  this  time  a  political,  not  a  cokmial 
one.   It  holds  the  key  to  Pekin,  the  hiiiterland  of 
Manchuria,  and  Korea,  and  her  possession  of  it  is  a 
great  guarantee  of  safety  for  the  Island  Empin.  More- 
over, the  peninsula  is  interposed,  as  it  were,  between 
China  and  Korea  and  would  pretty  effectually  block 
off  China  from  further  interference  in  the  latter  coun- 
try.  Japan  was  very  reluctant  to  give  up  the  fruits  of 
her  victory,  but  the  depleted  condition  of  her  war-chest 
and  the  mobilization  of  the  navies  of  three  powers  left 
her  no  recourse.   A  Japanese  writer  asserts  that,  "  The 
historical  significance  of  this  memorable  incident  de- 
serves special  emphasis.   It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
with  it  Eastern  Asiatic  history  radicaUy  changed  its 
character."  *   But  in  retroceding  Port  Arthur  it  ap- 
parently did  not  occur  to  the  Japanese  to  provide 
against  any  other  power  getting  hold  of  it.  Perhaps 
it  would  not  have  mattered  anyway,  since  she  was  in 
no  position  to  enforce  her  demands. 

The  immediate  effect  of  Japan's  victory  was  to  stimu- 
late European  aggression  in  the  Orient.  On  the  Teu- 
tonic principle  that  "  attack  is  the  best  defense  "  the 
Powers  hastened  to  intrench  themselves  before  Japan 
could  be  in  a  position  to  checkmate  them.  "  Spheres  of 
influence  "  rapidly  began  to  condense  out  of  the  nebula 
»K.  Asakawa,  "  Russo-Japaaesc  Conflict."  Boiton,  1904. 


JAPAN  GOMES  OF  AGE  47 

of  Oriental  poUtics.  and  for  the  next  ten  years  it  seemed 
as  if  CSiina  was  to  cease  to  exist  as  a  nation. 

Russia  asstaned  the  role  of  a  devoted  friend  to  China 
against  the  hated  Japanese;  loaned  her  half  the  money 
(without  security)  to  pay  the  indemnity  and  guaranteed 
(in  the  secret  "Cassini  convention")  to  protect  her 
against  her  enemies.   China  was  not  ungrateful  for  this 
help,  and.  in  return,  in  1898  « leased  "  to  Russia  for 
99  years  the  same  Port  Arthur  that  Europe  had  forced 
out  of  the  hands  of  Japan.   Port  Arthur  thus  became 
for  Japan  what  Alsace-Lorraine  has  been  for  France  for 
forty  years,  and  the  first  move  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
war-game  was  played. 

There  was  something  of  a  motive  of  self-protection 
m  Russia's  action.   The  first  aggressor  was  Germany, 
and  the  leasing  of  Port  Arthur  was  a  sort  of  counter- 
moyj.  One  of  the  finest  harbors  on  aina's  coast  is  that 
of  Kiao  Chau  in  the  rich  and  populous  district  of  Shan- 
tung. Germany  for  some  time  had  had  her  eye  upon 
this  port,  but  it  was  not  wise  to  attempt  to  gain  a  foot- 
hoW  while  Russia  might  object   For  a  few  years 
followmg  the  condusion  of  the  Chinese-Japanese  war 
Russia  was  very  busy  strengthening  her  "  fences  "  in 
Manchuria,  and  Germany  saw  her  opportmiity.  For- 
tunately two  Cathohc  priests  were  lynched  November  , 
i897.  by  a  mob  in  Shaatmig.   The  governor  of  the 


4*  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

province  ordered  an  investigation  at  once  and  in  three 
weeks  the  ringleaders  were  caught.  But  it  was  too 
late.  Already  the  German  warships  were  m  Kiao  Chau 
harbor  and  German  marines  had  seized  the  town.  As 
no  diplomatic  representations  had  been  made  to  Pekin, 
the  Chinese  authorities  were  left  to  infer  that  the  seizure 
was  a  punishment  for  the  murders.  Meanwhile  Prince 
Henry  of  Prussia  had  been  sent  by  the  Kaiser  with  a 
squadron  to  proclaim  the  doctrine  of  the  "  mailed  fist " 
and  to  force  the  "  lease  "  for  99  years  of  Kiao  Chau. 
Germany's  justification  for  this  action  was  expressed 
by  Herr  von  Bulow  in  the  Reichstag  April  27,  1898, 
when  he  said:  "  Mention  has  been  made  of  a  partition 
of  China.  Such  a  partition  will  not  be  brought  about 
by  us  at  any  rate.  All  we  have  done  is  to  provide  that, 
come  what  may,  we  ourselves  shall  not  go  empty- 
handed.  The  traveler  cannot  decide  when  the  train  is 
to  start,  but  he  can  make  sure  not  to  miss  it  when  it 
does  start.  The  devil  takes  the  hindmost."  And  in 
Germany's  contest  with  the  devil,  Herr  von  Bulow  in- 
tended that  her  place  should  be  far  from  the  rear.* 

»  Close  students  of  this  phase  of  Germany's  policy  will  note  that 
von  Billow's  Imperial  Master  did  not  take  quite  the  same  Imssei- 
fatre  point  of  view.  In  his  famous  speech  at  Bremen,  to  the 
troops  departing  for  China  to  participate  in  the  quelling  of  the 
Boxer  outbreak  (July  27,  1900).  Kaiser  Wilhelm  said:  "The 
Chmese  have  overthrown  the  law  of  Nations;  .  .  .  preserve  the  old 
Prussian  thoroughness;  show  yourselves  as  Christians  in  joyfully 


JAPAN  CX)M£S  OF.  AGE 


49 


Germany's  action  was  immediately  followed  by 
Russia's  in  Port  Arthur,  and  a  little  later  England 
claimed  equal  privileges  in  Wei-hai-wei.  Even  Italy 
spoke  for  a  share,  but  was  frowned  upon  by  the  others 
for  her  presumption.  France  had  long  since  strongly 
intrenched  herself  in  Tonking  on  the  south.  England 
and  Germany  both  wanted  the  rich  territories  of  the 
Yangtse  valley,  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  they  might 
have  gone  to  war  about  it  on  some  pretext  or  other  by 
this  time  if  the  Russo-Japanese  war  had  not  deflected 
the  trend  of  events.  In  short,  the  "break-up"  of 
China  seemed  very  imminent.  In  this  aggressive  cam- 
paign, which  suggests  a  pack  of  jackals  quarreling  over 
the  body  of  a  dying  ox,  Japan  was  a  disturbing  element. 
Actuated  by  no  especially  altruistic  sentiments  toward 
China,  she  was  nevertheless  confronted  by  the  prospect 
of  having  her  future  markets  preempted  by  hostile 
powers  and  her  own  development  checked.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  latter  recognized  in  Japan,  since  her 

bearing  your  tri&ls;  may  honor  and  glory  follow  your  flags  and 
weapons.  You  know  very  well  that  you  are  to  fight  against  a 
cunning,  brave,  well-armed,  and  terrible  enemy.  If  you  come  to 
grips  with  him,  give  no  quarter,  take  no  prisoners.  Use  your 
weapons  m  such  a  way  that  for  a  thousand  yean  no  CUnete  sbaU 
dare  to  look  upon  a  German  askance.  Show  your  manliness.  The 
blessing  of  God  be  with  you.  The  prayers  of  an  entire  pecyle 
and  my  wishes  accompany  you  every  one.  Open  the  door  for 
culture  once  for  aUI "  [Official  version  prteted  ia  the  Rikktm- 
seigtr,  translated  by.  Christian  Gauss.] 


50  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


easy  victory  over  China,  the  only  considerable  obstacle 
to  the  success  of  their  aggressive  campaigns  on  the 
continent 

One  other  event,  a  little  later,  strengthened  the  fears 
of  Europe  and  gave  the  Powers  pause.  This  was  the 
notorious  "  Boxer  "  outbreak  of  1900.  The  relief  expe- 
dition incident  to  the  affair  afforded  another  oppor- 
tunity to  show  the  world  the  proficiency  of  Japanese 
arms.   Ever  since  the  conclusion  of  the  war  of  1895  a 
seething  current  of  anti-foreign  propaganda  had  whirled 
beneath  the  surface  of  things  in  China.  A  few  for- 
eigners had  seen  the  outbreak  coming  and  had  uttered 
warnings,  but  they  went  unheeded.  The  seizure  of  terri- 
tory on  the  part  of  the  European  powers  at  this  time 
was  resented  the  more  deeply  because  a  national  self- 
consciousness  was  beginning  to  stir  throughout  the  in- 
choate Chinese  Empire.  Germany's  activities  were 
particuhrly  resented.  Japan  was  an  Oriental  covmtry, 
and  while  the  Chinese  may  have  despised  her  they  could 
hardly  resent  her  presence  as  a  next-door  nei^ibor. 
Formosa  was  a  prize  of  war  and  was  not  a  part  of  the 
sacred  Empire  anyway.   Russia's  activities  were  con- 
fined to  sparsely  settled  outlying  districts.  England 
and  France  had  been  established  so  long  that  in  a 
measure  the  Chinese  had  grown  accustomed  to  them. 
But  Germany's  presence  on  Chinese  soil  was  so  un- 


JAPAN  COMES  OF  AGE 


51 


called  for,  the  excuse  so  flimsy,  and  her  actions  so 
threatening  that  a  very  profound  effect  was  produced. 

Shantung,  the  province  in  whidi  is  located  Kiao 
Chau,  is  one  of  the  oldest  and  the  most  densely  popu- 
lated of  aU  China.   It  was  the  birthplace  of  Confucius 
and  is  often  referred  to  as  the  "  sacred  province."  In 
order  to  strengthen  their  grip  on  this  province  and  their 
control  in  the  immediate  hinterland  of  Kiao  Chau,  the 
Germans  began  to  construct  a  railway,  the  concession 
for  which  was  most  unwillingly  granted.   Now  any 
long-settled  district  in  China  is  one  vast  graveyard,  and 
nothing  is  so  repugnant  to  the  sensibilities  and  religion 
of  the  Chinese  as  the  desecration  of  the  grave  of 
an  ancestor.  Granting  that  the  Germans  would  not 
wantonly  affront  the  Chinese,  yet  to  build  such  a 
railroad  without  interfering  with  graves  is  a  physical 
impossibility,  and  it  is  certainly  true  that  in  construct- 
ing the  relatively  short  line  now  in  operation,  tlyi^mndg 
of  graves  were  yiolated.   This  particular  act  (which 
has  been  repeated  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  whenever 
railways  have  been  built  in  the  empire)  did  much  to 
inflame  Chinese  feeling.   Again,  thr  very  great  credulity 
and  superstition  of  the  common  people  led  them  to 
accept  all  sorts  of  wild  tales  regarding  the  hated  for- 
eigner.  Distru;     .  the  missionaries  also  contributed  a 
part  to  the  general  feeling,  and  economic  influences 


53  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

lik(  vise  were  not  lacking,  for  the  growth  of  foreigr 
trade  atid  the  introduction  of  Western  manufactures  in 
man  cascb  threatened  to  disturb  the  economic  h?i»itiTt 
of  iiiis  \  -y  conservative  people. 

There  has  existed  in  China,  for  over  a  century,  a  secret 
society  (analogous  let  us  say  to  our  "  Odd  Fellows  "  or 
"  Knight  '  ■  J  thias  ")  called  the  /  Ho  Tw  i  and  re- 
ferred to  h\  .01  'gners  .hs  "  Boxers. '  Tl  ^  society,  'a,  f 
benevolent,  ha.'f  mystical,  and  wholly  patriotic,  ur.  iP- 
took  to  c  ir  ti.e.r  .lative  land  of  the  dete  d  -oreigners 
who  prof  ;:cd  i  The  Boxer  anti-for-  ,'n  campaign 
rapidly  gamed  headway  in  Shantung  and  -oon  ^  jt  quite 
out  of  hand,  f  tr  the  •  nine  e  soldiers  sent  to  subdue  them 
went  over  to  the  Boxer  side. 

It  would  not  be  pt   ment  to  de\  )te  space  here  to  a 
description  of  the  startling  and  melodramatic  crisis  of 
this  agitation.    The  details  of  the  siege  of  Pel  a  anu 
the  relief  of  the  foreign  legations  h  -  the  troops  of  the 
allied  powers  will  be  fo-inH  in  ai;    modern  history  of 
China.*    But  two  aspects  c  f  this  ampaign  of  the  for- 
eign troops  in  North  China  deserve  especial  mentio 
In  the  first  place,  the  'mergency  was  a  v  r  idd- 
one  in  spite  of  the  repeateci  warnings.    Amei   a  har 
troops  in  the  Philippines,  and  Japan  was  of  cc    e  r*-- 
door.    But  the  latter  was  disinclined  to  cour  iticisii. 
>See  etpecta%  "Qam  in  Gm^ion.'  by  A.  H.  cmith. 


^APAS  r  ..i£S  OF  AGE 


53 

bv  acting  too  pre'  .pitately.  and  ac  a  matter  of  fact  inter- 
nal ni  jealousies  played  a  conspicuous  part  in  dfeter 
ni  ng  the  relative  propc  tion  of  troops  each  nation 
si     d  contribute  to  the  expeditionary  fore  dispatched 


ti  'ekin. 


S  /crian 


R  !ssia 

"  Chinese-/  astern 
chur  d,  ran  ♦nr  r  ^Q 

-k.  and  clari  us 
d  th  ;!w:. 
grip   r;  *he  threr  pr  > 
of  rjub  began 
CMC*  iu..!:<cr  V  ilJ 
T    T  '  ■  30,c 

'icu  peac 

nif. 

fron     ^ani  ;u: 
a"      f'd  by 
vay  gt  3' 
shit  led  . 
presence 


iffereiiUyartuated.  TheTrans- 
^  but  just  completed,  and  the 
branch,  pUuiDed  to  exploit  Man- 
n  ies  througu  a  region  su'^dently 
V  i.  jnd  binary  circumstances. 
mudi    illy  to  get  a  firmer 


5,  R   sia  at  the  first  out  eak 
H      n      9t  from  Siberia,  ifae 
be    own,  but  it  was 

W       uie  Boxe    campaign  was 
gn     once  more  in  Ch«a,  k'una 
reluctance  to  withdraw  any  troops 
To  the  protests  of  ihe  Pow^'r  he 
nveriing  her  army  of  occupat  -no 

These  guards  were  constantly 
th'  Tapaaese,  the  meaning  of  tr 
ily  to    lear.    Russians  began  to  em^ 


th'  presr  ,c    ,tei.  '    :  the  future  tense  in  speaking  of 

Mar    una      R;  sian  territory. 
^       was  a  second  round  in  the  Russo-Japanese  game 
^  •-^    dri    trick  taken  by  Ru:-x    The  Boxer  out- 
«Uc      .  ter^ded  to  hasten  the  climax  for  another 


54  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

reaacm.  The  diaftatdi  of  the  conqneite  force  up  to 
Peldn  afforded  a  most  interestiiig  laboratory  demoih 
stration  of  the  comparative  efficiency  of  the  different 
armies  as  they  marched  and  fought  side  by  side  against 
a  common  foe.  In  this,  not  only  did  the  Japanese 
troops  stand  comparison  with  any  others  in  efficiency, 
but  in  tiidr  conduct  they  shone  above  tlw  majority. 
The  soldiery  of  Europe  seemed  bent  upon  justifying^ 
once  and  for  all,  the  Chinese  designation  of  Westerners 
as  ''foreign  devils."  Looting,  rapine,  murder  and 
devastation  fdlowed  in  their  wake.  After  Peldn  had 
been  entirely  subdued,  the  inertia  of  destruction  kd 
them  into  private  "punitive  e^qieditions "  into  various 
parts  of  the  country.  In  these,  the  Japanese  (and  the 
Americans)*  took  no  part  The  troops  of  both  these 
nations  were  under  the  ounidete  control  of  their  officers 
and  maintained  the  most  perfect  discipline.  In  bravery 
and  military  efficiency  the  Japanese  caused  all  die 
Occidental  experts  to  "  take  notice"  and  the  dipkxnats 
to  think  some  long  thoughts.  If  a  handful  of  troops 
showed  themselves  so  efficient,  what  might  the  natk» 
under  arms  be  like?  If  the  West  had  made  its  own 
comparisons,  had  not  the  East  done  likewise?  Verify 
this  Oriental  CarUiage  must  be  destroyed.  Jiqian  nwst 
not  be  allowed  to  get  so  strong  as  to  dullenge  ^  in- 
terests of  Europe  in  China. 


JAPAN  COMES  OF  AGE  55 

Thus  the  moves  and  countermoves  on  the  diplomatic 
chessbocfd  grew  more  and  more  complex.  It  was  no 
longer  the  "  Powers  "  against  China  and  against  one 
another;  it  was  the  Occident  against  the  Orient.  The 
entrance  of  militant  Japan  into  the  game  threatened 
the  success  of  the  whole  policy  of  aggression.  In  the 
excited  fancy  of  students  of  "  welt-politik"  whose 
knowledge  of  the  subject  had  not  been  gained  at  first 
hand,  and  to  whom  all  Orientals  looked  alike,  Europe 
was  soon  to  be  at  the  mercy  of  Asia,  newly  aroused  to 
self -consciousness,  and  possessed  of  the  war  tools  of  the 
West. 

Germany  and  France  therefore  had  nothing  to  lose 
by  encot-raging  Russia  to  put  down  upstart  Japan. 
England  saw  a  chance  to  profit  herself  by  utilizing  the 
new  militant  power  against  her  "  hereditary  foe  "  (des- 
tined, in  the  inconsistency  of  politics,  to  be  her  ally  in 
1914),  and  concluded  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  in 
1902-  Japan  thus  found  that  the  immediate  effect  of 
her  demonstration  of  military  prowess  was  to  make 
herself  both  courted  and  feared. 

By  way  of  parenthesis  let  us  note  that  the  panicky 
fear  of  a  "  Ydlow  Peril "  rests  upon  a  fallacy  which  has 
only  to  be  stated  to  be  self-evident.  This  faUacy  is  the 
assumption  that  a  people  can  be  both  barbarous  and 
civilized  at  the  same  time.   Ages  ago,  to  be  sure,  Mon- 


56  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

golian  hordes  overran  Eastern  Europe,  but  conditioni 
have  changed  since  the  tiroes  of  Genghis  Khan.  Men 
barbarians  would  stand  no  chance  against  the  machine 
guns  and  trained  soldiery  of  a  modem  state.   But  it  is 
forgotten  for  the  time  being  that  for  any  people  to 
compete  with  a  modem  nation  m  war,  that  people  must 
be  equaUy  "  dvUized."   For  military  ability  nowadays 
demands  not  only  the  possession  of  modem  arms,  but 
much  more,  the  possession  of  a  capacity  for  organization, 
wealth,  credit,  a  specialized  commissariat,  efficient  agen- 
cies for  combating  disease,  etc.   In  proportion,  there- 
fore, as  an  Oriental  people  should  evolve  in  ability  to 
compete  in  a  military  way  with  Europe,  it  would  be 
compelled  at  the  same  time  to  evolve  in  the  accompany- 
ing features  of  civilization,—  to  become,  in  other  words, 
a  civilized  state.   And  when  it  should  reach  such  a  point, 
it  would  be  inhibited,  ipso  facto,  from  being  the  menace 
to  civilization  it  might  have  been,  potentially,  before 
such  an  evolution  began.    For  a  member  of  the  modem 
family  of  nations  has  as  little  freedom  of  individual 
action  in  comparison  with  a  barbarian  tribe  as  a  man, 
the  member  of  a  highly  organized  social  community, 
has  in  comparison  with  his  brother  of  the  jungle.  This 
does  not  mean  of  course  that  an  armed  Orient  may  not 
in  some  future  time  challenge  the  supremacy  of  Europe 
in  war.   Let  us  assume  an  analogous  instance.   It  is 


JAPAN  CX)MES  OF  AGE  57 

conceivable,  for  example,  that  war  may  occur  some  day 
between  Germany  and  the  United  States.    But  it  is 
inconceivable  that  the  peasantry  of  Germany,  the  shop- 
keepers, bankers,  students,  and  artisans,  should  simul- 
taneously drop  their  several  duties  in  the  complex  social 
organization  of  that  Empire,  and  in  a  frenzy  of  preda- 
tory migra'ion.  swarm  across  the  Atlantic  to  invade 
America  and  attempt  to  replace  our  putative  Anglo- 
Saxon  avilization  with  a  Teutonic  one.    Assuming  that 
Ac  Onent  for  centuries  has  been  "  uncivilized  "  in  the 
We^cm  sense  (an  assumption  wholly  gratuitous),  the 
Occident  never  need  fear  the  sort  of  peril  that  Kaiser 
wilhelm  so  eloquently  voiced. 

Events  moved  fast  in  the  Orient  during  the  first  few 
years  of  the  new  century.   Japan  would  only  too  gladly 
have  delayed  the  climax,  but  she  was  like  a  man  tied  to 
a  ninaj^y  wagon,  who  either  has  to  run  himself  or 
fall  and  be  dragged.   Admiral  Alexieff  became  the  Rus- 
^  Viceroy  of  the  Far  East,  and  the  Russian  policy 
l«»nie  more  aggressive,  more  domineering,  more  re- 
gardless of  outside  opinion.   Diplomatic  intrigue,  never 
absoit  from  Ko«a,  fairly  subcharged  the  atmosphere 
of  that  unhappy  peninsula.   Not  content  with  Port 
Arthur  the  Rusrians  began  to  set  the  stage  for  the 
acquisition  of  Masamphfi  at  Japan's  very  door.  More 
Asqmeting  even,  to  Japan,  was  the  ascendancy  that 


$9  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


Russia  was  rapidly  gaining  over  the  Chinese  officials  at 
Pekin.  M.  Pavloff ,  the  Russian  minister  at  Seoul,  pro- 
fessed the  niDSt  supreme  contempt  for  the  Japanese  and 
all  their  woric.  In  the  face  of  all  this,  Japan  was  not 
idle.  She  bent  every  energy  in  feverish  haste  to  prepare 
for  the  inevitable  conflict.  Every  one  in  the  Far  East 
knew  that  the  shock  would  come,  except,  apparently, 
the  Russians. 

When  war  broke,  the  Japanese  quickly  established 
the  command  of  the  seas  by  practically  annihilating  the 
Russian  fleet  From  their  near-by  base  they  swarmed 
over  Korea  and  into  South  Manchuria.  Port  Arthur 
was  besieged,  and  the  Manchurian  armies  began  to  work 
their  way  north  along  the  line  of  the  railway.  Port 
Arthur  put  up  a  stubborn  resistance,  and  the  Japanese 
threw  away  many  thousands  of  men  in  the  assaults 
upon  the  various  forts  that  crowned  the  steep  hills. 
Eventually  these  fell,  one  by  one,  and  Port  Arthur  for 
a  second  tune  became  the  possession  of  Japan.  Mean- 
while the  Japanese  armies  slowly  pushed  the  Russians 
back  toward  the  Siberian  frontier  with  longer  battle 
fronts  and  heavier  losses  than  the  world  had  hitherto 
seen.  But  all  the  while  the  former  were  getting  farther 
from  their  home  base  and  the  Trans-Siberian  railway 
was  responding  better  and  better  to  the  strain  put  upon 
it,  pouring  in  more  Russian  troops  from  the  north. 


JAPAN  COMES  OF  AGE  59 

Japan's  credit  was  strained  to  the  utmost  In  ^ite  of 
her  apparently  continuous  victories,  she  btgui  to  find 
herself  in  a  precarious  position. 

The  Far  Eastern  campaign,  however,  was  very  un- 
popular in  European  Russia,  and  internal  troubles  began 
to  multiply  at  home  which  made  the  Russian  situation 
equally  difficult  Consequently,  when  President  Roose- 
velt proposed  a  truce,  both  sides  were  glad  to  cease 
fighting. 

The  people  of  Japan  hailed  this  as  a  complete  victory 
for  their  arms  and,  naturally,  it  would  have  been  im- 
politic for  thdr  leaders  to  undeceive  them.  They 
looked  for  a  great  indemnity  to  recompense  Uiem  for 
the  huge  outlays  and  sacrifices  they  had  made.  But 
the  Japanese  plenipotentkuies  who  came  to  PortsmouA 
to  arrange  the  terms  of  Uie  treaty  knew  before  they 
started  that  tfaqr  could  esqpect  no  indemnity  fnmi  an 
enemy  whose  territory  was  not  even  touched  by  the 
c(mflict  In  the  end,  a  line  was  drawn  at  the  point 
(Changchun)  where  the  armies  had  faced  eadi  other 
at  the  ctmduston  of  hostilities.  This  line  practical^ 
divided  MaiMhuria  into  a  northern  half  and  a  southtfn 
half.  South  Manchuria  thus  became  the  "  Sphere  of 
Influence  "  of  Japan,  while  Port  Arthur  passed  imo  her 
hands  as  the  successor  of  Russia  to  the  "kaae."  An 
intimate  contnd  was  established  over  Korea,  and  a  few 


6o 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


years  later  the  unhappy  kingdom  was  to  find  itself 
annexed  to  Japan  as  an  integral  part  of  that  Empire. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  it  was  Russia's  troubles 
at  home  that  were  largely  responsible  for  her  desire  to 
stop  fighting,  rather  than  the  complete  victory  of  Jap- 
anese arms.  But  the  masses  of  Japan  did  not  know  that, 
and  they  gave  voice  to  loud  indignation  when  they 
learned  that  there  was  to  be  no  indemnity.*  As  Roose- 
velt was  identified  in  their  minds  with  the  stopping  of 
the  war,  they  quite  illogically  but  not  unnaturally  asso- 
ciated America  with  the  loss  of  their  anticipated  in- 
demnity. 

The  attitude  of  the  American  people  before  and  after 
this  omflict  is  an  interesting  study  in  mob  psychology. 
The  mind  of  the  American  is  rather  emotional  than 
logical  and  his  instinct  is  to  favor  the  underdog.  Witli 
a  mental  picture  of  the  relative  sizes,  on  the  map,  of 
Japan  and  Russia,  and  quite  ignoring  the  comparative 
eflteiendes  of  tht  two  armies  and  navies,  Americans 
were  almost  unanimously  and  emphatically  on  the  side  of 
Japan  during  the  war.  This  state  of  mind  was  but 
natural  in  the  light  of  past  history,  for  the  most 
Ue  of  relations  had  existed  between  Japan  and  America, 
while  at  the  same  time  Russia  had  appealed  to  tis  as  the 

*  A  certain  allowance  was  made  Japan  for  the  expeittc  of  kMpiiv 
Rns^an  prisonen. 


JAPAN  GOMES  OF  AOB 


6i 


home  of  oppression  and  the  antithesis  of  every  ideal 
that  we  most  cherished.  This  pro- Japanese  sentiment 
was  abundantly  fostered  by  the  fact  that  practically 
all  the  sources  of  publicity  upon  which  American  news- 
papers depended  were  in  the  hands  of  Japan  or  her  ally, 
England. 

Continental  Europe  could  not  look  with  equanimity 
upon  the  accretion  of  power  on  the  part  of  Japan  or  the 
possible  defeat  of  Russia  by  an  Oriental  coimtry,  and 
realizing  that  our  position  facing  the  Pacific  gave  us  a 
peculiar  interest  in  what  was  happening  in  East  Asia, 
Europeans  were  quite  unable  to  comprehend  our  atti- 
tude. This  was  because,  as  stated  above,  our  point  of 
view,  unlike  that  of  Europe,  was  dictated,  not  by  reason, 
but  by  emoti(Mi.  But  it  is  dangerous  to  be  the  popular 
idol  of  an  emotional  people.  Hardly  was  the  war  over 
when  our  enthusiasm  began  to  cool,  and,  as  is  the  way 
with  enthusiasts,  we  went  to  the  opposite  extreme. 

There  were  several  reasons  for  our  change  of  mind, 
and,  as  usual,  we  were  again,  as  a  people,  the  victim  of 
a  press  whose  sources,  if  not  tainted,  were  at  least  hardly 
unprejudiced. 

For  one  thing,  Japan  found  herself  in  a  difficult 

position  with  regard  to  Korea  and  China,  a  position 

that  has  not  been  without  parallels  in  our  own  recent 
hi^ory. 


63 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


When  the  cast  of  the  die  found  us  in  1898  in  poMei- 

sion  of  the  Philippines,  official  Washington  was  non- 
plused by  the  problem  of  what  we  should  do  with 
them.  In  the  beginning,  President  McKinley  did  not 
favor  retaining  the  islands.  But  when  the  commis- 
sioners appointed  to  negotiate  the  peace  treaty  finally 
received  their  instructions,  the  President  wrote:  "  With- 
out any  original  thought  of  complete  or  partial  acquisi- 
tion, the  presence  and  success  of  our  armies  at  Manila 
impose  upon  us  obligations  which  we  cannot  disregard. 
The  march  of  events  rules  and  overrules  human  actum." 
So  the  Commissioners  were  directed  to  demand  the  oet- 
sion  of  the  island  of  Luzon. 

But  the  imperialistic  spirit  of  the  American  people 
had  been  kindled  and  there  arose  differences  of  opin- 
ion among  the  Commissioners  themselves.  President 
McKinley,  never  unresponsive  to  the  pressure  of  public 
opinion,  finally  changed  his  mind  and  cabled  the  United 
States  Commissioners  to  demand  the  cession  of  the  entire 
archipelago.  This  was  done,  und  the  islands  became  our 
"  property  "  against  the  vehement  protests  of  the  Spanish 
Commissioners,  who  were  put  in  "  the  painful  strj?t  of 
submitting  to  the  law  of  the  victor."  The  sincerity  of 
their  protests  need  not  concern  us.  The  fact  remains 
that  in  a  brief  space  of  time  we  found  it  expedient  t* 
act  quite  differently  from  our  announced  intentions. 


JAPAN  COMES  OF  AGE  63 

It  is  rather  absurd,  though  not  at  an  unnatural,  that 
we  should  blandly  forget  all  this  and  take  umbrage  at 
Japan  only  a  few  years  later,  when  she  revised  her  policy 
in  a  somewhat  similar  manner.  During  the  six  months 
preceding  the  Russo-Japanese  war  the  diplomatic  com- 
munications that  were  constantly  exchanged  between 
the  two  nations  never  failed  to  assert  and  reassert  that 
the  "integrity  and  independence  of  Korea  "  (and  on 
Japan's  side  of  Manchuria  as  well)  was  the  one  thing 
sought  and  cherished  above  all  others.  In  the  Ji^ese 
Imperial  rescript  dedaring  war  upon  Russia  (after  hos- 
tilities had  begun)  occur  the  words:  *'  The  integrity  of 
Korea  has  long  been  a  matter  of  gravest  concern  to  our 
Empire,  not  only  because  of  the  traditional  relations 
between  the  two  countries,  but  because  the  separate 
existence  of  Korea  is  essential  to  the  safety  of  our 
Empire."  More  than  this,  the  Japanese  govenmient 

went  out  of  its  way  to  assure  the  worid  of  its  good  inten- 
tions regarding  Korea,  in  the  Korean-Japanese  Proto- 
col.* in  which  Japan  pledged  hendf  to  guarantee  "  for 
all  time  the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the 
Korean  Empire  "  and  the  "  safety  and  response  of  the 
Imperial  House  of  Korea," 

In  spite  of  aU  this,  only  five  yean  after  the  cessation 
of  hostUities,  Korea  found  itself  annexed  as  a  part  of 

>Fcbk  37,  1901. 


^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


the  JafKUiese  Empire,  and  her  country  "  administered  " 
by  Japanese  officials  in  a  way  that  left  no  doubt  in  the 
nrinds  of  Koreans  and  foreigners  as  to  the  meaning  of 
the  sittiation.  So  soon  did  Japan  find  her  announced 
intentioni "  overruled  "  by  the  "  march  of  events." 

To  enter  upon  a  discussion  of  the  rights  and  wrongs 
of  this  change  of  attitude  is  not  the  writer's  purpose. 
The  Japanese  have,  of  course,  justified  their  actions  as 
we  did  ours  in  the  matter  of  the  Philippines.  Their  ne- 
cesiity,  however,  coincided  in  time  with  the  natural  re- 
action in  Amerioi  from  our  excessively  pro-Japanese 
feeling  described  above,  and  we  began  to  suspect  the 
motives  of  the  Oriental  Empire  more  than  we  otherwise 
should  have  done.  But  not  only  did  the  press  and  the 
public  revise  then-  opinions  suddenly  and  decidedly.  Al- 
most at  the  same  time  the  State  Department  began  to 
show  a  quite  different  countenance  toward  America's 
former  prol^ 

With  the  advent  of  WiUiam  H.  Taft  to  the  Presi- 
dential chair  came  Philander  Q.  Knox  as  Secretary  of 
State  to  the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Mr.  Knox 
was  a  corporation  lawyer  whose  rebtions  with  "  Big 
Busmess  "  were  mtimate,  and  his  influence  was  soon  fdt 
in  the  Far  East  When  the  Russians  evacuated  Man- 
churia after  the  occupation  of  1900,  one  of  the  condi- 
tions arranged  for  with  Chma  was  the  opening  of  three 


JAPAN  COMES  OF  AGE 


6S 


ports  to  trade.  To  these  three  new  treaty  ports  the 
United  States  promptly  appointed  consuls,  and  Ameri- 
can trade  began  to  make  a  showing.  The  apparent  im- 
portance of  our  trade  was  due  to  the  general  lack  of 
trade  credited  to  other  nations  rather  than  to  the  great 
amount  of  it  in  itself.  The  American  Tobacco  Com- 
pany, ousted  from  Japan,  sought  to  create  a  market  in 
Manchuria,  with  the  Japanese  government  as  its  only 
competitor.  The  Standard  Oil  Company  began  to  build 
up  a  profitable  trade.  We  have  done  a  good  business  in 
high-grade  sheetings.  But  there  has  never  been  much 
in  the  way  of  general  and  varied  imports,  and  of 
the  importance  of  Manchurian  trade  with  America  there 
has  been  a  great  deal  of  misstatement  and  exaggeration 
in  the  newspapers  and  the  speeches  of  politicians. 

After  the  fighting  had  ceased,  but  before  the  Japanese 
troops  had  evacuated  South  Manchuria,  and  while 
foreigners  of  other  nationalities  were  strictly  debarred 
from  the  province,  Japai  ese  traders  swarmed  over  the 
country  and,  backed  by  the  government,  with  its  sys- 
tems of  drawbacks  and  rebates,  the  important  Japanese 
commercial  houses,  such  as  the  Mitsui  family,  estab* 
lished  a  firm  foothold. 

The  American  firms  that  had  laid  the  foundation  for 
a  profitable  business  saw  their  prospects  dwindling  and 
began  to  bring  pressure  upon  the  State  Dejtartmat. 


»  JAPANB8R  EXPANSION 

The  Japanese,  while  protesting  their  adherence  to  the 
doctiifie  of  conserving  the  independence  and  integrity 
«)f  Manchuria  and  Korea,  had  been  equally  prompt  in 
promising  to  retain  the  "  Open  Door,"  into  which  Sec- 
retary Hay  had  thrust  a  foot  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  But  the  "march  of  events"  seemed  indeed  to 
give  good  reason  to  believe  that  there  was  as  little  like- 
lihood of  the  maintenance  of  the  "Open  Door"  in 
Manchuria  as  there  was  of  its  "  integrity." 

Theoretically  Manchuria  is  still  a  Chinese  province. 
In  the  north,  Americans  not  long  ago  established  their 
status  with  reference  to  the  Russians  by  refusing  to 
deliver  their  passj  )rt3  to  the  Russian  police  for  refer- 
ence, as  one  is  required  to  do  in  Russia.    In  other  words, 
they  claimed  to  be  foreigners,  not  in  Russian,  but  in 
Chinese  territory.    In  theory,  the  same  thing  holds 
south  of  Chang  Chung.   As  a  matter  of  fact,  South 
Manchuria  is  to-day  Japanese  territory  in  a  much  more 
intimate  way  than  Canada  is  British.    There  is  nothing 
in  the  pompous  phrases  of  the  various  state  papers  to 
indicate  this,  however.   Nor  is  the  stotus  oflkially 
accepted  by  China. 

In  1907  Japan  came  to  a  full  understanding  with 
Russia  regarding  their  mutual  interests  in  Manchuria, 
and  in  an  agreement  signed  July  17,  the  two  powers 
mutually  engaged  to  maintain  the  status  quo. 


JAPAN  COMES  OF  AGE 


67 


The  heart  of  the  Japanese  control  it  the  nilro«d. 
Without  the  South  Ifanchoriaa  Railrcwd,  Japan's 
oocupatkm  of  Manditiria  would  amount  to  but  little. 
Keenly  realizing  this,  Japan,  early  in  the  game,  secured 
from  China  the  treaty  by  which  the  latter  forswears 
any  project  of  paralleiing  the  line  or  of  establishing  a 
rival. 

Many  and  detailed  were  the  complaints  that  arose 
from  Aiiiericans  concerning  the  alleged  violatioas  of  the 
"Open  Door"  agreement  on  the  part  of  JwpUL 
rinally  Mr.  Knox  stuped  in.  With  a  Uandness  al- 
most  Chinese,  In  astnmed  imocenoe  of  anything  but 
the  assured  intentions  of  Japan  to  carry  out  her 
pled|^,  Mr.  Knox  proposed  z-.  »:!rv  way  to  guanntce 
to  China  the  integrity  of  ivn  -  s-Jiurian  provinces. 
This  was  to  neufralize  the  Sou;>.  ^tl^oichurian  Railway, 
and  to  loan  China  $100,000,000  with  whidi  to  buy  it 
back.  The  money  was  to  be  raised  by  a  joint  loan  to 
be  participated  in  by  the  vanous  powers. 

The  proposal  was  received  with  b^ildered  astonish- 
ment, dismay,  and  indignation  m  Japan.  When  they 
had  caught  their  breath,  the  Ji^anese  protested  that  the 
war  had  cost  them  ten  times  one  hundred  millions,  to 
say  nothing  of  150,000  human  lives;  that  they  alone 
bad  prevented  Russia  from  occnpyii^  Manchuria  to 
the  exclusion  of  every  o^er  interest,  and  Uiak  Hii"* 


68  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

had  been  helpless  to  protect  herself.  Did  any  one 
imagine  that  the  clock  could  be  put  back  to  the  period 
before  the  war  and  have  things  again  just  as  they  were? 

Very  well,  Mr.  Knox  had  something  in  his  other  hand. 
This  alternative  proposal  was  to  build  a  railway  from 
Kin-chau  to  Aigun  on  the  Amur  River,—  a  line  parallel- 
ing the  South  Manchurian  Railway.    Such  a  line. 
China  was  inhibited  from  building  by  the  terms  of  her 
post-bellum  agreement  with  Japan.    The  scheme  was 
to  be  financed  by  the  cooperation  of  the  English  firm  of 
Paulings  and  an  American  group  consisting  of  J.  P. 
Morgan  and  Co.,  Kuhn  Loeb  and  Co.,  The  First  Na- 
twnal  Bank  of  New  York,  and  the  National  City  Bank. 
On  the  assumption  that  Manchuria  was  still  Chinese 
territory,  of  course  no  other  country  than  China  could 
offer  valid  objection  to  such  a  concession  nor  could  any 
other  nation  offer  objection  except  to  China. 

This  proposal  amounted  to  a  forcing  of  Japan's  hand, 
and  put  her  statesmen  in  a  quandary.  But  in  the  end 
her  face  was  saved  by  the  British  bankers  dropping  out 
of  the  agreement  Whether  this  action  was  due  to 
pressure  brought  to  bear  by  the  British  government  at 
the  instigation  of  her  Oriental  ally,  Japan,  has  not  been 
made  public,  of  course^  but  one  may  surmise  as  much. 
The  American  bankers  did  not  care  to  undertake  the 
project  alone  and  the  matter  was  dropped. 


JAPAN  COMES  OF  AGE  69 

The  net  result  of  Mr.  Knox's  Japanese  policy  WBS 

nil  from  the  standpoint  of  either  diplomacy  or  of  pnc- 
tical  achievement.  An  old  guide  to  chess-playing  used 
to  have  the  rule,  "  Avoid  useless  checks."  Mr.  Knox's 
proposals  seem  very  much  like  useless  checks.  He  could 
hardly  have  anticipated  a  successful  outcome  to  his 
neutralization  scheme.  And  if  his  idea  was  to  "  show 
up  "  Japan  to  the  world,  it  is  hard  to  see  what  dipto- 
matic  advantage  could  lie  in  so  doing. 

Of  course,  if,  as  would  have  been  the  case  with  Russia 
or  Germany  or  England,  these  Manchurian  maneuvers 
had  been  merely  the  first  move  in  a  game  in  which  they 
should  be  followed  up  by  a  display  or  use  of  force;  if, 
in  other  words,  it  had  been  the  intention,  the  soberly 
decided  policy  of  the  United  States  to  become  a  partic- 
ipant in  Oriental  politics,  as  European  powers  are  par- 
ticipants, then  there  would  have  been  an  explicable 
motive  in  the  American  action.    But  a  democratic 
government  like  our  own  cannot  undertake  policies 
that  are  not  supported  by  public  opinion,  and  certainly 
public  opinion  in  this  country  would  never  tolerate  the 
use  of  the  military  ann  of  the  nation  to  back  up  its 
aggressive  commercial  diplomacy.    Without  thU  inten- 
tion Mr.  Knox's  attempt  was  meaningless. 

But  this  does  not  mean  that  his  proposals  were  un- 
important  On  the  contrary,  their  eflfect  upon  Ameri- 


^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


can-Japanese  relations  has  been  moat  profound  Md 
permanent.   They  mark  the  end  of  tilt "  elder  kcotlHr  " 
period.  There  still  remain  many  thoosaads  of  Ae  older 
generation  in  both  coontriea  who  cannot  forget  the 
amicable  relations  that  Oied  to  exist,  or  the  attitnde  of 
disinterested  helplessness  of  American  officials  towaid 
Japan,  that  meant  so  much  to  the  htter  m  her  early 
struggles  for  a  place  in  Ae  Eastern  sun.  But  from  now 
on,  America  and  Ji^Mm,  as  nations,  can  never  again  be 
on  the  same  old  footing.   Eadi  win  always  suifect  the 
other's  motives.   Periiapa  the  situation  coidd  not  have 
been  avoided  sooner  or  later.   Both  peoples  nitrely 
have  emerged  from  a  period  of  natiooal  ««Hftffncf, 
with  its  natural  enthusiasms,        maturity,  with  its 
cold  practicality  and  its  own  sdfish  mterests.  Yet  good 
feeling  between  alien  peoples  is  a  vahttbfe  political  asset, 
and  Mr.  Knox's  activities  have  done  a  good  deal  to 
destroy  the  former  Amerlcan-Japaneae  friendsh^  w^ 
out  gaining  any  corresponding  advantage. 

One  immediate  effect  of  the  American  proposals  was 
to  throw  the  two  erstwhik  combatants  into  eadi  oMmt's 
arms.  A  little  over  five  months  after  Ji^  had  de- 
clined the  neutralization  proposal,  she  ttm^^i4f4  (July 
A,  1910)  an  agreement  with  Russia  to  iwlnf  ^  the 
status  quo  in  Manchuria.  The  next  year,  however, 
Russia  began  to  extend  her  boundaries  hi  the  Sea  ol 


JAPAN  OOMK      AOB  71 


Okhotak,  and  Japan  replied  by  dispatching  cruisers 
thither.  Russia  offered  to  arbitrate  the  matter  at 
Tht  Hague,  but  Japan  in  turn  proposed  to  concede 
the  Russian  demands  if  she  could  get  as  a  quid 
pro  quo  the  full  recognition  of  her  own  claims  in 
Manchuria.  Russia  consenting,  the  two  powers,  in  a 
new  understanding  executed  in  1912,  agreed  to  defend 
jointly  their  interests  in  that  province. 

Summaty 

The  history  of  Japan's  foreign  relations  during  tfae 
second  half  of  tiw  nineteenth  century  is  mainly  tfaat  of  a 
struggle  for  national  autonomy,  particnlarly  k  regard 
to  the  control  of  aliens  in  her  own  dominions  (extra- 
territoriaHty)  and  the  ri^^t  to  adjust  her  own  tariffs. 
These  rights  the  Western  natioi»  leftiaed  to  concede  to 
Japan  until  she  had  demon^ted  her  military  prowess 
in  the  wtf  with  China  (1894-5)'.  During  this  period 
the  "personal"  relations  between  Japan  and  Aaerica 
were  intmiate  and  cordial.  America  was  in  tiM 
lead  in  granting  to  Japan  her  national  r^  and  in 
helping  her  upon  her  feet  For  tl^  reason,  Japanese 
learned  to  look  npoo  tlie  States  wtdi  especial 

friendliness. 

FoBowii^  the  O^iese  war,  in  «^  the  Japanm 
were  overwhdminify  victorious,  Etatipe  began  Id  letr 


for  die  niccess  of  the  aggressive  projects  that  the  va- 
riow  *'  Powers  "  had  undertaken  in  China,  which  looked 
to  tl«  tiltinwte  partition  of  that  country.  The  rise  of 
Japaa  was  viewed  with  misgivings.  As  a  consequence, 
the  European  powers,  especially  Germany,  Russia,  and 
England,  hastened  to  intrench  themselves  firn^' v  before 
Japan  should  be  strong  enough  to  checkmate  them. 
The  direct  result  of  this  activity,  particularly  that  of 
Geniany  in  Shantung,  brought  on  the  "Boxer  out- 
break" in  1900,  in  the  quelling  of  which  Japan  showed 
herself  to  be  on  a  par  with  any  other  country  in  modem 
warfare. 

The  Boxer  trouble  gave  Russia  a  chance  to  establish 
hersdf  in  Manchuria  and  to  gain  a  preponderant  in- 
fltKoce  m  Kmrea  and  even  in  Pekin.  The  impossibility 
<rf  J^Mn  and  Russia  coming  to  an  understanding  with 
f«fHrd  to  their  mutual  interests  in  continental  Asia  and 
the  arrogant  attitude  of  the  Russian  officials,  who  de- 
pMded  upon  Muff  and  were  convinced  that  Japan 
wo^  not  fight,  led  finally  in  1904  to  the  war  between 
the  two  countries.  The  earlier  victories  in  this  war 
were  all  on  the  side  of  Japan,  particularly  on  the  sea, 
but  it  is  doubtful  what  the  final  outcome  might  have 
been.  Internal  troubles  in  Europe  led  Russia  to  accept 
President  Roosevelt's  offer  of  mediation,  and  the  con- 
flict ceased  with  neither  side  really  victorious.   The  loss 


JAPAN  CX)MES  OF  AGE  73 

of  an  expected  indcnm^  led  to  iU  Mtiig  toward 
America  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  poputeoe. 

In  order  to  gain  what  advaMage  Ae  could,  Japan 
hastened  to  root  hendf  securely  in  16uiciiuria  and 
annexed  Korea.  This  was  contrary  to  lier  snnrnmccd 
intentions  and  aroused  the  suspicion  of  AiMrfeans  and 
the  antipati^  of  the  Uidtod  States  State  Department, 

underthetemporaiy  influence  of  "Big  Business."  As 
a  result,  impossible  proposals  were  made  to  Japan  by 
America  which  have  been  the  cause  of  m  fc»*«itf  and 
suspicion  toward  us,  where  only  friendly  fediflp  pf»> 
viously  existed.   On  the  other  hand,  the  acMiss  of 
Japan  on  the  Continent,  which  she  has  isft  weie  mn- 
sary  for  her  own  protection  and  ftrture,  have  dene  omch 
to  dissipate  our  previous^  extra-frien<fiy  attitude  to- 
ward her.   As  a  consequence,  the  end  of  the  fet  iM^f 
century  of  American-Japanese  intercourse  finds  begi 
nations  on  the  point  of  abandoning  the  stanc^omt  of 
international  amity  that  has  been  so  cfaaracterotic  <^ 
their  relations  in  the  past 

The  feeling  of  gradual  estrangement  has  been  acoon- 
panied  in  America  by  the  fear  that  the  rise  of  a  stfo^ 
militant  power  in  East  Asia  may  have  fa  it  dements  of 
'i^ansfer  to  our  own  commercial  policies  and  aspiratioos. 
Partic  ularly  since  the  Spanidi  war  our  possession  of 
the  Philippines  renders  us  peculiarly  vufamble  to  at- 


74  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

tack  in  the  event  of  an  international  controveny  ant- 
ing, and  compels  us  to  look  toward  Japan  from  a  very 
different  point  of  view  than  we  should  have  had  if  a 
whimsical  fate  had  not  bequeathed  us  aa  Otioital 
problem  of  our  own. 


CHAPTER  IV 


ahbbzca;,  japan,  and  the  phxuppinbs 

The  "  Philippine  Problem  "  occupies  a  large  share  of 
public  attention  at  present,  and  rightly  so,  for  few  situa- 
tions that  we  have  ever  been  called  upon  to  face  have 
demanded  so  much  far-seeing  statesmanship  or  have  so 
put  to  the  test  our  national  honor  and  responsibility, 
concerning  which  we  have  such  a  good  opinion.  The 
ultimate  solution  of  this  problem  will  have  most  signifi- 
cant consequences  for  the  future  not  only  of  the  Philip- 
pines but  of  the  United  States  as  well.  For  with  it  is 
bound  up  the  portentous  "  Problem  of  the  Pacific," 
which  is  the  occasion  of  much  high-sounding  and  alarm- 
ing  oratory,  in  Congress  and  out. 

In  the  latter  connection,  Japan  of  course  comes  in  for 
much  attention,  and  without  doubt,  in  the  event  of  a 
war  with  Japan,  it  would  make  a  great  deal  of  difference 
to  America  whether  we  retain  our  sovereignty  over  the 
Islands  or  not,  and  if  so,  to  what  extent. 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  discuss  the  pros  and  cons  of 
the  Philippine  question  with  regard  to  our  relations 
with  the  Islands  present  and  future,  nor  the  question  of 

75 


^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

thdr  independence;  rather  I  shall  confine  myself  solely 
to  such  topics  as  have  a  bearing  on  American-Japanese 
rdationi. 

How  We  Got  the  Islands 
The  Spanish-American  war  of  1898  is  one  of  the  most 
significant  milestones  in  our  national  history,  not  so 
much  because  of  the  importance  of  that  conflict  in  itself 
as  because  it  opened  the  eyes  of  Americans  to  their 
place  in  the  world.    Previously,  we  as  a  people  had 
been  so  preoccupied  with  home  affairs  that  we  had 
become  provincial.   The  Spanish  war  with  its  unex- 
pected consequences  shook  us  out  of  this  attitude,  once 
for  all,  and  brought  us  face  to  face  with  world  move- 
ments and  world  problems. 

The  most  unforeseen  consequence  of  tlie  war  to  the 
American  people,  as  a  whole,  was  the  acquisition  of  the 
Philippines.  To  nearly  every  one,  previous  to  1898, 
the  name  was  without  meaning;  we  hardly  knew  of  the 
existence  of  ihe  islands  or  of  the  fact  that  Spain  had 
colonies  in  the  Pacific*  Of  course  the  State  and  Navy 
Departments  were  fully  informed  regarding  the  archi- 
pelago, but  when  Admiral  Dewey  was  sent  with  his 

«  DeMi  C.  Worcester,  one  of  the  leading  authorities  on  the  Philip- 
pines and  their  problemsi  reUtes  that  after  Ui  rctom  to  America 
as  a  member  of  the  first  Philippine  Commissioi.  a  good  old  lady  at 
L???"  birthplace  asked  him:  "  Deanie,  are  them  Philiopians 
you  hare  been  a  Tisitin' the  people  that  Paul  wrote  the  Epistle  to?  - 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  77 


squadron  to  seek  the  Spanish  fleet  in  Manila  harbor, 
there  was  no  other  intention  in  his  or  any  one's  else 
mind  than  that  of  attacking  an  enemy  wherever  he 
might  be  exposed  to  attack.  Yet  there  had  not  been 
lacking  far-sighted  students  of  world-politics  even 
among  the  Filipinos  (J.  Rizal)  who  had  foreseen  the 
western  expansion  of  the  United  States,  foreshadowed 
in  the  occupation  of  Hawaii  and  Samoa  *  and  had  pre- 
dicted that  the  Islands  would  some  day  come  under  the 
sway  of  America. 

The  Spanish  in  their  control  of  the  Philippines  had 
pursued  the  same  policy  that  they  did  in  the  two  Ameri- 
cas; that  is,  they  had  exploited  the  country  entirely  for 
ihe  ^,enefit  of  the  privileged  classes  at  home,  incidentally 
extending  the  benefits  of  the  church  to  the  "  heathen." 
Patemal  and  benign  in  the  beginning,  by  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century  this  control  had  developed  in  many 
respects  into  a  downright  tyranny. 

As  a  consequence,  before  the  war,  there  had  been 
fomenting  an  active  opposition  to  the  rule  of  Spain  on 
the  part  of  some  of  the  Christian  races  of  the  Philip- 
pines, which  was  on  the  point  of  bursting  into  open 
rebellion,  when  the  coming  of  Dewey  and  the  collapse 
of  Spanish  authority  changed  the  whole  situation. 

During  the  progress  of  the  peace  negotiations,  as 
*  See  LeRoy,  "  The  Americans  in  the  Philippines,"  L 


^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

•Imdy  described,  the  idea  c  f  retaining  the  whole  archi- 
pelago poaseiMd  the  Arr  rican  people.   The  Spanish 
Cbomiissioiiers  hoped  to  the  last  for  European  inter- 
vcBtkm  and  purposely  protracted  the  discussion.  More- 
over, they  protested  that  to  relinquish  both  the  Philip- 
pines  and  the  West  Indian  Islands,  while  at  the  same 
time  retaining  the  debt  of  the  latter,  would  precipitate 
a  crisis  in  Spain  and  force  a  resumption  of  the  war, 
•utddal  as  such  a  course  would  be.   Such  ai.  outcome 
was  not  without  danger  to  America  on  account  of  the 
possibUities  of  European  intervention.   One  power, 
Germany,  was  apparently  not  averse  to  such  interven- 
tion.  It  was  discovered,  unofficially,  that  Spain  would 
not  be  insulted  at  the  offer  of  a  cash  compensation,  and 
the  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  Americans  was  that  such 
a  payment  would  be  mudi  less  than  the  cost  of  resuming 
war.   Twenty  miUion  dollars  was  agreed  upon  finally 
as  the  price  for  the  transference  of  the  whole  Philippine 
group  to  the  United  Stat«s.   Of  course  all  that  we  had 
really  captured  by  arms  was  Manila  and  its  environs, 
and  in  the  other  isbnds  were  many  thousands  of  Moros. 
Igorrotes,  and  other  races  who  did  not  discover  till  some 
time  afterwards  that  there  had  been  a  war  or  that  tney 
had  been  "sold."   They  would  indeed  have  resented 

the  Idea  that  they  had  ever  been  "  owned  "  l,y  Spain  or 
anyone  else. 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  79 

As  we  look  at  tbew  peace  aegotialioiia  acraaa  the 
space  of  eighteen  yun,  it  ia  evident  that  the  Spaniah 
nobles  were  more  than  a  match  for  the  Yankeea  in 
driving  a  good  bargam.  And  the  %ttiiah  cartooM 
current  in  1898,  picturing  Uncle  Sam  aa  a  pofk^mtcher 
obsessed  by  the  worship  of  the  dollar,  acquire  a  quite 
unintentional  slant  of  humor. 

The  un  foreseen  dropping  into  our  lapa  of  a  rich  colony 
that  many  nations  would  have  fought  to  obtain  not 
unnaturally  stirred  the  imperialistic  apirit  of  the  Ameri^ 
can  people.   There  has  always  been  a  minority  in  the 
United  States,  however,  who  looked  into  the  future^  and 
foreseeing  the  complications  that  must  inevitably  follow 
the  participation  of  America  in  Oriental  poUtIca,  bcUer- 
ing  that  the  retention  of  the  islands  will  unqueatklih 
ably  involve  such  participation,  and  failing  to  diacover 
enough  profit  in  the  possession  of  them  to  juatify  the 
danger  involved  in  keeping  them,  have  oppoaed  the 
whole  Philippine  program. 

These  "anti-imperialists"  found  their  handa 
strengthened  by  the  Filipinos  themselves.  (Perhapa 
n  would  he  truer  to  state  it  the  other  way  round.) 
Before  the  American  occupaUon,  inaunection  waa  well 
under  way  and  the  leader  of  the  insurrectos,  AgulnaMo 
strove  to  get  as  much  credit  out  of  the  fall  of  Spaniih 
^  as  possible.   The  Christian  Filipino  appm  to 


»  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

have  many  of  the  attributes  of  the  Latin-American. 
In  both  cases,  perhaps,  this  is  a  heritage  from  Spain. 
Like  the  Spanish-American,  ho  is  much  given  to  ora- 
tory, to  intrigue  and  personal  politics.  If  America  had 
not  so  unexpectedly  stepped  in  in  1898,  it  is  not  at  all 
unlikely  that  within  a  few  years  conditions,  in  some  of 
the  islands,  at  least,  would  be  comparable  to  those  in 
Mexico  to-day,  inviting  intervention,  possibly  by  Ger- 
many, possibly  by  Japan,  and  annexation  to  some  other 
country. 

The  Filipino  protested  violently  against  being  sold 
or  traded  as  a  chattel,  and  it  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  the 
transfer  for  a  money  consideration  of  an  alien  land  and 
its  inhabitants  from  any  country  to  the  United  States 
would  have  worried  the  signers  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  or  the  American  statesmen  of  the  '6o's. 
It  is  hard  to  say  how  sincere  the  Filipino  agitators  were. 
It  is  much  more  certain  that  the  American  occupation 
deprived  them  of  their  chance  to  shine  as  saviors  of 
their  country  from  the  yoke  of  Spain. 

At  any  rate,  supported  by  the  discontented  element 
in  the  Islands  and  the  anti-imperialists  in  America, 
armed  resistance  was  offered  to  the  Americans  after  the 
transfer  had  been  effected,  and  for  three  years  our  sol- 
diers fought  an  inglorious  guerilla  war  with  the  Fili- 
pinos.  In  the  end  the  Islands  were  pacified.  The 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  FHIUPFINES  Si 

whole  situation  has  been  complicated  by  the  lack  of  any 
permanent  policy  on  the  part  of  the  American  Con- 
gress toward  the  Islands  and  their  people. 

It  is  repugnant  to  the  ideals  of  the  people  of  this 
country  to  hold  subject  any  nation  against  its  will. 
The  practice  of  exploiting  a  weaker  race  for  the  benefit 
of  the  strong  is  equally  otmoxious.  The  fallacy  of  one 
nation  "  owning  another  or  profiting  by  such  owner- 
ship is  pretty  well  understood  here  too.  Altogether 
there  is  a  very  general  consensus  of  opinion  that  so  long 
as  we  remain  in  the  Philippines  we  shall  do  so  for  the 
good  of  the  Filipmos,  not  for  our  own  profit.  Such  a 
policy  has  not  always  been  followed  by  other  colony- 
owning  nations.  Wholly  altruistic  at  first  sight,  in  the 
long  run,  if  successful,  it  will  bear  practical  fruits.  For 
the  establishment  of  an  independent  nation  across  the 
seas,  educated  by  American  methods,  with  American 
ideals  and  every  reason  for  friendliness  toward  the 
nation  that  has  given  them  their  chance,  cannot  he^ 
but  redound  to  the  commercial  advantage  of  Hat  coun- 
try which  has  played  the  part  of  a  foster  parent. 

But  apart  from  this  consideration  we  feel  that  it  is 
our  duty  to  lend  every  aid  possible  to  a  weaker  people 
that  chance  has  thrown  upon  our  hands,  and  with  char- 
acteristic thoroughness  we  have  gone  ahead.  The  his- 
tory of  the  introduction  of  American  schools  and  schod 


"  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

teachers  in  the  Islands  is  too  well  known  to  need  repeat- 
ing.  The  education  has  been  practical  in  the  extreme. 
The  Filipino  has  learned  the  dignity  of  labor  and  the 
means  of  making  a  living.    Most  striking  of  all  has  been 
the  success  of  the  tactful  American  administrators 
among  the  wild  Mohammedans  or  the  heathen  tribes  of 
the  hills.    For  the  first  time  in  ages  peace  reigns  in 
districts  where  heretofore  head  hunting  has  been  the 
only  occupation.   And  the  benefits  of  peace  are  begin- 
ning to  be  felt.   Among  all  the  many  tribes  of  various 
origins  and  characteristics  American  schools  have  been 
established.   One  effect  is  becoming  obvious.  Hereto- 
fore no  community  of  interest  was  possible  where  the 
population  was  split  up  into  scores  of  groups,  speaking 
different  dialects.   Now  a  common  language,  English,  is 
beginning  to  effect  a  solidarity  previously  non-existent. 
Such  a  result  would  have  been  absolutely  impossible  if 
exploitation  of  the  people  had  been  the  motive  of  the 
Americans.   It  would  disappear  as  by  magic  should  a 
policy  of  exploitation  be  inaugurated.   In  the  opinion 
of  Mr.  Worcester,  expressed  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee, considering  the  recent  Philippine  bill:  '*  There  is 
a  great  deal  more  English  spoken  in  the  Philippines 
to-day,  after  a  decade  and  a  half  of  American  rule,  than 
there  was  Spanish  spoken  after  something  more  than 
three  centuries  of  Spanish  rule." 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  83 


The  American  is  not  given,  temperamentally,  to 
counting  pennies.  Nowhere  else  in  the  world  are  chari- 
ties so  lavish.  Altruism  costs  money,  and  we  expect  to 
pay  for  the  luxury.  But  the  cost  of  the  Philippine 
enterprise  has  daunted  even  the  American.  It  has  re- 
peatedly been  stated  in  Gmgress  that  we  have  expended 
over  a  hiHioa  dollars  in  the  Islands  since  our  occupancy 
there.   This  again  has  been  vehemently  denied.' 

Hardly  any  two  authorities  agree  on  the  cost  of  re- 
taining the  Philippines.  We  may  believe,  however,  that 
it  is  a  sufficiently  large  sum.  At  any  rate  it  approaches 
$10,000,000  per  year  for  the  direct  expense  of  the  army 
uuring  a  decade  of  more  profound  peace  than  the  archi- 
pelago has  ever  known  before.  The  House  G)mmittee 

^  Perhaps  as  dependable  a  statement  as  may  be  found  is  tiie  <me 

filed  with  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Philippines  by  Brigadier 
General  Mclntyre,  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs.  This 
statement  covers  the  years  1903  to  1914  inclusive,  and  therefore 
does  not  include  the  $20,000^  paid  Spain  in  the  beginning,  nor 
the  cost  of  putting  down  the  insurrection. 

Quartermaster  Corps  |  ^<o63fi9SJ03 

Medical  Department    36o,sS3.3S 

Engineering  Department    7i574>946&( 


Philippine  Censm 


„    .   $119,010,677.14 

Yearly  average  (War  Department),  $£M7S.947.6S.  These  may  be 
taken  at  tite  altra-coaservitive  rock-bc^tom  fignrct. 


Ordnance  Department  .... 

Signal  Service  , 

Cnast  and  Geodetic  Survey 
Congressional  ReUef  Fund 


84 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


in  charge  of  the  subject  reported  in  1912  that  the  United 
States  government  expends  directly  and  indirectly  ap- 
proximately $50,000,000  annu^Uly  on  the  Islands. 

The  People  of  the  Philippines 

The  *'  civilized  "  peoples  of  the  Islands,  exclusive  of 
whites,  number  about  7,000,000,  distributed  among  eight 
groups.  Of  these,  the  most  numerous  are  the  Visayans 
and  the  most  cultured  are  the  Tagalogs.  All  are  Ma- 
layan in  origin,  although,  in  places,  Chinese  and  other 
strains  have  intermingled.  Successive  waves  of  oversea 
migration  appear  to  have  struck  the  various  islands. 
Each  new  wave  seems  to  have  defeated  and  driven  back 
the  inhabitants  of  the  coast  to  the  mountains  of  the 
interior  and  to  have  replaced  them.  An  extraordinary 
diversity  of  tribes  and  dialects  has  thus  resulted.  Some 
of  the  islands  are  very  densely  populated,  Cebu,  for  in- 
stance, having  a  population  of  337  to  every  square  mile, 
but  little  less  than  that  of  Grea*  Britain. 

The  islands  were  discovered  by  Magellan  in  1521. 
In  1584  one  Miguil  de  Legaspi  was  sent  to  be  governor 
of  the  Philippines  for  life.  He  proceeded  forthwith  not 
only  to  pacify,  but  to  Christianize  the  people  and  met 
with  extraordinary  success,  except  among  those  tribes 
that  had  already  embraced  Mohammedanism  (the 
present-day  Morosjl,  or  were  too  remote  to  reach.  So 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  85 


thoroughly  Christianized  did  the  northern  peoples  be- 
come that  in  1677  the  Filipinos  themselves  sent  out 
missionaries  to  Siam,  China,  and  Japan  to  convex  the 
heathen  in  those  lands.  But  the  Japanese  were  little 
amenable  to  this  process  and  torture  and  killed  the 
missionaries.  The  Filipinos  thereupon  canonized  the 
martyrs  and  enshrined  their  memories  in  popular  his- 
tory. Their  attitude  toward  non-Catholics  being  pre- 
cisely that  of  the  Spanish  or  of  the  inhabitants  of  I^tin 
America,  it  has  resulted  that  the  Japanese  are  held  in 
popular  estimation,  e  en  now,  to  be  little  better  than 
barbarians,  an  opinion  that  is  not  shared  at  all  by  the 
better-informed  and  more  open-minded  people  of  North 
America  and  Northern  Europe. 

This  attitude  of  the  Filipinos  toward  the  Japanese  is 
an  important  factor  to  keep  in  mind  in  the  present  dis- 
cussion. At  various  times  in  the  past,  the  proposition 
has  been  made  that  if  the  Philippines  are  a  burden  to 
the  United  States,  the  latter  might  sell  them  to  some 
other  country  with  a  greater  itch  for  territory  and 
fewer  scruples.  England,  Germany,  and  Japan  were 
suggested.  The  rumor  was  revived  on  two  occasions 
when  ex-President  Taft  visited  Japan.  In  both  cases 
it  was  reported  that  the  Filipinos  were  aroused  to  a 
frenzy  of  indignation  at  the  idea  of  being  "  sold,"  par- 
ticularly to  "  pagan  Japan."   It  is  needless  to  say  that 


^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

there  never  was  any  official  basis  for  such  an  idea,  but 
it  is  interesting  to  discover  the  reaction  of  the  Filipinos 
toward  it 

The  Chinese  are  much  more  numerous  in  the  archi- 
pelago than  Ae  Japanese,  and  to  some  extent  have 
intermarried  with  the  Filipinos.  Practically  the  entire 
retail  business  of  the  Islands  is  in  their  hands,  as 
well  as  the  greater  part  of  the  money.  They  have 
been  characterized  as  the  "Jews  of  the  Orient,"  and 
the  average  Catholic  FUipino  has  the  same  economic 
background  for  his  dislike  of  them  that  the  Catholic 
.)ean  has. 

On  the  whole,  although  the  Filipino  is  a  Malay,  his 
racial  antipathies  are  against  the  Oriental  and  his  racial 
sympathies  are  with  the  European. 

The  "  non-Christian  *'  Filipinos  (including  the  wholly 
savage  Nigritos,  the  semt  rivil'zed  pagan  Igorrotes,  and 
the  Moslem  Moros)  j.: '  >  less  numerous,  perhaps 
because  of  their  persisu  activity  in  head  hunting. 
The  Moros,  moreover,  have  a  very  definite  object  m 
killing  non-Mohammedans,  at  once  the  most  pleasing 
and  effective  way  of  securing  a  safe  passage  to  the  Mos- 
lem paradise.  The  opinion  has  been  expressed  thr.t  had 
Legaspi  not  come  three  and  a  half  centuries  ago,  the 
active  Moros  might  have  "Moslemized"  the  whole 
archipelago  by  now.   These  internecine  and  anti- 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHIUPPINES  87 

Christian  feuds  art  at  present  stilled  by  the  omni- 
presence of  the  American  rule.  Should  it  be  removed 
now»  without  quecdon  thqr  would  break  out  anew. 

The  Tiesources  of  the  Philippines 
The  tropics  are  the  regions  of  the  earth  in  which 
Nature  has  been  most  lavish  in  her  gifts  to  man.  Rub- 
ber, coffee,  cocoa,  dyestuffs,  and  drugs,  gums,  sugar, 
teak,  mahogany  and  other  precious  woods,  jute  and 
hemp,  tea,  tobacco,  and  many  valued  fruits,— these  arc 
exclusively  or  in  large  part  tropical  products.   Ihe  use 
■)f  them  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  temperate 
t=mates  is  constantly  increasing.*    The  interest  of 
Europe  and  temperate  America  in  the  tropics  is  there- 
fore well  founded.   And  of  all  tropical  countries,  the 
Philippines  appear  to  offer  the  greatest  diversity  of 
riches  coupled  with  a  greater  accessibility  than  is  the 
case  with  any  other  except  the  Dutch  Indies. 

The  archipelago  is  in  many  places  very  wild  and 
mountainous  and  its  mineral  wealth  is  to  a  great  extent 
stin  undiscovered.  Yet  copper,  gold,  lead,  petroleum, 
zinc  mercury,  antimony,  platinum,  and  iron  have  been 
found  in  quantity,  and  some  day  the  mineral  resources 
of  the  Islands  will  be  a  conspicuous  item  in  their  natural 
wealth.  That  day,  however,  must  wait  upon  the  invest- 
»  See  Benjamin  Kidd,  "  The  Control  of  the  Tropks."  18^ 


i  rl 


I 


^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

ment  of  large  amounts  of  capital,  and  capital  will  wait 
upon  the  permanent  establishment  of  stable  conditions. 
An  exception  must  be  made  in  the  case  of  coal.  In 
some  of  the  islands,  notably  Batan  and  PolHlo,  enr  rmous 
beds  of  excellent  coal  are  found.  In  the  former  field, 
government  engineers  have  estimated  that  there  are 
76,000,000  tons  in  sight.  Nevertheless  these  sources 
are  practically  unworked,  and  nearly  all  the  coal  used  in 
the  islands  is  imported  from  Japan,  with  a  small  propor- 
tion from  Australia. 

Yet  it  is  in  its  agricultural  wealth  that  the  Philippine 
archipelago  is  most  noteworthy,  for  the  growing  season 
is  twelve  months  of  the  year  and  there  is  really  no  limit 
to  Nature's  supplies  of  this  sort.  No  less  than  665 
different  kinds  of  hardwoods  are  found.  Some  of  these 
are  of  rare  and  exquisite  beauty  when  finished,  and  the 
Filipinos  are  being  taught  in  the  American  trade  schools 
to  make  high-grade  furniture  that  compares  with  any 
produced  in  Europe  or  America. 

The  chief  export  and  most  valuable  product  is  hemp, 
which  is  the  finest  in  the  world  for  cordage,  and  because 
of  its  superiority  enjoys  almost  a  monopoly  in  the 
maricet  Much  of  this  comes  to  America  and  a  great 
deal  used  to  go  to  Europe.  It  constitutes  likewise  the 
most  important  item  of  export  to  Japan,  where  it  is 
manufactured  into  hats.   Hemp  requires  a  "  steaming 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHIUPPINES  89 


climate,"  and  a  great  deal  of  it  comet  f<ain  the  wild 
Moro  province  of  Mindanao, 

Next  to  hemp  in  importance  is  copra,  the  ^  fruit 
of  the  coc<»nut,  which,  before  the  great  war,  totmd  its 
maricet  chiefly  in  Marseilles  and  Hamburg.  The  aver- 
age annual  export  of  copra  is  115,000  tons,  valued  at 
about  $11,000,000. 

Another  valuable  agricultural  product  is  sugar,  which 
however,  is  of  low  quality  and  finds  most  of  its  maricet 
in  China.  Sugar-cane  growing  is  attended  with  more 
risk  and  demands  more  capital  than  ahnost  any  other 
industry  now  exploited  in  the  Philippines.  Locusts, 
droughts,  and  typhoons  have  proved  heavy  handicaps, 
and  the  large  concerns  that  have  recently  invested 
heavily  in  sugar  production  have  not  as  yet  succeeded 
in  making  a  striking  profit 

Tobacco  is  a  product  that  in  the  minds  of  Americans 
is  associated  with  the  Philippines  mofc  any  other. 
Tobacco  growing  and  curing  was  greatly  ti^m^  Mi  by 
the  Spanish.  Great  quantities  are  consumed  by  the 
Filipinos  themselves,  and  tobacco  forms  l»rt  «^  or  5 
per  cent  of  the  total  export. 

Rubber  is  a  development  of  the  future.  In  iioii 
to  the  rubber  and  gutta-percha  trees,  there  are  eral 
wild  vines  that  carry  a  high  percentage  of  nMe  wd 
are  easily  treated. 


90  JAPANESE  BXPAN8I0N 


Thg  Nttdt  of  the  Itkmds 

For  centuries  the  interior  of  the  large  ishnds  has  been 
the  haunt  of  head-hunting  savages  and  the  southern 
iaiands  have  been  controlled  by  fierce  and  untamable 
Moros.  Some  of  the  same  head  hunters  (the  Bontoc 
Igorrotes)  have  achieved  extraordinary  skill  in  rice 
culture.  Yet  It  is  a  fact  that  except  in  the  densely 
populated  ishmd  of  Cebu  the  present  population  tends 
to  huddle  together  in  villages,  leavuig  unocrupied  the 
vast  spaces  of  hmd  between  the  settlements.  The 
amount  of  araUe  land  that  is  at  present  under  cultiva- 
tion is  but  a  fraction  of  what  might  be  so  utilized.  This 
situation  is  doubtless  a  legacy  from  unsettled  conditions 
m  the  past  which  made  pioneering  dangerous,  although 
it  may  be  due  to  a  UkIc  of  ambition  on  the  part  of  the 
inhabitants,  for  whom  life  is  too  cjy. 

Before  the  Philippines  shall  have  taken  their  pbce 
m  the  world  they  must  have  developed  their  agricul- 
tural resources  to  the  pomt  at  which  they  not  only 
supply  their  own  food,  but  produce  an  excess  to  ex- 
change for  the  manufactured  products  of  Europe  and 
America,  upon  which  they  will  always  be  dependent 
At  present  this  is  far  from  bemg  the  case.  Today 
large  quantities  of  foodstuffs,  particularly  rice,  are  im- 
ported mto  the  PhiUppines.  The  amount  of  these  un- 


AMERICA,  lAPAN,  AND  THE  PHIUPPINE8  9« 

ports,  howe\  r,  is  rapidly  dwiiidliiig.  In  191a,  over  22 
million  doUart'  worth  of  foodstuffs  were  imported, 
although  in  1914  this  amotint  had  dropped  to  kss 
than  13  million.  This  one  item  is  indicative  of  the  lack 
of  development  of  the  islands  in  a  commercial  way. 

Nevertheless  the  effect  of  the  American  otTtipation 
for  a  decade  and  is  becoming  evident  The  total 
exports  and  imp.  lave  about  doubled  in  that  mter- 
val;  and  the  imports  from  the  United  States  have  risen 
from  10  per  cent  of  the  total  in  1901  to  50  per  cent 
in  19 1 4. 

The  prosperity  of  the  islands,  in  the  main,  will  depend 
upon  the  development  of  their  natural  resources,  mineral 
and  agricultural,  and  this  in  turn  will  depend  upon  two 
factors:  on  the  one  hand,  the  investment  of  large 
amounts  of  capital,  and  on  the  other  hand,  an  increased 
(  iency  of  the  available  labor.  Both  of  theses  but 
p  -  Jcularly  the  former,  in  turn,  are  dependent  upon 
long-continued  peaceful  conditions.  The  timidity  of 
capital  is  axiomatic.  At  the  present  time,  and  for  some 
years,  few,  if  any,  large  investments  have  been  made 
on  account  of  the  uncertainty  regarding  the  plans  and 
purposes  of  the  United  States  toward  the  Philippines. 
This  timidity  has  not  been  allayed,  either  by  the  intro- 
duction of  party  politics  in  the  pres«it  Philippine  ad- 
ministration or  the  recent  agitation  in  connection  with 


9»  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

the  so-called  Jones  bill  introduced  in  the  63d  Con- 
gress. 

We  may  take  it  as  demonstrated  that  the  laborers, 
upon  whose  shoulders  the  success  of  commercial  develop- 
ment finally  rests,  will  of  necessity  continue  to  be  Fili- 
pino, Hindu,  Chinese,  or  some  race  that  is  able  to  with- 
stand a  tropical  climate.    The  American  cannot  do  so, 
nor  can  the  Japanese.   As  a  laborer,  the  white  man 
cannot  exist  in  the  tropics,  at  any  rate  not  in  competi- 
tion with  the  darker-hued  peoples.    Says  Professor 
Benjamin  Kidd  in  connection  with  the  attempt  to 
acclimatize  the  white  man  in  the  topics:  "Excepting 
only  the  deportation  of  the  African  races  under  the 
institution  of  slavery,  probably  no  other  idea  which  has 
held  the  mind  of  our  civilization  during  the  lact  three 
hundred  years  has  led  to  so  much  physical  and  moral 
suffering  and  degradation,  or  has  strewn  the  world  with 
the  wrecks  of  so  many  gigantic  enterprises."    (  This  was 
written  before  the  building  of  the  Panama  canal,  which 
forms  a  conspicuous  exception  to  the  above  statement). 

One  pressing  need  of  the  Philippines  has  been  met  in 
great  part  by  the  American  officials  in  control.  This 
is  the  opening  up  of  communications,  which  not  only 
enable  the  Filipino  farmer  to  bring  his  produce  to  market 
or  shipping  point,  but  also  bind  the  whole  people 
together  in  a  community  of  intercourse  that  they  have 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  93 


never  experienced  hitherto.  In  a  country  of  steep 
mountains  and  torrential  tropical  rains,  of  course  such 
roads  require  constant  care  to  keep  them  in  condition. 

International  Relations 

In  the  first  flush  of  possession,  the  Philippine  Islands 
appealed  to  many  citizens  of  this  country  as  a  tremen- 
dous addition  to  our  national  wealth, —  as  a  very  val- 
uable asset  We  have  seen  something  of  what  the  cost 
of  this  possession  has  been, —  the  overhead  charges,  so 
to  speak.  And  there  has  been  gradually  brought  home 
to  us  the  fact  that,  speaking  still  in  commercial  terms, 
they  arc  a  liability,  not  an  asset.  At  the  same  time  we 
have  realized  that  the  only  justification  for  our  presence 
in  the  islands  is  the  benefit  of  the  Filipino,  not  of  our- 
selves, unless  we  wish  to  make  the  Filipino  one  of  our- 
selves, which  is  not  a  popular  wish. 

The  reiterated  phrase,  "  Trade  follows  the  flag,"  is 

not  true.   Trade  follows  the  line  of  least  resistance.* 

In  1 90 1  imports  into  the  islands  from  the  United  States 

were  only  about  three  fifths  of  what  they  were  from 

Great  Britain  and  only  half  again  as  great  as  those 

from  Germany.   Even  in  19 14  they  were  only  one  half 

» A  British  student  of  foreign  affairs  said  in  Btaekwoofs  Maga- 
sine  thirteen  years  ago:  "It  is  true  that  trade  follows  the  flag. 
It  is  sad  to  be  obliged  to  confess,  however,  that  in  the  Pacific  to- 
day, it  is  the  trade  of  foreign  nations  which  most  succmfuliy 
follows  the  Union  Jade" 


94  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

of  the  whole  amount.  As  for  exports  from  the  Philip- 
pines to  the  United  States,  in  1901  they  were  only  40 
per  cent  of  those  to  England  and  in  1914  they  had  risen 
to  only  two  fifths  of  the  whole  export  total.  And  this 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  until  the  passage  of  the  Under- 
wood Tariff  Law,  an  export  duty  was  levied  on  Philip- 
pine products,  which  was  remitted  in  the  case  of  exports 
to  America.  Moreover,  on  dutiable  goods  a  rebate  of 
25  per  cent  has  been  given  in  favor  of  the  United  States. 

From  the  wholly  seUish  standpoint  of  national  profit 
we  should  have  received  enormously  greater  returns  on 
our  money  if  we  had  devoted  the  millions  that  have 
been  expended  in  the  Philippines  to  the  development  of 
commerce  with  South  Araerica  or  even  with  Europe. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  our  experience  with  colonial  posses- 
sions as  a  source  of  profit  has  been  quite  in  line  with 
that  of  England,  France,  and  Germany.  Of  comse  we 
have  our  altruistic  endeavor  to  console  us. 

Apart  from  direct  pecuniary  gain,  there  are  those  who 
point  to  the  position  of  the  Philippines  on  the  "  thresh- 
old of  Asia,"  or  particularly  China,  in  the  belief  that 
we  shaU  obtain  an  important  advantage  in  the  contests 
for  the  trade  of  that  nation  by  such  a  foothold.  The 
writer  is  quite  unable  to  appreciate  this  point.  Our 
trade  with  China  consists  in  selling  individual  Chinese 
or  Chinese  firms,  American  products,  particularly 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  95 


American  manufactures.  None  of  this  trade  will  ever 
go  via  the  Philippines,  nor  will  the  islands  nor  their 
people  ever  be  instrumental  in  increasing  it  to  any  great 
extent.  It  may,  indeed,  work  out  the  other  way.  We 
feel  that  it  is  for  the  good  of  the  Filiirino  not  to  subject 
him  to  keen  competition,  so  that  we  have  extended  the 
Chinese  exclusion  act  to  the  islands.  The  great  anti- 
American  boycott  of  1906  was  occasioned  primarily  by 
Chinese  resentment  at  the  administration  of  this  same 
law.  Its  enforcement  in  the  Philippines,  for  which  we 
are  responsible,  may  be  the  occasion  of  reviving  the  boy- 
cott and  losing  us  still  more  trade. 

But  the  objection  is  at  once  raised:  "Trade  has  a 
political  as  well  as  a  commercial  aspect.  Our  foothold 
in  the  Philippines  will  give  us  a  base  from  which  to  pro- 
tect our  Asiatic  commerce.  It  is  never  claimed  that 
they  will  be  much  of  a  factor  in  mere  buying  and  sell- 
ing." This  introduces  us  to  the  portentous  phrase, 
"  The  Mastery  of  the  Pacific." 

Few  political  questions  have  been  more  befuddled 
by  shibboleths  than  those  of  the  Orient  and  the  Pacific* 
The  Pacific  is  the  largest  ocean.  Its  "mastery'*  has 

»The  "Yellow  Peril"  is  a  cons^axms  example.  The  awful 
menace  of  this  phrase  would  not  be  half  ao  impressire  if  the  color 
were  any  other  than  "ydtow."  Uoconsdous  association  and  sug- 
gestion often  completely  overshadow  reason.  Compare  Havdodc 
ElUs,  "  The  Psychology  of  Yellow."  Pop,  Sci.  Mo„  voL  68. 


^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

a  Nictzschian  flavor  that  is  compelling.  But  let  as 
analyze  it 

In  time  of  peace  it  is  hard  to  conceive  of  any  mastery 
of  an  ocean  except  on  the  part  of  the  nation  that  ships 
the  most  goods  across  it.   It  is  the  goods,  not  the 
nationality  of  the  carriers,  that  counts.   American  com- 
merce, all  over  the  world,  before  the  European  war,  was 
great  and  increasing  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  was 
carried  largely  in  foreign  bottoms.   The  Japanese  have 
recently  awakened  to  the  fact  that  their  heavily  sub- 
sidized Pacific  steamship  lines  carry  the  larger  percent- 
age of  their  freight,  not  from  Japanese  ports,  but  from 
Hongkong,  China,  to  America  and  back,  so  that,  as 
their  subsidy  covers  a  prospective  loss,  they  are  taxing 
themselves  for  the  empty  glory  of  carrying  foreign 
goods  under  the  Japanese  flag! 

It  is  otherwise,  of  course,  in  time  of  war.  The  United 
States  has  discovered  to  its  consternation  that  its  trade 
may  suffer  from  lack  of  American  ships.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  is  no  real  analogy  between  Europe  and  Asia, 
the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific.  It  is  possible  for  England 
with  her  powerful  fleet  and  the  possession  of  Gibraltar 
and  the  English  Channel  in  a  measure  to  control  the 
Atlantic  so  far  as  Germany  is  concerned.  Such  a  con- 
dition would  be  out  of  the  question  in  the  vast  expanse 
of  the  Pacific   The  exploits  of  the  will-o'-the-wisp 


t 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  IHILIPPINES  97 


Emden  in  the  autumn  of  1914  are  a  striking  com- 
mentary upon  the  inability  of  the  great  Japanese  fleet 
to  adequately  patrol  that  waste  of  waters.  No  nation 
cm  dominate  the  Pacific,  so  long  as  any  other  nation 
can  maintain  a  fleet  there.  And  the  Philippines,  al- 
though an  advantage  to  our  fleet  in  the  Pacific,  are  by 
no  means  a  ne>. .  jsity.* 

The  following  colloquy  at  the  hearing  on  the  naval 
appropiiatior  bni  before  the  House  Committee  on 
Naval  Affairs,  December  15, 1914,  is  interesting  in  this 
connection: 

Mr.  Withebspoon.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  ask  a 
question  or  two.  Commander,  you  speak  of  controlling  the 
seas.  Is  there  any  nation  in  the  world  that  contrds  &e  seas  ? 

Commander  St/sling.  Well,  I  think  England  comes  prob- 
ably nearer  controlling  it  than  any  other  nation. 

Mr.  Withersi-oon.   They  do  not  control  the  Baltic  Sja. 

Commander  Stirunc.  No ;  I  should  say  the  Baltic  Sea  was 
controlled  by  Germany. 

Mr.  Witherspoon.   Does  England  control  the  Black  Sea? 

Commander  Stirling.   Well,  no ;  her  ally  Russia  does. 

Mr.  Wxthisspoox.  Does  England  control  the  Mediter- 
ranean Sea? 

Commander  Stuung.  'VeU,  her  allies  control  it. 
Mr.  WiTHEaspooN.  1     .  not  ask  you  anything  about  that 
I  asked  you  about  England. 

^  This  is,  of  course,  a  consideration  quite  apart  from  Hit  need 
of  coaling  stations  at  strategic  points. 


98  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


CoMicAinia  SrnuMC.  Itainoiiiitstodiesaincdiing:yc«,sir. 
Mb.  Withebspoon.  Is  it  not »  fact  that  France  eootr^  the 

Mediterrar^ean  Sea? 

CoMMAMOEK  Stibung.  She  has  tin  greater  f?rce  there. 
Ma.  WiTHBBSPOON.  And  she  put  the  greater  force  there  for 

the  very  purpose  of  having  control  of  that  sea,  and  England  has 

concentrated  all  her  battleships  in  the  North  Sea  for  the  par- 
pose  3f  controlHn,  that.  Is  not  that  true? 

CoMMANDEB  Stibunq.  For  thc  purpose  of  watching  the 
Gemum  fleet 

Mr.  Withebspoon.  Well,  she  has  got  control  of  the  North 
Sea,  has  she  not?  I  mean  England. 

CoMMANDEB  STIRLING.  She  has  coHtrol  over  the  North  Sea. 

Ma.  Withebspoon.  And  she  has  it  because  she  has  got  her 
fleet  concentrated  there.  Is  not  that  tme? 

COMMANDEB  Stibling.  Ycs,  sir;  one  reason. 

Mr.  Withebspoon.  If  she  had  her  fleet  divided  and  a  part  of 
it  in  her  possessions  all  over  the  world,  she  would  wA  have 
control  of  the  North  Sea? 

COMMANDEB  Stibung.  If  she  reduced  her  fleet  so  that  Ger- 
many  thought  she  would  have  an  equal  chance  of  success -> 

Mr.  Witherspoon  (interposing).  Has  England  got  contnl 
of  the  Atlantic  Ocean  ? 

CoMMANUtB  Stibung.  Yes. 

Mb.  Withebspoon.  What  ships  has  she  got  in  the  AtUmtic 

Ocean  as  powerful  as  our  fleet? 

COMMANDEB  Stibung.  Now,  of  courso,  that  opens  op  a 
little  — 

Mb.  WiTHBBSPOON  (interposing).  Well,  she  has  not  got 
anything  in  there  except  some  cruisers? 
Commander  Stirling.   No,  sir, 

Mb.  Withebspoon.  She  has  not  got  a  single  KanHi*«T  m 
the  Atfamtic  Ocean? 


15431 

AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHIUPPINES  99 

CoMMANosR  Stirling.  I  consider  diat  control  '-^r  ao  Ut 
as  tlie  bdiigerents  are  concerned. 

Ma.  WiTHEBSPOON.  I  am  not  talking  about  belligerents;  I 
am  talking  about  the  control  of  the  aea.  You  mean  by  the  con- 
trol of  the  sea  the  nation  who  has  shipa  there  powerful  enough 
to  dominate  it?  Is  that  what  you  mean  by  it? 

Commander  Stirling.  Yes,  air ;  I  consider  a  nation  controla 
the  sea  that  can  send  a  dominint  force  into  it. 

Mr.  WxTHnsKOK.  That  can  do  it? 

Commander  Stirling.  Yes,  sir.  She  may  lose  control  of  it 
for  a  month  or  a  week,  buc  if  she  can  eventually  dmninate  it  by 
sending  a  force  into  it,  she  controls  the  sea. 

Mr.  Wixhemtoon.  But  if  England  could  send  a  fleet  into  the 
Atlantic  Ocean  and  thereby  control  it,  she  would  not  have  her 
fleet  in  the  North  Sea,  and  she  would  not  have  control  of  tha' 
would  she? 

Commanior  Stirung.  No;  against  the  woild,  against  a 
combination,  I  do  not  suppose  England  wouU  be  considered  — 
I  wiU  take  that  back.  England  does  not  control  the  sea  against 
a  combination  where  the  nation  who  is  against  her  — 

Mr.  Witherspoon  (interposing).  She  could  not  control  the 
Asiatic  waters,  could  she  ?  She  has '  ot  any  ships  there  power- 
ful enough  to  control  it  as  against  Japan? 

Commander  Stouhg.  Against  only  Japan  as  an  enemy  she 
would  rontrol  it 

Mr.  Witherspoon.  Has  she  got  any  battleships  ? 

Commander  Stiruko.  No,  but  !;he  could  send  them  out  there. 

Mr.  Witherspoon.  I  am  not  asking  you  about  that  lam 
talking  about  what  existr  today.  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  no  nation 
on  eart..  is  able  to  control  bui  one  part  of  the  seas  at  the  tame 
time?  Isiwtthat  mie? 

CoMMANDta  SxitUHG.  Ycs,  SIT;  that  is  prc'ty  tTuc.  She 
only  wants— 


JAPANESE  E3CPANSI0N 


IS*,  WiTHMSPOOH  (interposing).  So  that  this  thing  of  one 
nation  cmtroUing  all  the  oceans  and  seas  of  the  vrorli  is  what  a 
high  French  authority  said  when  they  adopted  the  poK^  of 
controlling  the  Mediterranean,  that  it  is  a  mere  chimera?  Is 

not  that  true? 

CoMMANDn  SnttiNG.  Yes ;  but  at  the  same  time,  with  one 
enemy,  if  you  consider  that  she  had  <mly  one  enemy  in  the 
Pacific  she  could  control  the  Pacific  against  that  enemy. 

Mr.  WiTHEaspooN.  Well  that  really  comes  down  to  this: 
That  if  a  nation  has  got  a  more  powerful  fleet  than  any  other 
nation,  it  can  control  that  nation  rather  than  the  ocean. 

CoMMANDEa  StiauMo.  It  can  control  the  possible  area  of 
hostilities. 

If  the  control  of  the  Pacific  is  a  mere  chimera,  as  the 
writer,  for  one,  believes  it  is,  then  the  possession  of  the 
Philippmes  is  to  us  not  only  a  liability  in  an  economical 
sense,  but  likewise  in  a  political  sense.  For,  to  protect 
the  archipelago  with  its  enormous  coast  line  against 
invasion  would  be  a  matter  of  stupendous  difficulty. 
They  would  offer  to  Japan  or  any  other  putative  enemy 
a  vuteeraWe  point  to  attack,  as  they  did  to  us  in  the 
Spanish  war.  While  the  loss  of  the  islands,  in  the  light 
of  the  facts  just  presented,  would  be  a  real  gain  to  us 
from  the  standpoint  of  self-interest,  their  sacrifice  in 
war  would  involve  a  loss  of  prestige  that  the  temper  of 
the  American  people  would  not  tamely  endure. 

What  is  the  way  out  of  this  dilemma?  At  present 
there  seems  to  be  a  confusion  of  counsel.  We  may  cut 


AMERICA!,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  loi 

loose  altogether;  grant  the  Filipinos  their  absolute 
independence  and  let  them  shift  for  themselves.  Yet 
those  whose  experience  in  the  Philippines  is  most  ex- 
tensive agree  in  the  belief  that  it  would  not  be  long 
before  present-day  conditions  in  Mexico  were  dupli- 
cated.  But  there  is  no  Monroe  Doctrine  to  protect 
the  Filipino  (at  least  it  is  questionable  if  Japan's 
would  extend  so  far  from  home),  and  it  would  not  be 
long  before  s#ie  other  great  power  stepped  in  and  re- 
stored order.    The  Filipino  would  be  in  a  worse  plight 
than  ever.   The  United  States  would  have  lost  national 
prestige  and  an  opportunity  to  render  a  service  to  a 
dependent  people,  and  her  citizens  would  have  lost 
much  wealth. 

We  might,  of  course,  as  has  sometimes  been  suggested, 
sell  or  give  the  archipelago  to  a  nation  of  our  choice. 
But  such  a  course  is  out  of  the  question  for  reasons 
discussed  elsewhere.    A  protectorate  is  often  proposed. 
The  function  of  a  protector  is  to  protect.    In  what  sort 
of  a  situation  would  Uncle  Sam  find  himself  '  protect- 
ing "  the  adolescent  Philippine  nation  against  the  con- 
sequences of  its  own  bumptious  acts,  the  control  over 
which  he  had  voluntarily  resigned.    Nothing,  in  the 
mind  of  the  writer,  would  be  so  certain  to  involve  our 
country  in  the  perilous  international  controversies  of 
the  Western  Pacific  as  to  assume  the  responsibility  for  a 


loa  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

suddenly  freed  Philippiiie  nation  given  over  to  its  own 
devices.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  need  not  annoinoe 
sudi  a  protectorate.  It  wotdd  be  inevitable,  if  tiie 
islands  were  given  their  indepindence  now,  on  accotmt 
of  the  predominant  place  that  American  interests  have 
made  for  themselves  in  tiie  present-day  Philippines. 

But  such  a  course  cannot  be  considered.  Another 
phm  that  has  been  mooted  is  to  give  the  Filipinos  thefar 
indq^endence  subject  to  a  jomt  protectorate,  the  islands 
being  neutralized  by  treaty  with  En|^d,  France, 
Japan,  Germany,  and  the  United  States. 

Recent  events  have  convinced  the  majority  of  Ameri- 
cans that  such  a  treaty  would  not  be  worth  drafting  so 
far  as  Germany  is  concerned.  And  recalling  the  r^id 
changes  of  front  indulged  in  by  Jiqpan  in  her  continental 
diplomacy,  many  Americans  feel  duit  the  same  may  be 
said  of  her.  In  other  words,  a  treaty  is  a  contract,  and 
a  nation  that  will  not  keep  its  word  because  it  is  to  its 
disadvantage  to  do  so  therd)y  destroys  the  only  asset 
that  stands  back  of  such  a  contractual  oUigation  and 
makes  it  of  any  value.  If  a  neutralization  agreement 
were  observed,  it  would  only  be  because  the  United 
States  stood  back  of  it  And  in  such  a  case  we  might 
as  well  have  Hxt  whole  respcmsibility  as  the  con^Uca- 
tions  incident  to  sharing  it  with  others. 

It  is  the  consensus  of  opinion  that  if  the  Filipinos 


AMERICA,  JAPAN,  AND  tHB  PHIUPPINI8  m 

were  given  conqdete  uutoootny  at  preient  tsnder  such  a 
neutralizatioii  ichene,  it  would  not  be  long  before  con- 
flicto  of  authority  would  occur  between  Filipino  officials 
and  aliens  other  than  Americans,  which  might  easily 
call  for  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  alien  power. 
The  United  States  would  then  be  in  a  position  either  of 
taking  sides  with  the  Fil^inos  against  the  foreign  power, 
or  else  of  taldng  sides  the  other  way  round.  In  either 
event  quite  unnecessary  and  dangerous  problems  would 
be  nised.  In  fact,  any  sort  of  a  protectorate  that  as- 
sumes responsibility  and  at  the  same  time  that  relin- 
quishes control  (as  would,  of  course,  follow  the  granting 
of  Filipino  autonomy)  would  be  dangerous  and  likely 
to  pLce  us  in  an  equivocal  situation. 

What  the  Japanese  would  do  with  the  Islands 

We  may  now  focus  th^  facts  noticed  m  the  preceding 

pages  upon  the  Japanese  aspects  of  the  problem. 

Let  us  suppose  that,  overnight,  American  rule  in  the 
Philippines  were  replaced  by  Japanese.   That  is  to  say 
let  us  omit  the  uncertain  and  disturbing  factor  of 
conflict  that  by  force  would  bring  such  a  thing  about. 
Consider  the  fait  accompli.   In  what  situation  would 
the  Japanese  find  himself? 

In  the  first  place  he  would  discover  that  he  was  a 
"  heathen  "  m  the  midst  of  millions  of  Roman  Catholics, 


i<H  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

whose  attitude  toward  him  would  be  colored  not  only 
by  the  feeling  of  the  conquered  toward  the  conqueror, 
but  also  by  the  aversion  dtxt  to  religious  prejudice.  So 
far  as  the  Japanese  has  had  a  chance  to  deport  himadf 
as  an  overlord  in  Manchuria  and  Korea,  the  prospect 
is  not  reassuring.  The  Japanese  suffers  from  a  lack  of 
that  sort  of  sentiment,  conspiciKnis  in  tiie  Anglo-Saxon, 
that  inclines  the  latter  to  assume  a  fatherly  attitude 
toward  an  alien  or  an  inferior.  His  methods  as  a  colo- 
nizer are  rather  more  like  the  German — highly  effident 
but  not  wholly  syn^thetic  In  Koroi,  where  anard^ 
has  been  immuient  for  so  long,  he  has  felt  it  necessary 
to  adopt  strong  measures  as  a  deterrent  to  opposition. 
The  Philippines,  half  conquered,  would  more  than  likely 
merit  the  same  treatment  in  his  eyes.  But  what  woubl 
be  the  result  of  the  adoption  of  repressive  measures? 
We  may  help  to  answer  this  question  by  considoing 
Formosa,  which  has  been  a  Japanese  possession  for  two 
decades.  To-day  the  whole  interior  of  this  island  is 
occu{»ed  by  head-hunting  savages.  The  subjugaticm 
of  these  ha.'  been  an  ever  present  problem  for  the  For- 
mosan  authorities.  Each  year  demanded  a  greater  out- 
lay until  in  Tyc3  the  annual  appropriation  was  nearly 
$1,000,000.  Then  the  Japanese  authorities  laid  out  a 
regular  program  to  extend  over  five  years,  beginning 
X9ia   Seven  million  five  hundred  thousand  dollars  was 


SkMEMCA,  JAPAN,  AND  THE  PHIUPFINE8  ICS 

appropriated.  After  four  years'  operations,  involving 
16,000  men  and  an  expenditure,  so  far,  of  $4,500,000, 
and  hundieds  of  casualties,  about  one  tenth  of  the  pro- 
gram had  been  car.  ed  out.  At  this  rate,  if  successful, 
the  cost  of  subjugating  the  natives  will  be  $45,000,000. 

In  the  Philippines,  the  Japanese  would  be  most  un- 
likely to  follow  out  the  disinterested  policy  of  the 
Americans ;  indeed  they  could  not  afford  to  do  so.  The 
cost  of  an  army  of  occupation,  ir  '  "v  of  the  peculiar 
disadvantages  under  which  tV  >uld  labor,  would 
be  many  times  that  of  the  Ui  J  States.  Under  any 
circumstances,  the  Japanese  control  in  the  Philippines 
would  never  extend  beyond  the  range  of  Japanese  guns. 
A  few  years  of  such  conditions,  and  the  roads  built  and 
kept  up  with  so  much  care  under  American  direction 
would  be  washed  out  and  destroyed.  The  people  of 
the  islands  are  not  an  industrial  community  like  the 
lopulation  of  Belgium.  It  would  be  impossible  to 
destroy  anything  that  would  prostrate  the  population. 
Outside  of  Manila  and  a  few  other  cities  there  is  nothing 
to  destroy  that  would  matter. 

Under  such  circumstances,  and  they  seem  to  be  in- 
evitable, on  the  premise  of  a  Japanese  occupation  by 
force,  what  would  the  Japanese  profit?  The  Philip- 
pines cannot  be  colonized  by  Japanese  laborers  any 
more  than  by  Europeans,   .xw/  ^    ducts  that  Japan 


io6  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


might  need  would  of  necessity  be  produced  by  Filipino 
labor.  Japan  would  get  no  rice,  for  the  Philippines 
annually  import  millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  that  staple 
from  other  lands.  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  Jap- 
anese might  make  a  government  monopoly  of  hemp 
and  rubber  as  they  have  of  camphor  in  Formosa.  But 
these  two  products  would  be  procured  with  the  great- 
est difficulty  under  a  military  occupation  and  their  cost 
would  be  enormously  greater  than  now. 

It  would  be  far  more  profitable  to  deal  with  the 
islands  as  a  foreign  power,  encouraging  the  development 
of  their  resources  in  order  that  they  might  have  the 
more  to  exchange  for  Japanese  goods,  than  to  attempt 
by  forced  control  to  increase  such  an  output  beyond  the 
limits  of  a  fair  exchange. 

Above  all,  little  development  of  the  Philippines  can  take 
place  even  under  the  most  peaceful  conditions,  without  the 
investment  of  foreign  capital.  Pending  such  a  develop- 
ment, the  islands  would  be  a  useless  burden  to  Japan,  and 
the  necessary  capital  she  could  never  furnish  herself. 

Altogether  no  greater  calamity  could  befall  the 
Japanese  Empire  than  to  be  compelled  to  assume  con- 
trol over  the  Philippine  Islands,  so  rich  in  potential 
wealth  and  so  poor  in  convertible  assets.  These  facts 
become  much  more  striking  when  we  examine  in  some 
detail  Japan's  economic  situation. 


CHAPTER  y 
japan's  economic  evolution 

The  Japanese  like  to  compare  themselves  with  the 
English,  and  their  Island  Empire  to  the  United  King- 
dom. Such  a  comparison  has  a  certain  justification. 
Both  are  relatively  small  island  groups  closely  adjacent 
to  a  rich  and  populous  continent.  Each  must  depend 
upon  a  strong  navy  for  national  protection.  Each  is 
densely  populated.  So  far  as  geographical  influences 
are  of  significance,  similar  conditions  may  be  expected 
to  produce  analogous  results.  One  must  not  be  too 
easily  impressed  by  analogies,  however,  for  the  histori- 
cal background  of  the  English  and  the  Japanese  and 
the  mental  characteristics  of  the  two  races  are  as  far 
apart  as  possible. 

Before  the  period  that  Toynbee  has  called  the  "  In- 
dustrial Revolution  "  (1760-1830),  England  was  a  self- 
sufficient  agricultural  country,  growing  her  own  food 
(in  the  seventeenth  century  her  imports  were  only 
one  fortieth  of  her  total  consumption,  whereas  now  they 
are  one  fourth),  and  with  her  weaving  and  other  indus- 
tries carried  on  in  the  homes  of  the  wortcers  both  in  town 

107 


io8  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


and  country.  This  was  Japan's  economic  status  until 
a  few  decades  ago ;  indeed  to  a  great  extent  it  is  today, 
for  Japan  is  in  the  midst  of  an  industrial  revolution, 
that,  mutatis  mutandis,  is  very  similar  to  what  England 
has  undergone. 

In  England's  case  the  transforming  change  was  due 
in  great  part  to  a  group  of  extraordinary  inventors  who, 
working  all  in  the  same  period,  perfected  machines  that 
very  greatly  increased  the  output  of  manufactured 
articles.  At  the  same  timj  there  developed  an  oversea 
trade  which  brought  enormous  returns,  and  produced 
in  England  a  very  large  supply  of  capital  to  be  reinvested 
in  industry.  The  social  readjustment  was  painful  and 
left  many  persistent  ills  in  its  train,  but  in  the  end  a 
population  essentially  agricultural  was  transformed  into 
one  essentially  industrial.  Moreover,  industry  became 
wholly  separated  from  state  control  and  interference. 

In  Japan  the  acceleration  of  social  change  has  been 
such  that  the  people  have  not  had  time  to  accommodate 
themselves  to  new  conditions,  and  the  state  has  had  to 
step  in  and  not  only  assume  direction  of  commerce  and 
enterprise,  but  furnish  the  capital  as  well. 

Japan  cu  an  Agricultural  Country 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Japan  is  an  extniordinarily 
mountainous  country,  her  population  is  mainly  agricul- 


japan's  economic  evolution  109 


tural.  Nearly  65  per  cent  of  the  total  population 
are  farmers.  When  we  find  that  the  chief  agricul- 
tural product  is  rice,  mostly  grown  in  flooded  paddy- 
fields,  and  that  only  about  15  per  cent  of  the  land 
of  the  Empire  is  arable  (only  half  of  that  paddy-fields), 
we  may  gain  some  idea  of  the  degree  of  intensive  agri- 
culture to  which  this  product  is  carried.  It  is  a  char- 
acteristic of  all  provincial  peoples  to  be  more  conser- 
vative about  their  food  than  about  anything  else. 
Rice  is  the  Japanese  staple,  and  it  will  be  a  long  time 
before  it  is  voluntarily  replaced  by  a  substitute  in  the 
national  diet.  Nevertheless  the  rise  in  the  cost  of  liv- 
ing has  been  as  keenly  felt  in  recent  years  on  the  other 
side  of  the  globe  as  on  this,  and  there  are  an  increasing 
number  of  Japanese  to  whom  rice  is  becoming  more 
and  more  of  a  luxury.  The  increase  in  the  price  of 
rice  during  the  past  ten  years  has  been  nearly  50  per 
cent,  and  it  is  a  commonplace  that  the  Japanese  fanner 
is  too  poor  to  eat  the  rice  he  grows.  This  condition 
makes  it  difficult  for  the  nation  to  depend  upon  imported 
rice  iv>  any  extent,  as  the  cost  of  transportation  must 
be  added  to  the  price  of  the  foreign-grown  product. 
Often  rice  is  mixed  with  millet  or  barley  to  make  it  go 
farther.  Not  infrequently  these  grains  replace  the  rice 
as  a  staple.  The  north  provinces  are  adapted  to  the 
raising  of  oats,  and  the  annual  crop  of  this  cereal  has 


no 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


increased  by  leaps  and  bounds  in  recent  years.  Wheat 
is  grown  in  considerable  amount,  although  the  abomi- 
nable quality  of  most  of  the  bread  sold  in  Japan  is  such 
as  to  offer  slight  inducement  for  any  one  to  forsake  rice 
for  it  except  under  compulsion.  Nevertheless  wheat 
and  wheaten  flour  are  consumed  in  increasing  quantities 
year  by  year.  In  1913  Japan  imported  from  America 
nearly  $s,ooo,cxx)  worth  of  wheat,  over  twice  the  import 
of  1912,  and  nearly  $500,000  worth  of  flour  besides. 
Buckwheat,  which  is  made  into  macaroni,  and  beans  are 
also  staple  articles  of  Japanese  diet.  A  large  amount  of 
wheat  is  consumed  in  the  manufacture  of  soy  (shoyu), 
the  native  sauce. 

Altogether  the  enforced  attention  to  the  cultivation 
of  grains  other  than  rice  may  result  in  modifying  the 
national  diet  and  in  extending  somewhat  the  percentage 
of  arable  land  in  the  Empire.  Indeed  about  75,000 
acres  of  wild  land  are  reclaimed  annually.  But  this 
can  by  no  means  keep  up  with  the  great  increase  in  the 
population.* 

The  birth  rate  in  1904  and  1905  was  30.6  per  1000  ; 

in  1906  it  was  29.1 ;  in  1907  it  was  33.2;  and  in  1908 

and  1909  it  was  33.7.   The  death  rate  for  the  same  pe- 

» For  many  reasons  it  would  be  of  great  advantage  to  the  na- 
tional welfare  if  meat  could  be  made  more  of  an  item  in  the 
national  diet,  but  the  extreme  poverty  of  the  people  precludes  this 
to  any  great  extent  Large  amounts  of  seafood  are  of  course 
cMMimied. 


JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION 


riod  has  remained  nearly  stationary,  about  21  per  1000. 
This  net  increase  in  the  population  produces  a  cumula- 
tive effect  The  population  of  Japan  (excluding  Korea, 
Formosa,  etc.)  in  1914  was  53,596,858,  an  increase  of 
3,342,387  since  1909.  The  annual  increase  is  now 
682,000  per  year,  although  ten  years  ago  it  was  but 
500,000.  This  increase,  without  doubt,  is  due  in  part 
to  better  conditions  of  life,  together  with  the  high  char- 
acter of  Japanese  medical  practice.* 

Growth  of  Industrialism 

The  consequence  of  thb  condition  is  apparent  With 
an  arable  area  sharply  limited  by  nature  and  a  rapidly 
increasing  population,  one  of  two  things  must  ha,ppea. 
Either  the  surplus  population  must  migrate  to  other 
food-producing  lands  or  else  Japan  must  modify  her 
national  diet  and  buy  her  food  of  other  countries.  Mi> 
gration  presents  many  problems  and  practical  difficul- 
ties, the  discussion  of  which  must  be  deferred.  To  buy 
her  food  abroad,  however,  she  must  have  the  where- 
withal to  pay  for  what  she  imports.  Raw  materials 
that  may  be  exported  are  few  in  number  and  small  in 

^It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  at  no  time  since  1890  has  the 

female  moiety  of  the  population  exceeded  the  male.  The  annual 
birth  rate  of  males  exceeds  that  of  females  from  3  per  cent  to  8 
per  cent,  averagings  as  a  rul^  a  fraction  over  4  per  cent 


"2  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

amount*  Circmnstanccs.  therefore,  rather  than  national 
instincts  have  forced  Japan  into  the  ranks  of  the  indus- 
trial nations,  earning  her  national  living  by  utilizing  the 
labor  of  her  miUions  of  hands  to  increase  the  value  of  raw 
materials  supplied  from  abroaa.  and  then  passing  them 
on  to  other  countries  in  the  channels  of  foreign  trade. 

The  group  of  statesmen  who  have  directed  the  affairs 
of  Japan  recognized  this  situation  years  ago,  and  the 
government  has  bent  every  effort  to  stimulate  and  foster 
industrial  enterprise.   This  has  been  a  much  more  diffi- 
cult problem  than  it  would  be  in  an  Occidental  state. 
It  must  be  recalled  that  only  a  half  century  ago  Japa- 
nese society  was  feudal,— a  feudalism  that  embraced 
not  only  the  military  aspects  of  life,  but  even  more  the 
arts  and  industries.   Foreign  commerce  was  something 
to  be  feared  and  opposed.   A  modern  factory  was  un- 
thinkable.  Accustomed  to  look  to  their  superiors  for 
aid  and  initiative,  no  amount  of  economic  pressure 
ever  would  have  induced  the  people  themselves  to  have 
embarked  on  industrial  enterprise.   The  government 
therefore  took  the  lead,  and  began  to  establish  and  sub- 

vaIu?oT»if.";  f  to  «>'»I  and  copper.  The  annual 

I       .  °^  "  $3S.oo<vw>  (1913) ;  that 

"  (^9^3).  Although  the  export  of  both  of 

S^f,nt "  to  the  past  two  decades,  the  total 

amount  ,s  but  a  small  part  of  the  total  export  trade.  (The  export 
of  coal  m  1913  was  about  $1  and  that  of  copper  $14,000^) 


JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION 


113 


sidize  all  sorts  of  manufacturing  ventures.  Since  the 
Russian  war  it  has  had  an  additional  incentive  to  par- 
ticipate in  any  enterprise  in  which  a  profit  could  be 
found,  on  account  of  the  pressing  need  of  getting  hold 
of  all  available  revenue  to  meet  the  heavy  post-bellum 
expenditures.  This  policy  has  resulted  in  making  the 
national  government  a  partner  iu  various  commercial 
undertakings  to  a  degree  quite  unknown  in  the  western 
world.  Cotton  and  silk-spinning  factories,  cement 
works,  glassworks,  match  factories,  shipbuilding,  brick- 
making  establishments,  and  iron  foundries  have  been 
inaugurated  by  a  paternal  government.  Some  of  these 
have  been  colossal  failures.^  Other  have  been  trans- 
ferred to  private  owners  aftur  a  good  start  has  been 
made.  But  such  enterprises  are  fostered  thereafter  in 
every  possible  way, —  by  protective  tariffs,  transpor- 
tation rebates,  bonuses,  even  the  relending  to  private 
companies,  at  a  low  rate  of  interest,  of  money  borrowed 
by  the  government  abroad. 

In  1896  there  were  7600  factories  of  all  sorts,  em- 
ploying 434,832  operatives.  In  1905  tiiere  were  9776 
factories  and  587,851  operatives.  In  191 3  there  were 
15,811  factories  and  916,252  operatives.  The  place  of 
women  and  girls  in  the  Japanese  factory  system  is  sig- 

^The  amraal  deficit  of  the  steel  foundry  openlbtd  ly  the  state  it 
about  $i,4oo/x)a 


"4  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


nificant  In  sUk-reeling  90  per  cent  of  the  operatives 
are  women;  in  weaving  and  cigarette  making,  over  80 
per  cent;  in  cotton  spinning,  over  60  per  cent* 

The  predominance  of  women  in  Japanese  industry 
is  correlated  with  the  scarcity  or  total  absence  of  the 
"  skilled  artisan  "  type  of  man,  a  pomt  to  which  we  shall 
recur  farther  on.  The  average  daily  wages  of  the  fe- 
male cotton-factory  operatives  arc  13.9  cents  (gold)  a 
day;  those  of  men  average  22  cents.  The  cotton-spin- 
ning factories  run  continuously,  night  and  day,  the 
operatives  working  in  shifts.* 

The  government  retains  ^ol  of  those  mdustries 
which  are  of  importance  to  i  ational  welfare,  such  as 
dockyards,  shipyards,  arsenals,  etc  In  addition,  the 
government,  for  financial  reasons,  has  created  monop- 
olies in  some  lines  of  business,  such  as  the  manufacture 
and  sale  of  cigarettes,  camphor,  and  salt. 

>This  includes  only  factories  in  the  American  sense.  A  hrge  per- 
centage of  the  manufactured  products  of  Japan  is  produced  in  the 
home  and  all  the  women  and  children  of  a  family  participate.  This 
condition  was  also  true  of  England  until  the  industrial  revdotion. 

'These  figures  are  from  the  Official  Report  of  the  Japanese  De- 
partment of  Agriculture  and  Commerce  and  are  for  the  year  1911 
(the  LiLst  published).  As  the  tendency  has  been  for  wages  to 
constanUy  increase,  the  current  average  wage  is  doubtless  a  cent 
or  two  higher.  The  Japan  Cotton  Spinning  Association  compiles 
annuall,  similar  statistics,  based  upon  reports  from  all  the  mills, 
and  publishes  the  average  wages  for  women  (1911)  to  be  14.1 
cents  and  for  men  22,5  cents.  About  two  thirds  of  the  operatiTes 
are  paid  by  ^ecework  and  one  third  fay  the  day. 


■yyi  ,--'i--.'."i''*»i'iau' 


JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION  "S 


The  Japanese  Workman 

The  success  or  failure  of  an  industrial  system  depends 
in  the  last  analysis  upon  the  character  of  the  human 
element  involved  rather  than  upon  machinery.  Japan 
can  purchase  machinery  to  duplicate  anything  in  a  Euro- 
pean or  Americ.'»n  factory.  The  success  of  the  indus- 
trial system,  however,  must  be  gauged  by  the  efficiency 
of  the  operatives  and  even  more  by  the  organizing  ability 
of  the  executive  departments. 

With  respect  to  the  last  point  it  is  perhaps  too  soon 
to  judge.  In  advertising,  the  Japanese  have  been 
quick  to  imitate  the  more  obvious  devices  of  the  West, 
particularly  of  America.  But  it  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  they  will  be  equal  to  the  demands  laid  upon  the 
ingenuity  and  creative  faculties  of  the  executive  heads 
of  big  business  enterprises,  such  as  will  be  necessary  in 
a  successful  competition  with  Europe  and  America.  In 
pushing  retail  sales,  particularly  by  means  of  itinerant 
agents,  the  Japanese  are  most  active,  resourceful,  and 
successful.  In  the  opinion  of  the  writer  they  lack, 
however,  the  patient  persistence  of  the  Germans  and  the 
imagination  and  brilliancy  of  the  successful  American 
sales  manager. 

The  quality  of  the  Japanese  workman  is  much  m'^re 
evident.   The  traditions  of  Japanese  social  life  a.. 


"0  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

responsible  for  the  fact  that  in  some  lines  Japanese 
workmanship  surpasses  that  of  any  other  people.  This 
is  particularly  seen  in  the  production  of  art-objects, 
including  fine  metal  work,  cloisonne,  damascene,  porce- 
lains, inlaid  wood,  ivory  carving,  etc.  This  perfection 
of  attainment  is  a  national  trait,  fostered  by  feudalism 
and  one  of  its  lingering  survivals.  No  Western  nation, 
except  perhaps  the  French,  can  hope  to  rival  the  Japa- 
nese in  this  line.  Yet  th's  ability  is  curiously  limited. 
The  Japanese  artisan  can  produce  an  inlaid  wooden  box 
of  which  the  nicety  of  construction  of  its  hundreds  of 
parts  is  a  marvel  to  an  Occidental,  but  he  is  quite  in- 
capable of  finishing  a  scientific  mechanism  or  instrument 
of  precision  so  that  it  can  compare  with  the  product  of 
a  European  or  American  workshop. 

In  the  rroduction  of  works  of  art,  time  is  no  object, 
but  in  the  savage  competition  of  international  com- 
merce, time  is  worth  dollars.  Now  in  commercializing 
her  native  industries,  Japan  stands  a  good  chance  to 
lose  that  artistic  quality  of  her  products  that  has  lai  s^ely 
created  their  markets.  This  is  felt  today  in  those 
artistic  lines  *Jiat  have  been  stimulated  by  foreign  de- 
mand. In  ceramics,  for  example,  one  will  look  in  vain 
for  the  old  artistic  qualities  in  the  product  of  the  big 
"factories"  of  Kyoto  and  Nagoya.  The  adept  who 
knows  the  by-ways  will  find  what  he  seeks  in  the  tiny 


JAPAN'S  EOQNQMIC  EVOLUTION 


117 


workshops  of  potters  t!iat  have  not  yet  been  "  commer- 
cialized." If  one  wishes  the  finest  embroideries,  he  no 
longer  finds  them  in  the  big  shops  of  the  cities.  The 
best  work  is  done  in  the  country  districts. 

The  Japanese  workman  as  an  artist  knows  no  rival ; 
as  a  skilled  laborer  in  the  Western  sense  one  might  al- 
most say  he  knows  no  inferior.  The  amount  of  waste 
energy  and  waste  time  that  is  expended  in  putting 
through  a  given  job  would  drive  a  foreign  foreman  to 
madness  if  he  had  an  eye  to  the  cost  sheet  As  a  matter 
of  fact  the  "  skilled  workman  "  type  is  practically  non- 
existent in  Japan.  This  limits  appreciably  the  nati<Mial 
capacity  for  industrial  development  and  probably  ex- 
plains in  part  the  failures  that  have  followed  attempts 
to  develop  many  lines  of  manufactures. 

Silk  reeling,  cotton  spinning,  and  such  other  proc- 
esses as  require  not  skilled  effort  but  merely  patient 
attention  are,  of  course,  successfully  carried  out  by 
Japanese  workmen  (or  more  often  workgirls).  But 
the  belief  that  the  Japanese,  given  the  machines,  can 
be  equally  successful  in  all  othtf  manufacturing  lines 
is  quite  unfotmd^. 

In  another  group  of  industries,  however,  Japanese 
success  is  marked.  This  involves  not  factory,  but  home 
production,  in  which  the  family  group,  old  and  youngs 
work  together.   All  the  fancy  straw  matting,  of  which 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

in  1913  wt  bought  $1,500,000  worth,  it  made  in  this 
wa  in  three  provinces  adjacent  to  Kobe.  The  myriads 
of  cheap  toys  are  similarly  produced..  Even  silk  is 
still  largely  reeled  hi  farmhouses  throughout  the  coun- 
try districts  of  central  and  southern  Japan.  One  of  the 


Diatnm  of  Japmfg  Fonigt  Trade— 1913. 
great  problems  facing  the  government— one  to  which 
apparently  not  much  attention  is  being  paid  — is  the 
training  of  skilled  workmen  in  those  lines  of  manufac- 


JAPAN*S  ECX}N(nbfIC  EVOLUTION  Ii9 

ture  that  are  alieu  to  Japanese  traditions,  in  which,  how- 
ever, she  hopes  to  compete  with  the  Occident  in  supply- 
ing the  rest  of  Asia. 

Jain's  FoTiign  Trade 
Pursuant  to  the  policy  mentioned  above,  state-fos- 
tered foreign  trade  has  steadily  advan^.  In  1890  the 
combined  imports  and  exports  totaled  a  figure  that  rep- 
resented only  $1.71  per  capita.  By  1900  it  was  $548 
per  capita.  In  1913  it  was  $13  per  capita.  The  accom- 
panying diagram  expresses  the  distribtition  of  this  trade 
for  the  year  1913.*  (The  European  war,  of  course,  has 
rendered  all  trade  conditi(ms  so  abnormal  that  the  quo- 
tation of  statistics  for  1914  would  not  be  pertinent)^ 

>  The  actual  figfures  for  1912  and  1913  are  as  follows : 


United  States   

All  America,  north  and  scutii, 

except  United  States  

All  Europe   

Australia   

All  Asia  except  Philippines  and 

Kuantung  

Philippines   

Hawaii   

Total  (including  other  coun- 
tries)   


Exratrs     |  IitRMm 

191a 

$  84,017.030 

$  63^3.847 

3,536417 
56,928,067 
4.297,309 

1,258,943 
101,247.690 

93452,373 

2,756,678 
2,600,533 

I14,074/)4I 
2,627,56s 
14,650 

$263426^ 

$30B,asa,iS4 

»20  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

From  this  diagram  it  will  be  seen  that  Japan  sold  to 
all  the  world,  except  America,  much  less  than  she 
bought  Of  the  great  factors  in  thir  international 
trade,  the  United  States  bought  of  Jaj  an  in  1912,  21  per 
cent  more  than  she  sold  to  her,  and  ii.  ka^.  33  pt  -  cent 
more.  Furthermore,  while  Asia  is  a  oeiter  cuwtomer  of 
Japan  than  we  are  (to  the  extent  of  $8,435,000  in  1912 
and  $27,555,000  in  1913),  yet  m  those  same  years,  the 
greatest  that  Japanese  export  trade  has  known,  never- 
theless she  bought  of  Asia  as  imports  mto  Japan,  in 
1912,  $21,622,000,  in  1913,  $34,721,000  more  than  she 
sold  to  Asia,  These  differences  have  been  maintamed 
approximately,  year  after  year,  in  spite  of  the  annual 
increase  of  the  total  value  of  the  trade.   Their  great 


United  States   

All    America    except  United 

States   

AH  Europe   

Australia  

All  Asia  except  Philippines  and 

Kuantung   

PhiUppines   

Hawaii   

Total  (including  other  coun- 
tries)   


Exports 

iMFCHtTS 

1913 

$  9136^12 

3,628.991 
73,320.864 
4^,273 

2,303,903 

109,704,487 
7,441.686 

119,424,371 
3,129,211 
2486,071 

154,145,655 
3308,621 
45.088 

$3i4>965,i86 

$363,256,960 

JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION 

significance  in  another  cctnnection  will  be  seen  a  little 
later. 

A  detailed  analysis  of  this  trade  would  be  quite  out  of 
place  here.   Yet  some  points  stand  out  conspicuously. 

Considering  first  the  imports  into  Japan,  we  find  that 
in  1913  these  totaled  $363,356,960.  Of  this  sum  the 
United  States  contributed  $60,959,364,  being  exceeded 
only  by  Great  Britain.  This  is  more  than  one-sixth  of 
her  total  imports.  More  than  half  of  this  is  raw  cot- 
ton, which  in  19 13  Japan  purchased  from  the  United 
States  to  the  value  o!  $31,981,732- 

The  Importance  of  Cotton 

Cotton  is  perhaps  the  most  important  single  item 
in  the  daily  life  of  the  Oriental.  Of  the  hundreds  of 
millions  of  inhabitants  of  Japan  and  China,  it  constitutes 
the  only  material  for  clothing  from  January  to  Decem- 
ber,—  one  thidcness  in  summer;  wadded  and  inter- 
lined in  winter.  The  fraction  of  the  population  that  can 
afford  to  dress  m  silk  or  wool  is  negligible.  In  Japan, 
thick  cotton-stuffed  futon,  much  like  an  American 
"  comforter,"  form  not  only  the  universal  covering  for 
the  Japanese  bed,  but  the  body  of  the  bed  it^^Jf .  Japan 
is  therefore  a  large  consumer  of  cotton  and  cotton- 
goods.  On  the  other  hand,  she  is  next  door  to  China, 


lai  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


whose  heavy  demand  for  cotton  goods  must  also  be 
satisfied.  These  two  facts  make  cotton  a  very  impor- 
tant consideration  in  Japanese  commerce  and  industry. 

Now  very  little  cotton  is  grown  in  Ja^  an  itself,  and 
although  experiments  have  been  undertaken  in  growing 
t.iis  staple  in  Korea  and  Formosa,  the  climate  of  the 
former  is  not  very  favorable,  and  sugar  and  other  crops 
are  more  profitable  in  the  latter.  All  the  raw  cotton 
that  is  worked  up  into  yams  and  cloths  in  Japanese 
mills  must  be  imported.  For  the  decade  from  1900  to 
1910  the  total  imports  into  Japan  were  $1,948,437,000, 
and  of  this  $473,143,000,  or  nearly  one  fourth,  was 
raw  cotton.  This  percentage  is  increasing.  In  191 1 
raw  cotton  formed  281^  per  cent  of  the  total  imports; 
in  191 2,  32    per  cmt;  and  in  1913,  32  per  cent. 

This  large  importation  of  raw  cc  tton,  ginned  and  un- 
ginned,  comes  chiefly  from  India,  China,  and  the  United 
States.  Egypt  contributes  a  relatively  small  amount, 
India,  up  to  the  present,  has  supplied  one  half,  or  more, 
of  all  the  raw  cotton  consumed.  American  cotton  is 
preferred  because  of  its  better  quality,  and  until  1900 
formed  40  per  cent  of  the  total  annual  import.  But 
since  then,  with  an  occasional  exception,  the  price  has 
risen  until  the  cheaper  Indian  cotton  has  displaced  it  to 
a  considerable  extent.  Chinese  cotton  is  cheap,  but 
harsh  and  of  ^ort  stafde. 


JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION  "3 

The  factor  of  transportation  plays  an  important  role 
in  this  trade.  Indian  cotton  takes  about  forty  days  in 
transit,  and  its  importation  is  facilitated  by  subsidized 
steamer  lines  between  Japan  and  Bombay  and  Calcutta. 
Until  now,  American  cotton  has  had  to  travel  either 
across  the  Atlantic  and  via  Suez  to  the  Orient,  or  else 
(the  more  usual  route)  overland  via  San  Francisco  and 
across  the  Pacific.  This  requires  rehandling,  often 
storage  en  route,  and  the  use  of  the  most  expensive 
transportation  facilities.  The  time  between  Houston, 
Texas,  and  Japan  is  about  eighty  days,  but  may  be  much 
longer.  There  is  always  loss  of  weight  on  the  road,  and 
the  transportation  charge  is  a  heavy  handicap.  The 
rate  from  Houston  to  Kobe  is  $30.24  per  cubic  ton, 
whereas  that  from  Bombay  to  Kobe  (deducting  a  re- 
bate) is  10.59  rupees  ($3.48)  and  from  Shanghai  to 
Kobe  $3.34  (  =  $1.67  gold).* 

It  is  obvious  that  American  cotton  must  have  char- 
acteristic excellencies  to  compete  at  all.  "  Chinese  cot- 
ton is  usually  white,  but  does  not  possess  any  special 
luster,  while  most  of  the  Indian  cottons  have  a  brown- 
ish tinge  and  both  cottons  are  harsh.  American  cotton 
is  softer  and  more  lustrous  and  the  addition  of  it  not 
only  adds  to  the  strength  but  improves  the  feel  and 

^"Cotton  Goods  in  Japan,"  U.  S.  Department  of  Ginimerce 
^cc.  Agt  Series  No.  86^  1914. 


IH  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


appearance  of  the  yarn  and  enables  the  mills  to  obtain 
a  better  price."  * 

American  cotton  therefore  will  always  have  a  market 
if  the  Japanese  mill  owner  can  afford  it.  The  Panama 
canal  ought  to  work  an  immediate  and  profound  change 
in  the  cotton  situation  and  establish  the  suprenuu^  of 
our  trade  in  that  staple  with  Japan.  Recognizing  this, 
the  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha  S.S.  line  to  Seattle  will  be 
reorganized  after  1915  and  the  service  of  those  ships 
will  thereafter  be  extended  to  the  newly  organized 
Panama  line,  for  which  a  governmental  subsidy  of 
$4»  185,765  will  be  appropriated  for  the  next  five  years. 

Notwithstanding  the  great  consumption  of  cotton 
in  Japan,  it  figures  also  as  a  very  important  item  in 
her  export  trade.  An  ahnost  limitless  market  exists  at 
present  in  China  for  cotton  goods.  In  1913  Japan  sold 
nearly  $49,000,000  worth  of  cotton  manufactures  to 
China,  over  six  times  the  value  of  the  raw  cottcm  sIm 
purchased  from  her.  Thus  a  large  part  of  American- 
grown  cotton  finds  its  way  to  the  Chinese  consumer  by 
way  of  the  Japanese  factory. 

Another  important  item  of  Japan's  imports  is  that 
of  iron,  steel,  and  machinery,  of  which  she  bought  in 
1913,  roughly  $40,000,000  worth,—  Great  Britain  lead- 
ing in  this  trad^  ^ith  America  and  Germany  con- 


JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION  "5 

tributing  about  25  per  cent  each.  Kerosene  oil  is  an 
important  item  of  import.  Its  use  is  widespread  and 
increasing  and  the  oil  fields  of  Northwest  Japan  never 
have  been  a  very  paying  venture.  The  United  States 
sells  to  Japan  about  $4,000,000  worth  of  oil  annually, 
and  the  Dutch  East  Indies  half  as  much  more.  The 
importation  of  wheat  and  wheat  flour,  which  is  mostly 
supplied  by  America,  is  rapidly  increasing  and  reaches  a 
value  of  over  $6,000,000. 

Turiiing  to  the  other  side  jf  the  ledger  again,  we  find 
a  few  items  relatively  conspicuous.  The  following 
table  will  show  this  for  the  year  1913: 


Items 

Japan  Exported  to 

V.SJi. 

Europe 

Silk  mfg.  (Habutaye)   

Cotton  yarns  and  textiles  . . 

Tea   

$62,703,000 
2,494.000 
158,000 
1,368,000 
4424.000 

$30,555,000 
9,236,000 
78,000 
354.000 

$  3,393.000 
60372,000 

125,000 

85,000 

$95498,000 

$73,321,000 

$122,554,000 

In  the  above  table  many  important  items  are  omitted 
in  order  to  render  more  conspicuous  the  most  important 
ones.  Thus  Australia  and  Canada  are  not  mentioned, 
although  Japan  maintains  a  growing  trade  with  both. 
A  great  variety  of  cheap  manufactured  goods,  such  aa 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


clocks,  matches,  and  umbrellas,  is  sold  to  China.  It 
should  be  mentioned  also  that  the  exports  to  South 
Manchuria  (Kuantung);  which  are  listed  in  the  official 
statistics,  are  omitted  on  the  ground  that,  whatever  may 
be  the  diplomatic  fictions  still  maintr.ined,  this  district  is 
really  part  of  Japan  and  its  trade  is  "  interstate  traffic." 
Ceylon  tea  is  getting  to  be  a  very  strong  competitor  in 
the  American  market  *  and  of  recent  years  has  replaced 
Japanese  tea  to  a  great  extent.  The  Japanese  govern- 
ment, recognizing  this,  is  now  attempting,  unsuccess- 
fully so  far,  to  meet  it  by  stimulating  the  development 
of  similar  (dark)  tea  in  Formosa.  A  trade  which  is  of 
very  recent  origin,  but  one  that  will  without  doubt 
show  an  extraordinary  development  in  the  near  future, 
is  that  of  cheap  toys  and  favors.  There  is  a  large  mar- 
ket for  these  in  America  at  Christmas,  Easter,  Hallow- 
e'en, and  other  festivals,  which  until  ve'y  recently  has 
been  supplied  by  Germany.  The  writer  has  seen  go- 
downs  in  Kobe  literally  filled  with  thousands  of  kinds  of 
these  novelties.  It  only  remains  to  create  or  enlarge  the 
market  in  America.  These  goods  are  manufactured 
by  the  so-called  "  family  industry  "  system  rather  than 
in  factories,  a  method  that  has  already  been  described. 

»  Over  80  per  cent  of  the  tea  produced  in  Japan  finds  its  market  in 
America.  The  decline  of  the  trade  is  seen  in  comparing  the  annual 
reports.  In  Z911  titis  represented  ^.iS^floO',  in  1913,  ^i\*Zf^ 


JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION  "7 

The  most  striking  item  in  this  table  is  that  of  raw 
silk,  which  constitutes  more  than  two  thirds  the  entire 
export  to  the  United  States  and  of  which  we  buy  twice 
as  mudi  as  all  the  rest  of  the  world.    Raw  silk  com- 
prises nearly  30  per  cent  of  Japan's  entire  export  to  the 
world.    Many  times  and  in  various  places  the  culture 
of  silk  has  been  attempted  in  this  country,  always  with- 
out success.   It  requires  a  cheap  grade  of  labor  of  a 
peculiar  temperamental  make-up  in  which  the  Oriental 
need  fear  no  competition  with  the  Occidental.  The 
great  value  of  this  import  is  an  index  to  our  national 
wealth  and  luxury,  for  it  is  manufactured  here  into  silk 
stuffs,  most  of  which  are  consumed  at  home.   In  the 
manufacture  of  this  raw  silk  into  high-grade  fabrics 
(other  than  habutaye)  American  mills  lead  the  world, 
and  it  will  be  many  a  day  before  Japan  can  compete 
with  us  in  the  world's  market  in  this  line. 

Approximately,  Japan  sells  annually  to  America 
about  25  per  cent  less  of  goods  than  she  does  to  Asia 
(chiefly  China)  and  over  30  per  cent  more  than  she  does 
to  all  Europe.  Her  total  exports  to  the  entire  world 
for  1913,  totaled  $314,965,186.  Nearly  one  third  of 
all  the  goods  she  sells,  therefore,  are  bought  J)^  the 
United  States. 


(TAPANESE  EXPANSION 


The  Balance  of  Trade 

The  di£Feruice  between  the  total  value  of  goods 
bought  and  sold  by  a  nation  in  the  channels  of  foreign 
commerce  is  known  as  the  "  Balance  of  Trade."  This 
balance  for  many  years  has  been  against  Japan.  In 
1913  the  excess  of  the  value  of  imports  over  exports  was 
more  than  $48,000,000.  In  other  words,  Japan  had  to 
pay  out  that  sum  in  gold  abroad,  instead  of  cancelling 
the  debt  with  the  account  on  the  other  side  of  the  ledger. 
The  distribution  of  this  balance  is  interesting  and  sig- 
nificant. In  the  account  with  Asia,  that  balance  was 
$36,000,000.  With  Europe  the  balance  against  Japan 
was  ahnost  the  same,  $36,500,000,  It  is  only  when  we 
come  to  America  that  we  find  the  situation  reversed,  for 
in  the  same  year  we  bought  of  Japan  over  $32,000,000 
worth  of  goods  over  and  above  what  she  bought  of 
us.  This  point  has  an  especial  significance  in  con- 
nection with  future  contingencies. 

Japan  is  \  he  happy  hunting  ground  of  the  well-to-do 
globe-trotter  and  the  adverse  balance  of  trade  is  con- 
siderably mitigated  by  the  disbursements  of  tourists 
in  Japan,  which  taken  together  with  the  remittances 
sent  home  by  Japanese  abroad  (in  Hawaii  and  Cali- 
fornia, for  example)  may  in  good  years  evai  up  the 
account   An  index  of  this  is  the  number  of  foreigners 


JAPAN*S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION  «a9 

who  land  at  Japanese  ports  during  the  year.  This  num- 
ber in  191 3  was  21,886,  including  over  4000  British 
and  5000  Americans. 

Of  course  an  occasional  adverse  balance  of  trade  is 
not  to  be  considered  a  national  disaster,  especially  if  the 
amount  involved  is  represented  by  industrial  invest- 
ments that  are  later  to  bring  profitable  returns.  But 
with  a  nation  like  Japan,  carrying  a  very  heavy  per 
capita  national  debt  and  at  the  same  time  with  an  ambi- 
tious military  program  that  diverts  millions  into  un- 
productive channels,  it  is  a  much  more  serious  matter. 

In  the  thirteen  years  from  1900  to  1913,  only  twice 
has  the  trade  balance  been  in  favor  of  Japan  (two  and  a 
half  million  dollars  in  1906  and  nine  millions  in  1909).* 
The  total  of  the  excess  of  imports  into  Japan  over  ex- 
ports for  the  other  eleven  years  is  $376,085,000. 

Japan's  Market  in  China 
The  "  awakening  of  China  "  has  been  much  heralded. 
A  decade  ago  when  the  German  !&nperor  had  his  vision 
of  an  armed  "  yellow  peril  '*  this  awakening  was  viewed 

»The  first  of  th«e  was  dae  to  business  depression  of  that  year; 
the  second  in  part  to  the  Imperial  Boshin  rescript  enjoining  na- 
tional economy.  It  must  be  understood  that  the  phrase,  "trade 
balance,"  as  t»ed  above  and  as  ordinarily  used,  refers  only  to 
"visible"  exports  and  imports.  Such  an  adverse  trade  balance 
may  often  be  compensated,  as  in  the  case  of  England,  by  a  favor- 
able balance  of  "inviuUe"  exports  and  importi. 


130  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


with  considerable  alarm  and  European  statesmen  re- 
minded one  another  when  too  late  of  the  virtue  in  the 
adage  to  let "  sleeping  dogs  lie  "  This  panic  h-s  passed 
away.  It  is  realized  that  from  the  standpoint  of  na- 
tional aggression  China  was  more  like  an  unstimulated 
jellyfish  than  a  slumbering  dragon. 

But  the  awakened  China  has  none  the  less  a  persistent 
interest  for  the  rest  of  the  world.  Four  hundred  mil- 
lion human  beings  beginning  (so  we  imagine)  to  throw 
off  the  shackles  of  ages  of  conservatism  and  adopt  at 
least  the  externals  of  Western  civilization,  with  new 
ideas,  new  aspirations,  new  wants,—  what  a  market  is 
this  for  the  trade  of  Christendom!  A  countr>'  of  ap- 
parently limitless  natural  resources,  almost  untouched, 
with  a  population  of  unparalleled  industry,—  here  are 
the  factors  to  create  the  wealth  that  makes  China  a 
much-sought  customer. 

The  recognition  of  this  condition  has  long  dominated 
the  field  of  international  diplomacy.  The  possession 
of  India  and  the  need  for  protecting  her  long  sea  lanes 
to  that  Empire  are  responsible  for  Gibraltar  and  the 
Suez  canal.  To  get  at  the  Orient  by  another  route 
has  been  the  central  problem  of  other  European  nations 
with  oversea  ambitions,  and  the  mainspring  of  much  of 
their  foreign  policy.  It  is  this  that  impelled  the  Rus- 
sians to  throw  their  sooo-mile  railway  across  Siberia 


JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION  «3I 

to  the  PaciHc  and  to  seek  there  an  ice-free  port,  a  policy 
that  led  eventually  to  the  war  of  1904.  It  was  the 
quest  for  the  markets  of  China  that  led  to  all  the  polit- 
ical undertakings  of  Germany  in  Turkey  and  the  near 
East,  the  struggle  for  a  "  place  in  the  sun  "  and  tUti- 
mately  the  European  conflict  of  1914. 

Nature  has  relieved  two  great  nations  of  the  necessity 
for  this  struggle.  Japan  is  at  the  very  door  of  China 
and  America  is  across  the  ocean.  Australia  may  be  a 
factor  in  the  near  future,  but  her  relations  so  far  have 
been  with  Europe  rather  than  with  Asia.  Compared 
with  America,  Japan  has  the  great  advantage  of  prox- 
imity and  a  certain  common  basis  of  written  language. 
America  has  the  advantage  of  great  wealth  and  natural 
resources.  What  America  sells  to  Asia  is  largely  raw 
materials.  What  Japan  sells  is  of  necessity  chiefly 
manufactured  products.  It  is  but  natural  then  that 
Japan  should  consider  herself  the  middle  man  or  com- 
prador of  the  Orient  and  that  she  should  seek  every 
avenue  to  China's  markets.  In  fact  the  dominance  of 
this  market  is  absolutely  essential  to  that  position  of 
national  prestige  and  influence  which  is  her  ambition. 
Her  success  so  far  has  been  very  marked. 

The  amount  of  the  exports  from  Japan  to  China  has 
increased  year  by  year  until  in  1913  they  were  about 
160  per  cent  greater  than  they  were  in  1902,  whereas 


I3a  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

those  of  the  United  States  had  increased  by  only  20 
per  cent.*  Both  countries  show  a  sharp  fall  in  the 
year  1909  due  to  the  Chinese  boycott  agitation.  Japan 
quickly  recovered,  but  America  has  done  so  but  little. 
The  gains  for  Japan  from  191 1  to  1913  are  phenome- 
nal, approximating  $20,000,000  a  year.  In  19 13  this 
great  gain  (about  two  thirds  of  the  entire  American  ex- 
port trade)  is  assignable  almost  entirely  to  increased 
sales  of  copper  (increase  100  per  cent),  cotton  textiles 
and  yams  (increase  33  per  cent),  and  refined  sugar 
(increase  nearly  100  per  cent).  Tl.>  sales  of  cotton 
goods  alone  were  over  $io,ocx),ooo  greater  in  1913 


^  The  following  table  shows  the  increase  in  the  valae  of  Japan's 
exports  to  China  for  the  past  twelve  years. 

Exports  to  China  (Including  Hong  Kong) 


Japan 

United  Statbs 

igo2 

$36,357,000 

$22,604,000 

1903 

47,359.000 

19,203,000 

1904 

48,572,000 

21,886,000 

190S 

54448.000 

57,596,000 

1906 

58390,000 

33^327,000 

1907 

53,0X0,000 

27,677.000 

1908 

40472,000 

26,6-2,000 

1909 

36,544,000 

20,549,000 

1910 

56,748,000 

16,160,000 

191 1 

56.336,000 

26,602,000 

1912 

71,482,000 

26,736,000 

1913 

93.765,000 

31,758,000 

1914 

Q 

35,395,000 

JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION 


133 


than  19 1 2.  The  great  increase  in  sugar  export,  in  spite 
of  a  heavy  home  consumption,  is  due  to  a  strongly  stim- 
ulated production  of  raw  sugar  in  Formosa,  where  it  has 
enjoyed  government  bounties,  tariff  drawbadcs,  and 
farm  subsidies.  Previously,  almost  all  tlie  raw  sugar 
came  from  Java  to  be  refined  in  Japan.  Another  it«n 
of  great  importance  in  Japan's  China  trade  is  that  of 
small  manufactures  such  as  clocks,  matches,  lamps,  and 
umbrellas.  These  things  are  luxuries  for  the  moment, 
but  quickly  become  necessities  as  the  spread  of  Occi- 
dentalism continues  in  China.  Suppose  that  education 
in  Western  conveniences  had  advanced  to  a  stage  at 
which  the  consumption  of  matches  in  China  is  oat  five- 
cent  box  a  year  for  each  inhabitant, —  not  a  very  ex- 
travagant prospect  surely.  Yet  the  sum  total  of  that 
year's  trade  in  matches  would  be  $20,000,000,  almost  as 
much  as  America's  total  exports  to  China  today. 

Of  course  this  assumes  that  China  would  not  begin 
to  manufacture  her  own  matches,  an  assumption  which 
is  very  unlikely.  It  is  more  probable  that  before  long 
Chinese  matches  would  begin  to  compete  in  the  world's 
markets  with  those  of  Japan  and  other  countriei.  For 
the  present,  however,  that  contingency  is  a  matter  of 
the  future.  Certainly,  just  now,  Japan's  growing  trade 
with  China  in  the  products  of  her  fs^ries  seems  to  be 
outdistancing  competitors. 


134 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


Other  evidence  of  the  growing  prominence  of  Japanese 
trade  with  China  is  seen  in  the  great  lorowth  of  her  ship- 
ping. During  the  last  half  of  the  nineteenth  century 
Great  Britain  dominated  this  trade  and  the  greater  part 
of  it  was  carried  in  British  ships.  The  last  fifteen  or 
twenty  years  have  seen  the  gradual  encroachment  of 
German  and  Japanese  interests  until  England's  preemi- 
nence  appears  likely  to  slip  from  her.  This  result  has 
been  due  not  so  much  to  the  decline  of  British  trade 
per  se  as  to  the  fact  that  the  extension  of  the  Chmese 
trade,  which  has  been  rapid,  has  mostly  gone  to  her 
rivals.* 

Japanese  Finances 
Japan  has  been  forced  to  levy  upon  every  conceiv- 
able source  of  revenue  to  provide  funds  for  her  military 
and  commercial  enterprises.  First,  there  is  the  land 
tax,  running  from  2.5  per  cent  to  5.5  per  cent  of  the 
assessed  value.  This  supplies  about  $4,300,000.  Next 

*The  tonnage  of  the  shipping  which  cleared  Chinese  ports  for 
the  past  ten  years  was  as  follows;  the  percentages  are  those  of  ap- 
proximate increase: 

Gkxat  Bbitain 


JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTIOK  135 


in  importance  is  the  income  tax,  on  a  sliding  scale  with 
a  minimum  of  $200.  The  percentage  of  taxatic^  runs 
from  I  per  cent  on  the  minimum  to  5.5  per  cent  on 
$50,000  or  more.  It  is  of  interest  to  discover  that  only 
thirteen  individuals  in  the  Empire  have  an  annual  in- 
come of  more  than  $20,000,  only  67  pay  on  $12,000, 
and  only  140  pay  on  $5500.  Only  seven  out  of  every 
thousand  make  $1400  per  year.  Yet  the  income  tax 
yields  the  government  about  $15,000,000  a  year. 

In  addition  to  these  two  excises  there  is  a  business 
tax  levied  under  some  twelve  different  headings;  this 
yields  about  $10,000,000  more.  Then  there  is  a  docu- 
ment tax  on  the  "  ad  valorem  "  plan;  a  tax  on  soy  (a 
Japanese  sauce) ;  a  tax  on  medicine;  a  tax  on  liquors 
corresponding  to  our  own  "  internal  revenue  " ;  a  tax  on 
sugar  (from  $1  to  $5  a  picul  of  433  pounds) ;  a  10  per 
cent  to  15  per  cent  special  tax  on  silks  and  woolens 
and  a  tax  on  traveling.  Lastly  there  is  a  tariff  which 
is  nicely  adjusted  to  the  principle  of  bringing  in  all 
that  the  traffic  will  bear.  Aside  from  foreign  books, 
fertilizers,  and  certain  raw  materials  such  as  cotton, 
rubber,  ores,  rags,  and  hemp,  that  are  utilized  in  native 
industries,  everything  on  the  list  bears  the  maximum 
charge, subject  only  to  the  "  law  of  diminishing  returns." 
The  income  from  the  tariff  is  roughly  from  $20,000,000 
to  $25,000,000  annually. 


136  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

In  addition  to  the  usual  methods  of  taxation  the 
Japanese  government  realizes  a  direct  profit  from  the 
control  of  certain  monopolies.  These  are  three  in  num- 
ber: tobacco,  salt,  and  camphor.  In  1898  the  govern- 
ment took  over  the  control  of  leaf  tobacco,  requirmg 
that  all  crops  should  be  sold  to  it  and  reselling  the 
product  at  a  fixed  profit.  But  the  Japanese  people  con- 
sume incrediWe  numbers  of  cheap  cigarettes,  and  two 
or  three  Japanese  firms  as  well  as  the  American  Tobacco 
Company  (located  in  Kyoto)  began  to  develop  and 
control  a  very  large  trade  in  the  manufactured  article. 
The  government,  having  embarked  in  trade,  could  not 
tolerate  a  competitor,  and  in  1903  a  law  was  passed 
making  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  cut  tobacco  and 
cigarettes  also  a  monopoly.  The  companies  received 
an  appraised  sum  for  their  plants  and  stocks,  and  in 
addition  20  per  cent  profit  on  a  year's  sales.  The  Amer- 
ican company,  thus  closed  out  of  Japan,  went  over  to 
Manchuria  after  the  war  and  started  a  competition  with 
the  Japanese  government. 

The  si»cciid  monopoly  is  that  of  salt,  which  was  taken 
under  control  in  1905.  The  government  does  not  con- 
trol the  manufacture  of  salt,  but  only  its  sale.  It  is 
practically  all  made  from  sea  water.  The  importation 
of  foreign  salt  is  discouraged  and  only  allowed  in  special 
cases  by  permission  of  the  government.    For  all  Japa- 


JAPAN'S  ECQNQMIC  EVOLUTION  137 

nese  salt  exported,  a  sort  of  bonus  is  paid  the  producer 
by  the  government  The  salt  monopoly  is  very  un- 
popular. 

The  third  monopoly  is  that  of  camphor,  which  is  one 
of  the  principal  products  of  Formosa,  although  a  con- 
siderable amount  of  can^hor  is  also  produced  in  Japan 
proper. 

These  three  monc^lics  produced  a  net  revenue  in 
1912-13  of  over  $30,000,000,  which  is  approximately 
the  annual  income  from  this  source. 

It  is  needless  to  s^y  that  a  financial  system  which 
is  compdled  to  resort  to  such  extraordinary  expedients 
in  taxation  is  a  httvy  burden  upon  the  people.  F$r- 
ticukriy  is  it  true  that  taxes  on  salt,  kerosene,  and  cot- 
ton fabrics  impose  the  heaviest  load  upon  the  pecurest 
classes.  The  mcome  tax  statistics  disclose  the  indi- 
vidual poverty  of  the  Japanese  compared  with  other 
peoples.  But  even  this  takes  no  account  of  the  great 
numbers  betow  the  minimum  income  ^el  who  pay, 
never&eless,  indirectly,  a  heavy  price  iw  the  privilege 
of  existoice. 

In  1905  two  well-known  Japanese  economists  pub- 
lished the  results  of  their  investigation  of  the  national 
wealth  of  Japan.*  They  summed     their  evaluations 

'"The  NstfaMMl  Washli  of  Jipm,"  by  E.  Igamht  sad  &  Take- 


>38  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


under  thirteen  heads,  viz.,  land,  buildings;  house  fit- 
tings and  furniture;  domestic  animals  and  birds;  min- 
eral wealth;  marine  products;  gas,  waterworks,  and 
electrical  enterprises;  shipping;  bullion;  joint  stock  com- 
panies and  banks;  goods  in  stock;  railways,  telegraph 
and  telephones;  navy. 

Considering  how  soon  naval  equipment  is 
"  scrapped,"  the  last  item  ($90,000,000)  might,  perhaps, 
be  omitted  from  the  table.  The  authors  subtracted  the 
amount  of  the  national  debt  ($202,708,000  m  1905)  and 
arrived  at  the  net  sum  of  $12,357,130,369.  As  the 
national  debt  in  1913  amounted  to  $1,276,897,000^ 
mostly  occasioned  by  wars  and  hence  not  represented 
by  a  corresponding  increment  in  the  amount  of  the  m- 
tional  wealth,  the  above  sum  would  be  decreased  to 
something  over  eleven  billions  of  ddlars.  This  would 
amount  to  approximately  $201  per  capita.  The  per  cap- 
ita wealth  of  the  United  States,  by  comparison,  is  $1310, 
or  over  six  time?  as  great 

With  the  burden  of  taxation  growing  yearly  heavier, 
the  cost  of  living  has  been  rising  equally  rapidly.  This  is 
a  phencmMncm  that  is  world-wide  and  is  to  be  ascribed 
only  partly,  if  at  all,  to  local  conditions  in  Japan.  A  good 
index  to  this  is  the  rise  in  the  price  of  rice.  In  1907  thb 
was  $8.01  per  koku  (5  bushels),  in  1912  it  was  $10.18. 
A  few  years  ago  a  Japanese  economist  investigated 


JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION 


139 


the  status  of  what  he  called  the  "  middle-class  farmer  " 
in  Japan  and  published  his  results  in  a  technical  Japanese 
economic  joumaL^  They  were  rather  startling.  He 
found  the  average  income  of  such  a  man  to  be  $133.55 
gold  per  annum  and  the  average  taxes  to  be  17  p|er  cent 
The  approximation  of  the  bare  necessities  for  living, 
this  economist  estimated  to  be  $158.10,  leaving  a  theo- 
retical deficit  of  $24.55.  And  I  imagine  that  to  a  great 
many  of  the  middle-class  farmers  in  Japan  there  is  a 
pronounced  shadow  of  reality  to  that  theoretical  deficit 

National  Expenditures 

It  is  of  particular  interest  to  scan  the  ddiit  side  of 
the  books  of  a  nation  so  heavily  in  debt  as  Japan  and 
whose  bonds  are  held  so  extensively  by  foreigners. 
Has  the  borrowed  money  been  invested  in  betterments 
of  the  whole  nation  or  in  remtmerative  industiy  or  has 
it  been  sunk  in  the  pit  of  nrilitaiy  oiterprise? 

We  have  already  mentiomd  the  patmial  character 
of  government  enterprises  in  providing  bonuses,  sub- 
sidies, refunds,  loans  at  sub-market  rates  and  similar 
aids  to  selected  f  racti<nis  of  the  peculation  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  ultimately  benefiting  the  whole  nation.  This 
is  an  expensive  policy  and  one  that  has  never  before 

«TaUiuU  HidtgfoiBi,  to  the  Tokyo  KtitaiZtuki,  toL  61,  p.  irtL 


•TAPANISB  EXPANSION 

been  attempted  on  so  comprehensive  a  scale.  Its  out- 
*xmc  wUl  be  watched  with  much  interest  by  forcigii 
students  of  history  and  economics. 

Somewhat  the  same  considerations  apply  to  the  na- 
tionalization of  railways  which  has  been  recently  con- 
summated. The  purchase  of  those  important  Imes  that 
had  been  built  by  private  companies  involved  a  bond 
issue  amounting  to  about  $250,000,000,  but  it  is  antici- 
pated that  this  will  be  paid  oflF  out  of  the  profits  and  th( 
account  is  not  included  in  the  annual  budget. 

The  ordinary  budget  expenditures  total  about 
$207,000,000  amiually,  of  which  about  $58,000,000  go 
to  the  army  and  navy  in  the  regular  channels.  The 
latter  two  also  take  about  $33,000,000  a  year  from  the 
extraordinary  appropriations,  making  over  $90,000,000, 
or  nearly  one  third,  out  of  a  grand  total  annual  expendi- 
ture of  $277,000,000,  that  goes  for  the  upkeep  of  a 
military  establishment.  It  is  true  that  the  same  pro- 
portion is  maintained  by  Germany,  England,  and  even 
the  United  States.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that 
these  are  rich  creditor  nations  that  may  waste  their 
substance  as  they  will. 

This  brings  us  to  the  complicated  subject  of  the 
national  debt,  a  full  discussion  of  which  would  be  in 
place  only  in  a  treatise  on  financial  history.  We  may 
note  one  fact,  however,  that  the  curve  of  the  national 


JAPAN'S  ICXttfOMIC  EVOLUTION 


«4i 


d«l)t  of  Japan  has  steadily  risen,  each  year  overtopping 
the  last.  In  1871,  the  first  year  of  constitutional  gov- 
ernment in  Japan,  the  national  debt  was  $2,500,000  or 
seven  cents  per  capita  of  population;  in  1890  it  was 
$124,810,000  or  $3.11  per  capita;  in  1900  it  was 
$251,488,000  or  $5.74  per  capita.  The  subsequent 
changes  may  be  noted  in  the  following  table: 

Tabu  ot  tbs  Total  National  Dew  of  Japan  fsok  1901 10  1914 
wits  thx  rtlatinc  per  capita  percentack 


xgoi 

1902 
1903 
1904 
igos 
1906 

1907 
1908 

1909 
1910 
19II 
1913 
1913 

1914  (lf«]r) 


260,1  J3/)oo 
276/]9OiO0o 
a8o^;90,ooo 
495/i44fO0O 
93^190,000 
1,108362,000 
1,138,410.000 
1,291,403,000 
I.3a5.i78;ooo 
1,37^33.000 
1,046,960^ 
1,372,540/100 


$5-31  per  capita 

544  " 

5.6s  " 

S.66  « 

9-84  " 

i8.4o  " 

31.66  * 

31.45  " 

IM7  " 

19.77  " 

18.65  " 

iao5  " 

18.43  " 


In  order  to  itMek  the  annual  interest  on  foreign  ddit, 
together  with  the  annoal  tmfavoraUe  trade  hllance^  tiie 
Japanese  government  is  compelled  to  maintain  a  large 
gold  reserve  abroad.  The  gdd  tfans  hoarded  at  the 
end  of  1913  (aside  from  a  reserve  of  $65,ooo«ooo  kept 
at  home  to  maintain  the  gM  standard)  amounted  to 


«4a  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


$120,500,000;  $102^,000  in  England,  ItJ/XKW) 
in  France;  $3,500,000  in  the  United  States  and 
$2,000,000  in  Gennany. 

There  is  another  side  to  this  story,  for  if  there  were 
no  amipensating  income  to  counterbabuice  the  Iwavy 
outflow  of  gold,  the  drain  would  be  heavier  perhaps  than 
the  present  system  of  finance  could  stand.  We  have 
already  mentioned  the  amount  of  cash  left  in  Japan 
by  Occidental  travelers,  a  variable  but  by  no  twnm 
inconsiderable  amount  To  this  must  be  added  a  large 
sum  that  is  annually  remitted  home  by  the  Japaiwie 
abroad.  The  Minister  of  Finance  recently  announced 
that  this  sum  amounted  to  $13,000,000  for  1912.  It  is 
obvious  that  if  a  sufficiently  large  army  of  Japaamt 
should  be  quartered  on  foreign  soil,  as  it  were,  sending 
hcMnc  the  profits  of  their  toil,  the  total  amount  alcme 
might  in  time  even  up  the  adverse  trade  balance. 
Whether  this  would  be  looked  upon  with  complacency 
by  the  foreign  nations  is  another  question.  And  this 
introduces  us  to  one  of  the  most  vexing  problems  facing 
the  Japanese  people  —  the  status  of  their  nati(mals  in 
foreign  lands. 


mm 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  *'  YBLLOW  PEUL  "  IN  A  "  WHITE  KAN's  COUNTKY  " 

The  dynamic  view  of  history  sees  mankind  in  a  con- 
stant flux,  racial  streams  flowing  this  way  and  that,  in 
great  migrations  through  the  years  and  the  centuries. 
The  dashes  that  have  ensued  when  one  wave  encoun- 
tered another,  when  the  occupants  of  a  frontier  terri- 
tory resisted  the  mvader— these  make  up  the  tissue  of 
historic  narrative,  which  is  chiefly  concerned  with  fight- 
ing. These  migrttions  began  long  before  the  dawn  of 
history  and  have  continued  to  the  present  and  we  have 
no  reason  to  8tqn>ose  that  they  will  not  persist  in  the  fu- 
ture, for  the  inertia  of  the  human  stream  is  very  great 

Until  comparatively  recently,  such  movements  have 
been  sbw  and  hardly  apparent  to  any  one  generation. 
Nowadays,  however,  thanks  to  mechanical  aids  to  trans- 
portation, population  movements  are  so  rapid  and  the 
results  so  startling  that  mankind  for  the  first  time  feds 
called  upon  to  look  ahead  and,  antidpating  clashes  be- 
fore they  come,  to  tiy  to  avert  them. 

For  many  centuries,  Asia  seemed  the  bottomless  well 
wheMe  came  these  human  floods.  The  Persian  inva- 

243 


«44  Ji^PANESE  EXPANSION 

sion  of  Greece,  the  conquest  of  Southeastern  Europe  bf 
the  Huns  in  the  fifth  century,  the  activities  of  the  Tar- 
tars under  Genghis  Khan  in  the  thirteenth  centuiy, 
whose  hordes  not  only  overran  Europe  but  even  turned 
to  the  East,  subdued  Korea  and  attacked  Japan,— these 
are  conspicuous  examples  of  the  pressure  of  Asia  upon 
the  rest  of  the  world. 

In  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries,  European 
adventurers  in  their  search  for  treasure  disdoted  the 
two  Americas  to  conquest  and  before  long  India  aad 
the  isles  of  the  sea  came  under  the  sway  of  the  Caue»- 
sian.  In  the  last  century  Africa  has  been  parcded  out 
like  a  loaf  of  bread. 

It  might  almost  seem  that  the  impulse  which  Afw 
gave  Europe  from  the  East  has  been  transmitted  around 
the  globe.  Af  ^y  rate,  the  beginning  of  the  present 
century  finds  the  European  white  man  in  cootrd  of 
practically  all  the  lands  of  the  earth  except  the  populous 
regions  of  East  Asia,— China  and  Japan.  AgatBlfc 
the  rock-like  conservatism  of  these  ancient  Asiatic  states 
the  tides  of  Occidental  power  have  beaten  and  dashed 
themselves  to  spray. 

The  frontier  of  European  civilization  is  the  west 
coast  of  America  and  the  island  continent  oi  Austral!*, 
and  these  lands  face  the  Orient  with  peculiar  interest, 
now  that  the  Orient  has  wakened  to  the  existence  of 


THE  "YEIXOW  PERIL" 


the  rest  of  the  world  It  if  this  aittiatioii  tl'a  :-  ,/'-c. 
those  long^stance  prophets  who  see  tiie  P^^. 
the  scene  of  the  most  significtnt  hamancooflictsthe  world 
has  yet  endured  For  it  is  no  longer  a  matter  of  Europe 
pouring  itself  out  over  the  rest  of  the  earth.  Rather 
Europe  has  come  to  a  stop  and  must  brace  herself  to 
withstand  the  shock  of  East  Asia  pressing  out  in  its  turn. 

The  conditions  that  led  to  the  comparatively  recent 
domination  by  Europe  of  the  New  World,  Africa,  and 
Australia,  were  at  the  outset  not  those  that  have  led 
to  the  great  racial  migrations  of  the  past  nor  hideed  to 
those  of  the  present.  It  was  not  the  pressure  of  over- 
crowding that  led  primarily  to  the  discovery  of  the  new 
lands  and  their  settlement  Rather  it  was  the  lurt  of 
gold,  the  spur  of  adventure,  the  lust  of  conquest,  or  the 
promptings  of  religious  zeal.  Such  moUves  led  daring 
souls  to  forsake  their  old  homes  for  the  new.  The  ^rit 
of  such  pioneers  made  possible  the  founding  of  our 
Republic,  the  astoni^g  development  of  its  material 
resources,  and  the  courageous  vision  that  has  made  the 
Far  West  of  America  one  with  the  East 

Our  latter-day  immigration  from  the  Mediterranean 
countries  and  from  Russia  could  never  have  achieved 
a  nation  in  such  a  space  of  tunc.  These  btter  are  the 
overflow,  crowded  out  by  pressure  of  drcwnstance«  at 
home,  and  they  are  very  different  in  their  psydiofegy. 


.0' 


h4 


HI 


'46  JAPANM  mAHucm 

The  American  immigrants  f  the  s<-\ '  nteciuh  and  t  ght- 
eentfi  centuries,  and  of  the  irst  haif  jf  the  nmef^nth 
as  well,  struck  out  into  the  wildeme  s  a  ikl  ed  it, 
whereas  their  present-day  succe^  lors  .ddie  m  cities 
and  save  their  pennies. 
Pireitaiaentljr  of  the  former  type  were   ie  len  and 


"  ?ticx 
•  s  0% 


wIk)  went  to  Califomifc  and  t     Ve^  •■ 
their  descendams  retain  marr  of  u  t.  ch 
A  man  of  this  tjrpe  is  accujttomrd  to  rei  up< 
initiadve  and  likely  to  assume  the  sutus  « 
to  •*  natives  "  or  foreigners  ( f  a  differ*^  cas*^ 
fcatnre  cannot  be  onitied  f rma  a  stud>      he  jbieni 
of  the  Asiatic  in  Califo  ma.   Th-*  sane  »,ag  aj^iies  a. 
weS  to  the  white  settlers  of  Aumt^  .     West  Canada. 

The  Expmnce  of  Sm^  Afrk» 

In  India  and  Ckma  tk  xipidario  's  so  6mm  ial 
the  struggle  for  mere  earislence  ^  ^i«ord  iaf%  Imb. 

Pardy  oe  thi^  accotmt  at  least,  w      f  in  il  iiKiiii 

a  cfaa*- ceteris. ic  **cool&t"  dm  &^  iinslriifarf  hboicfs. 
accustc  iied  to  live  on  ^  i^ape^  fare  and  to  do  the 
harden  kindj     labc     O  ^  Ubor  of  dus  sort  means 


large  ?rQfy$  tc  wners 


ttid  tiw  presence 


of  a  large  coolie  cl  is.  by  drt  laf  9^  the  conyatttkn 
of  the  ^faite  laborer,  leaves  aS  «    mniiint  wfates  in 

ti»  status  <rf  en^yers  and  ovtL-ACL^ji 


IT 


THE  **  YELLOW  PERIL  " 


H7 


From  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  when 
the  Dutch  colonized  South  Africa,  until  the  era  of  British 
domination  in  the  nineteenth,  labor  in  South  Africa 
wa  all  done  by  black  and  Asiatic  slaves.    The  British 
freed  the  slaves,  and  in  consequence  the  labor  problem 
I    vv  constantly  more  difficult.    Finally,  in  1859  they 
decided  to  import  Hindus.    To-day  the  Hindu  popu- 
lation n  Natal  is  greater  than  the  white,  and  they  con- 
trol      majority  of  the  shops  and  farms.    A  writer 
on  th    jbject,  after  sayii.    hat  the  Hindu  has  driven 
out  the  white  workman,  sin  e  .he  latter  cannot  compete 
on  the  former's  sraie  y{  living,  states  that  "  The  Asiatic 
is  w  ^rth  less  to  the  country  than  the  white  man  he  dis- 
place     It  is  estimated  in  Vatal  that  the  Orientol 
onfv    ntributes  £1/6/   i  a  }  ar  to  the  public  revenue, 
the  white  re  cent  contributes  £30/11/4. 
ndu  problem  for  South  Africa  grows  daily 
mort       .cing.   The  Hindu  is  a  British  subject,  and 
when     ..a5  finished  his  term  of  indenture  as  an  imported 
laborer  in  Natal  and  expresses  a  desire  to  stay  on  instead 
of  retufBing  to  India,  he  quite  naturally  fails  to  see  why 
he  cannot  do  so;  why.  in  other  words,  a  British  subject 
in  one  cdeey  loses  his  rights  in  another.    In  the  early 
part  of  1914,  the  resentment  of  the  Hindu  broke  out 
in  the  form  of  stolas  and  riots.   The  war  h 
public  attention  from  this  part  of  the  wor 


1 


JAPANESE  £X{>A>'SION 


apparently  imconcihblc  conflict  between  the  wUte 
and  brown  elements  of  the  British  Entire  is  found  one 
of  the  most  difficult  iMX)blcnis  that  British  In^tfialisa 
has  ever  been  called  upon  to  face. 

The  White  'Australia  Doctrine 

In  the  early  days  of  the  gold  excitement  in  Australia 
it  was  difficult  to  keep  white  laborers  on  the  randies, 
and  Chinese  coolies  were  imported,  but  the  oomeqiienoes 
of  letting  in  the  yellow  flood  were  soon  apparent,  and 
exclusion  laws  were  enacted  by  the  various  provincial 
governments.  The  Kanakas  presented  even  a  inocc 
difficult  problem,  and  it  was  not  lung  before  opposition 
developed  toward  the  entrance  of  all  "  ofif  colored " 
races.  The  idea  of  keeping  Au^ralia  a  **  white  man's 
country  "  took  early  root. 

In  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  peihaps  because  of 
the  newness  of  their  settlement  and  the  lack  of  conser- 
vative traditions,  the  modem  doctrines  of  the  lal^r 
parties,  including  those  of  socialism,  have  made  great 
headway.  It  is  not  too  much  to  assert  that  politics 
in  the  antipodes  b  controlled  entirely  by  the  labor 
party.  This  does  not  mean  that  Australia  is  completely 
unionized,  but  rather  that  every  issue  is  fou|^t  out  as 
between  labor  and  the  rest  of  the  conununity.  The 
slogan  of  this  party  is '*  Sodalini  ill  oar  TlflM."  And 


THE  "YELLOW  PERIL" 


H9 


it  is  not  difficult  to  infer  the  attitude  of  such  an  dement 
toward  the  question  of  the  importation  of  coolie  labor. 
In  this  they  find  themselves  at  oat  wiUi  the  rest  of  die 
white  population. 

But  the  Australian  labor  party  has  been  more  than 
short-sighted.  Not  only  have  they  opposed  the  immi- 
gration of  Orientals;  they  have  also  bitterly  opposed 
the  immigration  of  Southern  Europeans  as  well.  As  a 
consequence  the  sparse  white  population  of  this  huge 
continent  is  ahnost  stationary,  although  it  would  appear 
that  the  strongest  sort  of  practical  opposition  to  the 
pressure  of  the  Orient  would  be  the  filling  up  of  the 
Commonwealth  with  assimilable  whites  and  thus  in- 
creasing the  European  population.  For  the  condition 
of  Australia  to-day  with  respect  to  the  physical  subju- 
gation of  the  country  resembles  thst  of  America  a  cen- 
tury ago. 

In  fact,  the  arrogant  point  of  view  of  Australians  to- 
day is  much  like  that  of  Americans  previous  to  the 
Spanish  war.  But  the  world  has  moved  fast,  and 
whereas  America  then  could  bluff  with  impiu^ty,  Aus- 
tralia may  see  her  bluff  called  at  any  time. 

Australia,  like  South  Africa,  is  in  a  peculiar  situation 
as  a  part  of  an  Empire  the  majority  of  whose  members 
are  colored.  The  population  and  immigration  quettioOi 
being  foremost  in  the  minds  of  her  *t^tfmm,  wm  a 


ISO  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


detenniniiif  factor  in  bringing  about  the  consotidation 
of  the  various  cohmses  into  the  Gnnmonwealth  at  the 
beginning  of  the  present  century.  In  union  is  strength : 
and  a  united  Au^ralia  could  bring  more  pressure  to 
bear  upon  the  home  country  than  could  independent 
provinces. 

That  the  immigration  problem  was  one  of  the  chief 
motives  for  the  establishment  of  the AustralianCommon- 
wealth  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  the  first  two  laws 
passed  by  the  new  Parliament  dealt  with  this*  subject 

These  laws  were  original  enough  and  drastic  enough 
to  merit  special  mention.  They  provided  for  the  ususl 
basis  of  exclusion  of  immigrants  as  pauperSf  crinunals, 
etc;  but  they  provided  also  for  a  "literacy  test,"  by 
which  it  was  very  explicitly  stated  that  only  such  for- 
eigners should  be  admitted  into  the  Coramonwetldi  as 
should  prove  themsehres  able  to  write  at  dictation  fifty 
words  in  any  European  language  and  sign  them  in  the 
presence  of  the  immigratioa  officer.  Thus,  if  tfaeic 
were  any  reason  for  exrlwding  Germans,  they  might  be 
given  a  passage  hi  Spanish  or  Pdish.  The  act  was  ^ 
course  devised  against  Orientals, —  Hmdus,  QUnesc, 
and  Japanese.  It  was  explicitly  promised,  in  fad,  that 
it  should  never  be  applied  agaUist  Europeans.  TMi 
discriminatioa  against  --he  vsiatic  im^ied  in  the  de- 
n»nd  for  a  test  in  any  Luropenn  language  |^ve  grMt 


THE  "  YELLOW  PERIL  '»  151 

offense,  and  in  1905  the  act  was  amended  by  striking 
out  the  word  "  European."    Accordingly  the  test  may 
be  applied  by  requiring  the  dictation  in  any  language, 
which  may  save  the  Oriental's  face,  but  does  not  help 
him  much,  for  the  high  court  of  Australia  has  decided  ^ 
the  precedent  that  "  it  is  for  the  officer  and  not  the  im- 
migrant to  select  the  language  for  the  dictation  test" 
That  the  Asiatic  is  aimed  at,  however,  is  obvious  from 
the  fact  that  but  one  Oriental  passed  the  test  in  1905 
and  none  Iihb  done  so  since  then.   The  law  was  again 
amended  in  191 2,  but  the  dictation  test  is  retained.  But 
one  quite  unexpected  result  was  that  white  immigration 
into  the  Commonwealth  almost  ceased,  it  being  diverted 
to  New  Zealand. 

Since  the  recent  military  programs  of  the  Japanese 
have  been  inaugurated,  the  Australians  have  become 
more  fearful  than  ever.  Thr  expansive  movement  of 
Japan  is  viewed  with  what  appears  to  be  quite  unneces- 
sary alarm,  seeing  how  far  away  from  that  country  they 
are.  Yet  the  sparsely  settled  condition  of  their  conti- 
nent U  no  doubt  inviting  to  an  over-populous  nation, 
and  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  arouses  misgivings  as 
to  what  support  England  would  give  her  dqwndcocy  if 
a  crisis  should  arise. 

This  hat  been  the  prime  motive  of  a  change  of  poUcj 
» la  the  ca»e  of  Chia  Gee  w.  Martta. 


152  iJAPANESE  EXPANSION 


with  regard  to  natioiialdefeiife.  Hitherto  Auttnlii  hat 
given  a  subsidy  of  £340^000  to  the  home  conntiy.  This 
has  now  been  withdrawn,  rather  to  Enghmd's  diifiat,  il 
one  may  judge  1^  current  Eng^  criticism.  The  fme- 
tion  of  England's  fleet  for  several  years  has  been  tint  of 
protecting  Great  BriUin  from  Germany,  British  hh 
terests  m  the  Pacific  being  left  to  her  ally  Japan.  Soch 
a  plan  has  not  suited  the  Australians  at  aQ,  and  thqr 
have  set  about  building  a  fleet  of  their  own.*  Themwijr 
begun  fleet  early  had  a  chance  to  prove  its  uNfutoiiib 
hot  to  Australia  but  to  the  British  Empire,  for  it  wii 
the  Australian  cruiser  Sydney,  it  will  be  remonbsrai 
not  tiie  Japanese,  that  put  an  end  to  the  activte  of 
Emdtn,  It  is  worth  noting,  also,  that  the  JapHMM  fltlt 
was  unable  to  prevent  the  destructioa  of  the  EflfHrii 
squadron  under  Admiral  Cradock  oiF  the  coast  oi  CUk. 

Situated  as  they  are,  the  Australians  have  a  vny  hssn 
interest  in  the  progress  and  completion  of  the  ¥umm 
canal.  Not  only  Australia  but  all  tiie  Soadi  Ftaiie 
will  without  question  be  immensely  benefted  by  it 

*Tlie  Australian  "untt"  eoanbu  of  one  aniMmd  crdMr,  ttnt 

nnannored  cruisers,  six  destroyers,  and  three  submarines,  represent* 
ing  a  total  cost  of  13,695,00a  It  is  to  be  identical  with  the  QuM 
and  Bast  Indian  naval  units.  Before  the  project  was  btgm  iifioo^ 
000  was  raised  by  popular  subscription  to  buy  a  "  dreadnoufht "  u 
a  gift  to  the  home  country.  This  money,  after  being  collected,  liow> 
ever,  was  eajcadsd  oAerwiM,  om  ImII  aotaf  Id  aniil  BMfim 
tmn^ntkm. 


THE  "YELLOW  PERIL"  153 

It  is  likely  that  with  their  present  independence  of  the 
mother  country,  Australia  will  before  long  enter  into 
more  intimate  relations  with  America  than  with 
England.   The  Australian  indred  might  not  be  un- 
willing to  extend  such  an  entente  beyond  the  domain  of 
trade.   For  in  the  problems  of  the  Pacific  the  United 
States  and  the  Commonwealth  have  much  more  in 
common  than  the  latter  has  with  England.    Such  a 
feeling  was  evident  when  the  American  fleet  made  its 
memorable  tour  of  the  Pacific  in  1908.   Our  fleet  met 
with  such  an  enthusiastic  reception  in  Australia,  ex- 
ceeding in  fact  the  welcome  extended  to  the  Prmce  of 
Wales  when  he  went  to  open  the  Commonwealth  Par- 
liament, that  England  was  astonished  and     bit  non- 
plused.  Sir  Joseph  Ward,  Premier  of  New  Zealand 
from  1906  to  1912,  is  quoted  as  saying  quite  flatly  that 
"  Australia  looks  to  America  as  her  natural  ally  in  the 
coming  struggle  against  Japanese  domination." 

The  Australian  standpoint  is  graphically  put  by  a 
writer  in  the  National  Review:  "The  Australian  fleet 
(when  there  really  is  such  a  fleet)  will  be  found  (when 
the  day  comes  for  defining  the  situation)  to  exist,  first, 
for  the  purpose  of  keeping  Australia  a  white  man's 
country  against  all  comers,  and  second  (only  second) 
for  the  defense  of  the  mostly  colored  empire.  .  .  .  The 
British  fleet  is  for  the  puipose  of  defending  the  British 


>54  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


Isles  agiinst  the  Gcnmns.   ThU  is  of  minor  importance 
to  the  Australian  as  regards  Australia.*  What  he  wants 
to  know,  supposing  a  powerful  Australian  fleet  b  built 
and  put  under  purely  British  command,  which  side  the 
fleet  will  be  on  if  the  time  comes  to  resohre  whether  the 
cdored  subject  is  a  real  yellow  citizen  or  not"  And 
agam:  "The  white  Australia  idea  is  not  a  political 
theory.  It  is  a  gospd.   It  counts  for  more  than  reK^ 
gion;  for  more  than  flag,  because  the  flag  waves  over 
ai  kinds  of  races;  for  more  than  the  Empire,  for  the 
Empire  is  mostly  black,  or  brown  or  yeUow;  is  largely 
heathen,  largely  polygamous,  partly  cannibaL  .  . . 
In  fact  the  white  Australia  doctrine  is  based  on  the 
necessity  for  choosing  between  national  existence  and 
natioaai  suickle.'* 

In  my  own  opinion  the  white  Australia  as 
cnhradng  the  continent,  is  <k>omed  to  faihuc  on 
account  of  cUmatic  conditions.  Experience  has  shown 
pretty  definitely  tiiat  the  white  man  cannot  endoit 
in  ^  tropics  as  a  workman.  He  may  be  tiie  bfafais 
of  a  tropical  popuktkm  but  not  tiie  bone  and  ans- 
cle.  The  cotored  races  will  hdwrit  the  tropics  hi  the 
emi. 

Now  nearly  half  of  Australia  lies  witiiin  the  tnfk»» 
and  never  win  be  a  white  man's  coun^  in  the  sense  that 
'  It  vobM  be  ft  tenftte  "tfilBhr  fot  Asatt^it  lo  to  tmiiilf  ft. 


THE  "YELFJOW  PERIL'"  155 

white  men  will  constitute  «ie  bulk  of  its  population  or 
supply  the  labor  for  its  development.  The  foUowiaf 
table  gives  some  idea  of  this  situation: 


AmSo.lCL 

WHITt  PorULA- 

noN,  191 1. 

Queensland   

3410 
aB3,ii4 

North  Territory   

Weft  Australia  

This  is  a  concentration  of  roughly  one  person  to  2  2/5 
square  miles.  When  we  learn,  however,  that  23  per 
cent  of  the  population  of  Queensland  is  found  in  the  city 
of  Brisbane  and  38  per  cent  of  that  of  West  Australia 
in  Perth,  the  sparseness  of  population  (about  one  man 
to  3  2/S  square  miles)  becomes  more  striking.  There 
are  abwrt  i«wo  aborigines  in  the  whole  continent 
These  do  not  comtt  in  «  holding  the  territory." 

This  enonnous  am  is  not  today  "effectively  occu- 
P-ed  by^««.  Some  day  it  will  be.  Certainly  not 
by  whites,  althoo^  if  they  are  lucky  they  may  domi- 
nate  it.  Nevertiieles.  at  tiie  present  moment  Austra- 
h«is  will  «,t  con«der  «Kh  a  possibility.  Long  ago 
Dr.  Fufum,  who  fa  hi.  «  National  Life  and  Character  » 
ftjt  called  attertion  to  the  "Yellow  Peril,"  said: 
Transfona  tiie  sortfaem  half  of  our  continent  into  a 


156  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


Natal  with  tfairteoi  out  of  fourteen  bdooging  to  an 
inferior  race  [Query:  inferior  from  what  standpoint] 
and  the  southern  half  will  speedily  approximate  to  the 
condition  of  the  Cape  G>k>ny  where  the  whites  are  in- 
deed a  masterful  minority,  but  still  only  as  one  to  four." 

The  Oriental  f»  British  Cohmbia 

Very  much  the  same  sort  of  phenomenon  that  has 
been  described  for  Australia  has  been  witnessed  in 
British  Cbhmibia  at  the  first  impact  of  the  Orient 
The  Canadian  province*  however,  b  handicapped  m  its 
actions  for  the  reason  that  it  is  controlled  in  faitematioBal 
affairs  by  Ottawa,  and  Ottawa  is  more  responsive  to  the 
wishes  of  England  than  to  those  of  the  people  on  the 
western  frontier. 

Like  Australia,  British  Cohmbia  is  very  sparsely 
settled,  and  as  in  Australia,  too^  the  hbor  dement  is 
powerful  The  first  anti-Chmese  kw  was  passed  hi 
1885,  allowing  but  one  Chinese  per  ton  to  the  ship^— 
a  hif^y  original  method  of  limitatioiL  In  addition, 
a  head  tax  of  $50  was  inqtosed.  In  1901  this  was  i»> 
creased  to  $100;  in  1904  to  $500.  In  addition,  the  lav 
prohibited  Chinese  from  worldng  in  factories  or  wock- 
shops,  although  they  miglit  be  employed  in  camietfcs 
or  as  domestic  servants.  This  statule  prodHeed  a 
curious  and  unforeseen  result  Immign^ion,  of  eoorse, 


THE  "TELLOHr  miL*'  W 

stopped  almost  immediately.*  The  Chinese  already 
within  the  province  became  increasingly  important 
from  an  economic  standpoint,  particularly  as  domestic 
servants,  in  which  capacity  they  are  unexcelled.  Their 
wages  doubled  and  tripled.  Mr.  King,  the  Chairman  of 
the  Royal  Commission  appointed  to  consider  the  prob- 
lem, reported  that  "without  organization,  without 
expense,  without  agitation,  every  Chinaman  became  a 
unit  in  a  labor  group  more  favored  than  the  most  exclu- 
sive and  highly  protected  labor  union." 

When  it  came  to  the  Japanese,  and  more  recently  the 
Hindus,  the  difficulties  of  the  British  Columbians  be- 
came more  critical,  for  the  former  are  the  allies  of  the 
home  country,  and  the  latter,  subjects  of  the  same  king. 
In  1899  Great  Britain  concluded  a  treaty  with  Japan, 
granting  full  reciprocal  privileges  of  residence,  travel 
and  protection.  The  treaty  did  not  include  all  the 
Empire,  India  for  instance  being  excluded,  but  Canada 
thought  she  saw  a  chance  to  cultivate  trade  with  the 

'  Between  Jane  30,  IW  and  Jan.  i,  1904,  16,007  Chinese  entered 
ViQeoum;  between  Jan.  i,  1904,  and  June  30,  1907,  only  121. 
Since  then,  however,  the  number  has  increased,  as  will  be  seen  in 
the  following  taUe.  In  1910  it  was  further  required  that  each 
ChtncM  Wof  widi  Um  faoo  in  cadi. 

»W*   itB7  Chlneae  catered 

*W  3156  Chinese  entered 

'^'o  5278  Chinese  entered 

 Chfam  entered 


'58  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

Orient,  and.  sonetinie  later.  enroUed  herself  as  a  third 
PW^  to  the  convention,  in  exchangt  for  Uriff  reduc- 
tions on  certain  Canadian  exports. 

Again  tiiinff  woriced  out  in  unexpected  fashion 
aiortly  after  the  Runian  war.  anti-Japanese  sentiment 
bq^  to  itir  in  CkMfomia.  and  at  the  same  time  wages 
to  fan  in  Hawaii   Consequentiy  thousands  of 
Japanew  deKended  upon  British  Cdumbia.  and  within 
»  few  years  have  possessed  themsdves  of  two  important 
•owtes  of  natural  weaWi.-4he  mines  and  the  fisheries. 
Veiy  vahiable  copper  mines  worth  above  $5,000,000 
««  now  said  to  he  owned  and  operated  by  Japanese, 
•nd  the  product  exported.  The  fisheries  are  abnost 
wholly  in  their  hands.  In  this  occupation,  it  was  of- 
esthnated  m  1913  that  10.500  hborers  were 

•mploywl,  each  one  of  whom  earned  from  $500  to  $3000 
»  year  practicaMy  an  of  which  was  sent  home.  It  is 
worthy  of  note  that  foreigners  are  prohibited  from 
either  mining  or  fishing  mJqwL  Indeed,  according  to 
the  law  only  British  subjects  are  Kcensed  to  fish  in  Ca- 
nadian waters.  But  naturalisation  involves  merely  a 
three  years'  residence  and  the  oath  of  alleg  .ncc.  and  the 

law  applies  only  to  the  fishennan  proper,  mit  to  his  boat. 
P«Uers  or  helpers.  Neverthdess  the«  are  over  3000 
•uch  naUtfalised  Japanese  in  British  Columbia.  Tl» 
Japanese  cooties  take  this  allegiance  so  Ughtly 


THE  "  YELLOW  PERIL  **  159 

the  provincial  government  cgntravenes  the  Dominkw 
law  by  prohibiting  the  naturalized  Jipanese  from 
voting.  This  disfranchisement  has  been  upheld  by 
the  Privy  Council  at  London,  England,  on  the 
ground  that  the  province  has  power  to  limit  its  own 
electorate. 

It  is  too  much  to  expect  that  the  whites,  particularly 
the  labor  element,  should  view  the  rapid  influx  of 
Japanese  with  complacency.  In  September,  1907,  a 
tramp  steamer  landed  1200  Japanese  at  Vancouver, 
and  the  event  precipitated  a  riot.  Agitators  worked 
up  the  mob  spirit  and  hoodlums  attacked  the  Japanese 
quarter  and  began  to  wreck  the  shops.  Finally  the 
Japanese  turned  at  bay  and  with  knives,  pistols,  and 
broken  bottles,  counter-attacked  so  fiercely  that  the 
attacking  whites  took  to  their  heels!  A  few  days  later 
the  arrival  of  a  consignment  of  Hindus  started  more 
rioting.  The  Ottawa  government  took  a  decided  stand 
and  promptly  reimbursed  the  victims.  Strong  official 
pressure  was  put  upon  the  Japanese  press  to  make  light 
of  the  incident  and  both  Japan  and  Great  Britain  found 
it  expedient  to  "change  the  subject"  as  quickly  as 
possible.  A  scapegoat  had  to  be  found,  however,  and 
tills  the  English  press  discovered  in  "  paid  agitators  from 
California."  Ihe  United  States  was  thus  responsible 
for  the  whole  occurrence,  and  the  Yorosu,  one  of  the 


irretpoBMbIt  jrellow  joumali  of  Tokyo,  expreued  tbe 
WW  of  •  ccrtdo  metkm  of  the  Japanese  public,  in 
•ttributmf  the  affair  to  the  wcak^meed  policy  of  tbe 
Japaaeae  Forejgn  Office  is  ooonection  with  the  San 
Frandaco  affairs. 

The  next  year,  the  British  Cohimbia  provincial  gov- 
•nunent  passed  a  biU  enaetiog  the  "  ictetion  test"  in 
fora  in  Australia  and  NatA  Three  times  has  this  bill 
been  passed,  only  to  be  each  thne  vetoed  by  the  Dominion 
govenmient  Yet  feeling  stiM  runs  so  high  that  when 
tha  J^aneM  tramhig  squadron  under  Admiral  Ijichi, 
maldqg  its  annual  cruise,  stopped  at  Vancouver,  suf- 
ficient hoitility  was  dssplayad  to  prevent  a  parade  of 
Japanese  aailort  under  anna. 

The  Hindu  is  the  newest  proMmi  for  British  Cel«n- 
bia.  Forwithhisoaaa«Hshiart>andhlsea^.^jV 

dicea,  he  Is  far  more  exotic  than  the  Japanese  *  ! 
iiitoa"handHne.down"anda-deri>y"hata:.  i 
poirihie  after  landmf.  When  the  WnAidoud  began  to 
tower  on  the  heriaon,  the  rtnadtan  imia%iation  oflScials. 

never  at  a  loss  for  origmal  expedients,  triad  to  ship  theot 
cokwed  hnmigrants  off  to  Honduras.  ButtheHin  J 
MturaUy  refused  to  go.  Thereupon  they  passed  a  kt* 
pn»vkling  that  no  Asiaties  Aonid  come  h^  by 

journey  from  Ae  sourtry  of  which  thiy  aie 
natives  or  dtim  and  upon  thnn^  liikals."  Of 


THB  *'YBLLOW  PERIL" 


i6i 


cour  «  as  there  is  no  direct  steamer  connectioa  

Ind  4  and  Canada,  the  law  presumably  aooomptisbci  • 
vcf}  effective  if  somemktt  ^wagmaom  fhrfk  upon 

Hindu  migration. 

The  complacency  of  the  Canadian  authorities  vat 
sadly  shaken,  however,  when  on  the  23d  of  May,  1914. 
a  Japanese  steamer,  the  Komagata  Maru  appeared  in 
Vancouver  harbor  with  350  Hindus  (Sikhs)  on  board. 
Led  by  one  Gurdit  Singh,  the  company  had  chartered 
the  boat  and  sailed  direct  from  India.  Arriving  in 
Vancouver,  they  asserted  their  rights  as  British  subjects 
to  enter  British  dommions. 

Faced  by  this  emergency,  the  Canadian  authorities 
dropped  euphemisms  and  flatly  refused  to  aUow  their 
fellow  citizens  from  the  Orient  to  land.  In  imitation 
of  the  suffragettes  the  Hindus  began  a  "  hunger  strike," 
but  tiie  Canadians  were  unimpressed  and  the  strike 
was  ab^  idoned.  Threats  were  made  to  burn  the  sh^ 
V'ief  that  the  Canadians  would  rescue  the  pas- 
^  gi.,s,  but  a  lingering  doubt  as  to  whether  the  former 
might  see  it  that  way  caused  the  project  to  be  aban- 
don j.  Meanwhile  the  matter  came  befc  e  the  Court 
and  in  July  a  decision  was  rendered  against  the  Hindus. 
Still  the  Komagata  Maru  lay  in  the  harbor  and  refused 
to  go.  FinaUy,  under  the  guns  of  a  Canadian  war 
vessel  (the  RatnbGw),  she  was  towed  to  sea  and  told  to 


»W  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

letve.  TWi  itigiesti  the  mitttisfactory  method  that 
n»etropoIitMi  polke  not  infrequently  employ  toward 
inembers  of  tiie  vagrant  claai. 

The  Hindu  in  the  United  Statca  haa  not  liaen  to  the 
l>««lit  of  a  problcn.  Yet  we  oould  hardly  look  with 
indifference  npon  the  immigration  of  any  oooaiderable 
nwaber  of  Hindna  mto  Canada.  For  if  we  ahould 
enact  exduaion  hws  agahiat  them  aa  we  have  against 
the  Chineae.  yet,  ahoold  they  be  given  free  access  to 
Canada,  on  the  plea  of  their  British  dtiaenship,  it 
would  be  a  most  difficult  problem  to  keep  them 
from  filtering  across  the  border  hito  the  United 
States,  mtrodudng  oot  more  racial  problem  for  oar 
distracted  people  to  solve. 

The  Asiatic  in  California 

In  our  own  country  very  much  the  same  history  is 
to  be  related.  The  chrooide  of  the  eariy  «M.t^  ©f 
California  with  the  O-iental  and  the  oonae^OMt  fCie> 
tion  is  quite  like  that  of  British  Columbia.  California's 
experiences  of  course  antedated  thfttt  of  the  Qh»> 
dian  province,  but  in  each  case  the  Chineae  mn  frit 
invited,  then  repulsed  at  the  behaat  of  ofgaaiaad  tobor, 
and  in  each  case  the  vacuum  thua  created  m»  ttad  kf 
the  Japanese,  producing  a  greater  problem  stffl. 

The  tale  of  our  treatment  of  the  rhintii  la  not  t 


THI  "YELLOW  PERIL*'  163 

pretty  one  considering  the  high  moral  tone  of  our  loof 
diplomatic  intercourse  with  China.* 

In  the  early  days  of  the  gold  excitement,  there  were 
no  candidates  for  jobs  as  cooks,  or  in  other  menial  em- 
ployment. When  the  Chinese  filled  such  places,  they  did 
not  displace  any  white  labor  at  all.  When  the  Pidfic 
railroad  was  building,  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to 
import  about  3000  Chinese  workmen  in  order  to  com- 
plete the  road  within  the  time  allowed  by  Congress. 

The  business  depression  that  came  in  the  '/o's  brought 
together  a  great  number  of  discontented  men,  out  of 
work,  and  the  famous  "sand-lct"  agitation  began. 
The  Chinese  and  the  plutocrats  were  picked  out  by  the 
"  Keameyite  "  agitators  as  the  enemies  of  the  Ameriom 
workman.  Several  exclusion  bills  of  various  sorU  were 
proposed  in  Congress,  one  of  which  was  passed,  and 
vetoed  by  President  Hayes,  and  another  one  later  by 
President  Arthur.  Meanwhile  California  submitted 
the  question  to  a  popular  vote,— one  of  the  earliest 
instances  of  the  referendum  in  American  politics  — 
and  out  of  practically  the  entire  vote  of  the  state  there 
were  154,638  for  exclusion  and  883  against.  In  the 
face  of  this  unanimity  of  sentiment,  after  a  varied 
experience,  an  exclusion  act  was  passed  in  1882.  Thit 

www     Dr.  M.  R.  Cooiidfc's  "Chiacte  Immigration." 


first  act  was  not  difficult  to  evade  znd  did  not  satisfy 
the  West.  In  various  places,  anti-Chinese  riots  broke 
out.  One  in  particular  at  Rock  Springs,  Wyoming, 
partook  of  tlie  nature  of  a  "Boxer"  outbreak,  the 
Chinese  being  hunted  and  shot  "like  antelopes."* 
In  1892  the  Geary  Act  vi'as  framed,  which  not  only  ex- 
cluded the  Chinese,  but  provided  for  the  most  stringent 
regulations  concerning  the  methods  of  its  administra* 
tion.  This  law  was  to  be  in  force  ten  years,  and  in  1903 
it  was  reenacted  for  an  indefinite  period.  The  act  was 
later  extended  to  include  Hawaii,  and  likewise,  by  Gen- 
eral Otis,  to  include  the  Philippine  Islands. 

It  was  not  the  exclusion  act  in  itself  that  gave  so 
much  offense  to  China  as  the  method  of  administering 
it.  Incoming  Chinese  of  the  exempt  classes  —  mer- 
chants, students,  and  travelers  —  were  treated  almoit 
as  criminals.  Things  reached  a  climax  at  the  1^  Loidi 
Worid's  Fair  in  1904.  The  Chinese  exhibitors  at  the 
Exposition,  the  invited  guests  of  the  nation,  were  fonii 
to  endure  a  situation  beside  whidi  the  lot  of  the  Fil^ias 
savages  on  exhibition  was  an  enviaUe  one.  The  ttim 
reported  by  these  returning  travders  no  doidit  kaC 
nothing  in  the  telling.  They  were  the  last  straw,  ui 
precipitated  the  great  anti-Ameriam  boycott,  in  wkUk 

1  S<»ie  tune  later  Coogrest  voluntarily  paid  Chiaa  m  imkmiiif 


Americaa  trade  tnd  American  interests  in  China  suf- 
fered so  heavily  in  1906-8. 

Bat  lK>wev«r  mucb  of  unnecessary  severity  and  lack 
of  tact  may  have  attended  the  administration  of  our 
Chinese  fwcturien  laws,  they  have  been,  at  any  rate, 
effe^ve.  The  Chinese  problem,  unless  we  reopen  it, 
is  no  longer  a  proUem.  Chinese  house  servants  in  the 
Far  West  have  anything  but  the  financial  status  of 
"  cheap  labor."  Other  races  are  employed  only  by  those 
who  cannot  aitidChhieie.  As  has  been  the  experience 
of  British  Cdorafaia,  the  succeas  of  Chinese  exclusion 
created  a  sort  of  vacomn  in  the  labor  market.  This 
vacuum  the  Japanese  mshed  m  to  fill  and  another  prob- 
lem was  hatched. 

In  18I0  theie  west  bnt  86  Japaaeie  in  all  California. 
The  mcnaae^  year  by  year,  k  seen  k  the  uble  on  page 
166  (taken  horn  Kawairami's  "  American-Japanese  Re- 
lations"). Fran  I9Q3  on  the  figures  include  immipa- 
twn  into  Hawi*.  which  ej^huat  the  «id<tai  jump.  But 
as  gwat  nundwrt  of  tee  um^ranta  merely  used  Ha- 
waii as  a  steppfaif  stone  to  Cahfomia,  the  figures  are  not 
hi|%  mideading.  la  the  summer  of  190;  the  famous 
''ff^ewaii's  agnamiut"  was  entered  into  between  Ja- 
piB  and  America,  fajr  which  Japan  votoMarily  afreed  to 

<»M  ghrmg  passpofta  to  Japmse  of  wofhnaa  elMB 
fortheporpoteofcoahigtothiacoaitry.  ThaaAtes- 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


dorioa  of  JapuMe  ianigniiti  at  picMBt  ^ 
oar  own  itatutet,  u  in  the  case  of  the  ChimM,  nor  iipMi 
a  tre^  mutually  biadinc  «wt  upon  the  foodirfi  of 
Japan.   DffidaQjr,  tncfa  imnigratioii  hat  caaied  ako- 
g«thcr  aiott  1907.  Proldify  it  haa  icaSy  etned  to  a 


Ybmi 

Japanisk 

IltlUCBAlfTS 

YlAB 

Japanxsx 

iMMIOAlITt 

ma 

1885 

S  ' 

m 

iflgo 
<%3 

II 
5 

a; 

ao 
49 
194 
»9 
404 
640 

691 
Iij6 
I40i 

1895 

1896 

1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
190a 
1903 
1904 

I9QS 

1906 

I33I 
I.Z50 
1,1 10 

1.536 

3^44 

13.635 
5.369 
14.370 

14,364 

I0J3I 

IJ335 
30,226 

hwie  extent  But  the  writer  spent  the  summer  of  1913 
In  the  Sttita  Clara  valley  and  taOced  with  numbers  of 
Japanese  workcra  In  the  strawberry  fields.  A  great 
many  of  these,  according  to  their  own  statements,  had 
been  but  a  few  months  in  America.  His  questions  as  to 
howthey  had  got  intoCaUfomia  were  evasively  answered. 

There  is  little  doiibt  tint  the  Japanese  government 
la  sincere  In  iu  attempt  to  limit  the  immigration  of  its 


THE  "YELLOW  PERIL" 


167 


cttiseni  to  tlr  U^td  SlilM»  aiilMiii|^  the  rttl  rcuen 
has  not  been  dwtlt  ypoa.  Of  course  Japan  with  all  her 
present  doraestk  diflfeuMw  u  not  deiirouf  of  creating 
an  occasion  for  racial  tolHiion  is  America.  But  the  is 
more  concerned  widi  lavinf  her  face  by  not  giving  any 
opportunity  for  diteriminatory  treatment.  Above  all, 
and  this  is  the  chief  coii^deration,  she  must  mafn^wi 
friendly  rehtiooi  with  Great  Britain.  Whether  the 
Anglo-J^aneae  alliance  would  stand  the  strain  of  an 
immigratioii  conflict  in  Britidi  Columbia  is  a  question 
belter  avdded  than  answered.  And  Japanese  policy 
must  be  consistent  with  reject  to  the  whole  west  coast 
of  America.  What  win  hi^pii  to  this  alliance  in  the 
readjustments  certain  to  follow  the  Worid  War  no  one 
can  say,  but  if  the  An^^Japaaeie  Alliance  givca  place 
to  a  Japaaesc-Ktttsian  intenie,  as  is  not  at  all  unlikely, 
then  the  reaaen  for  maintaining  such  a  "  gentkman's 
agreement "  may  no  longer  hold. 

The  Ji^anese  imaiigami  in  rural  California  tend  to 
hang  together  in  groiqM,  as  is  of  course  natural,  since 
they  speak  little  or  no  Inglisfa  and  are  not  too  warmly 
welcomed  by  w^is.  On  ^  one  hand  diey  hire 
themselves  out  on  a  contract  system,  particularly  to  the 
orchardists,  who  con^li^  that  they  have  no  sense  of  die 
sanctity  of  contracts.  In  work  diat  requires  squatting, 
such  as  the  picking  of  strawberries  or  the  cuhivatkn  of 


JAPANESE  EXPANOCW 


•Vftt  btm,  they  have  no  cqtstlt  in  effidency.  They 
ara  Ml  eoMat  loQf  to  hire  out,  however.  Whoithi^ 
have  M^Kiaied  thmaeivet  wMi  the  local  titaatkai. 
they  wffl  leaR  a  mall  {arm,  often  at  a  high  figure,  and 
•tart  k  on  Mr  own  hook.  Others  follow.  "  Grcih- 
m*tUm*'  beghis  to  operate  and  the  whites  move  o«t 
LanchBids  becoato  fmholdi,  and  a  permanent  Asiatic 
Bodeos  becomes  eilafairfMd.  In  this  way  they  get  a 
noaopelyof  certohipNiHcts.  In  Southern  Califoina 
the  celsfy  and  tnMk  craps  are  diiefy  in  the  hands  of  the 
JapaMie;  m  die  Saala  Oara  valley,  the  beny  crap. 
Some  of      richest  and  most  prosperous  districts  of 
California  (not  necessarily  ^rsdy  settled  regions)  have 
•ettled     with  Japanese  until  the  entire  compleidoa  of 
the  region  has  changed.   Fresno  and  the  Vaca  vidhy 
are  notorious  examples.   It  is  stated  in  the  Twelfth 
Biemdal  R^rt  of  the  California  Bureau  of  Labor  Sta- 
tistics that "  ninety  per  cent  of  all  the  people  met,  wal»  - 
ing  or  drivh^  on  all  the  country  roads  around  Vacaviflc^ 
arc  Japanese."  That  is  to  say,  the  whites  who  formerly 
lived  there  have  migrated. 

In  the  trades  also.  Japanese  competition  has  been  keealf 
felt  In  carpentering,  laundering,  construction  coittradi. 
they  are  undercutting  their  white  competitOTS  below  the 
limit  of  doing  business  on  an  American  ba^  Chcip 
restaorants  are  also  gradually  passing  hito  tiieir  handle 


THl  "YELLOW  PERIL 


1% 


It  is  needless  to  My  that  the  native  AmerietB  in 
California  took  cognizance  of  the  situation  long  ago. 
Contrary  to  general  belief,  opedaUy  in  the  Eastern 
United  States,  the  anti-Japanese  movement  did  not 
originate  in  union  labor  drdei,  though  tk  natUfaUy 
quickly  enlisted  a  foUowmg  among  the  working  and 
tradespeople.  Indeed  the  movement  hu  been  not  a 
little  embarrassed  and  deprived  of  the  ooosideration  it 
should  have  received  in  other  quarters,  by  die  unre- 
strained activities  of  the  "Aaiatic  Exchuion  League" 
and  some  of  its  spokesmen. 

The  San  Francisco  school  troubles  of  1907,  already 
described,  were  quieted,  and  dropped  from  the  limeligfat 
of  public  attention,  but  the  feeling  that  had  precipi. 
tated  the  affair  was  by  no  means  dead.   Two  years 
afterward,  in  1909,  the  CaUfomia  legisbture  considered 
various  bills  designed  to  segregate  Japanese  in  the 
schools,  prevent  Japanese  ownership  of  land,  and  in 
other  ways  restrict  their  activities  within  the  state. 
President  Roosevelt  again  intervened  and  induced  the 
California  officials  to  drop  the  matter.   This  was  wise, 
as  the  bills  were  not  carefully  drawn  and  their  passage 
would  inevitably  have  involved  the  national  government 
1"  difficulties. 

In  1913  the  California  legislature  again  occupied 
•tself  with  anti-Japanese  kgislatioa.  BiUs 


>70  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


posed  in  both  chambers.  In  one  of  these  bills  the  words 
"ineligible  to  citizenship"  were  used.  Fearing  that 
the  enactment  of  this  legislation  might  upset  delicate 
international  relations,  President  Wilson  took  the 
unusual  course  of  personally  interesting  himself  to 
the  extent  not  only  of  telegraphing  to  the  governor  of 
the  sUte  his  own  views  and  wishes,  but  also  of  sending 
Mr.  Bryan,  the  Secretary  of  State,  to  the  coast  to  con- 
fer with  the  lawmakers.  Mr.  Bryan  was  cordially 
received  and  accorded  a  respectful  hearing.  He  re- 
quested the  Califomians  to  defer  action  until  President 
Wilson  and  the  State  Department  should  have  had  an 
opportunity,  either  alone  or  in  conjunction  with  a  com- 
mittee of  the  California  l^slature,  to  negotiate  with 
Japan,  or  else  to  enact  a  law  similar  to  that  of  Illinois 
which  allows  aliens  to  hold  land  for  but  six  years. 

The  l^islature  did  not  act  upon  any  of  those  sugges- 
tions, tmt,  instead,  turned  its  attention  to  a  new  bill, 
drafted  by  the  sUte  attom^-general,  U.  S.  Webb. 
The  Webb  bill  passed  both  houses,  but  Governor  John- 
son had  promised  the  President  to  refrain  from  signing 
it  until  a  chance  had  offered  for  the  national  government 
to  act  in  the  matter.  President  Wilson  did  request  that 
the  bill  be  not  signed  until  the  matter  could  be  taken  up 
dijrfomatically  with  Japan.  But  the  governor  refused 
to  pec  any  "  absolutely  controlling  necessity  "  for  with- 


THB  "YELLOW  PERIL" 


171 


holding  his  signature  and  it  became  a  law,  August  io» 

The  Webb  Act  providet  first  that "  AU  aliens  digible 
to  citizenship  under  the  Uiws  of  the  United  States  may 
acquire,  possess,  enjoy,  transfer,  and  inherit  real  prop- 
petty,  or  any  interest  therein,  in  this  State  in  the  same 
manner  and  to  the  same  extent  as  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  except  as  otherwise  {H'ovided  by  tiie  laws  of  this 
State."  In  the  second  section  it  was  enacted  that  **  AU 
aliens  other  than  those  mentioned  in  section  I  may  ac- 
quire, possess,  enjoy,  and  transfer,  real  property  or  any 
interest  therein,  in  the  manner  and  to  the  extent  and  for 
the  purpose  prescribed  1^  any  ^eaty  aow  exiting  be- 
tween the  government  of  the  United  States  and  the  na- 
tion and  country  of  whidi  said  alien  is  a  citizen,  or  sub- 
ject, and  not  otherwise."  Sudi  aliens  are  permitted  to 
lease  agricultural  I?-  ds  for  three-year  periods. 

In  his  detailed  repty  to  the  President's  request  that 
he  withhdd  his  ngnature  from  tiie  bill,  Govemcn'  Johxt- 
son  said  that  otho:  states  had  enacted  similar  laws,  that 
the  naturalization  laws  of  the  United  States  determine 
who  may  and  who  may  not  be  digible  tor  citizenship; 
that  the  phrase  "perscms  who  cannot  become  eligible 
under  the  existing  laws  to  become  citizens  of  the  United 
States  "  occurs  in  the  immigration  law  parsed  both 
houses  of  the  Sixty-second  Congress;  and  that  Califor- 


JAPANS8B  EXPANSKXN 

Ob  WM  ncftlx  foOowtng  the  tututes  of  the  United 
Stattt  in  my  ducrimintiioii  regarding  citizenship. 
The  govwnor  further  itited  that  the  question  was  not 
"whether  any  offense  had  been  taken  [by  Japan]  but 
whether  jnady  it  shonkl  be  tidcen." 

The  daim  hat  been  made,  and  perhaps  with  some 
•how  of  juitice.  that  party  politics  played  more  of  a 
part  fa  the  enacting  of  this  legislation  than  it  should 
have  done  and  that  a  "  Progreaaive  "  governor  was  not 
tversc  to  pnttfag  a  Democratic  President  "  in  a  hole." 
If  this  were  true,  it  would  betray  an  afanost  incomprc- 
hensible  ihort-sigfatedness  on  the  part  of  California's 
officials.  For  it  has  been  well  said  tiiat  the  "  California 
Japanese  question  is  2  per  cent  OOiforaia  and  98  per 
cent  natiooaL** 

The  Japanese  government  took  official  cognizance 
of  the  situation  even  before  the  Webb  hw  was  passed. 
Ambassador  Chinda  having  called  upon  President 
Wilson  the  second  day  of  his  aAninbtration.  and 
expressed  the  belief  that  should  any  of  the  bills  pend- 
ing m  the  aiifomia  kgishture  become  tows  "the  ef- 
feet  would  be  very  aeriooa."  Uter,  Viscount  Chinda 
made  other  rqiresentations,  and  it  aeema  to  have  ben 
a  rMult  of  the  pressure  thus  exerted  tiuit  the  admfait- 
tration  took  the  unutual  steps  to  influence  atate  kgit- 
lation  that  have  been  described.  When  the  Webb  bin 


THB  *< YELLOW  PERIL" 


173 


had  become  law,  the  Japanese  government  lodged  a 
formal  protest  with  the  State  Department  (May  io» 
1913).  which  pointed  out  that  in  the  Japanese  view  mt 
law  was  not  only  unfair  and  diKriminatory,  but  vio- 
lated the  spirit  of  the  American- Japanese  treaty.  The 
American  reply  pointed  out  that  the  difficulty  was  an 
economic  not  a  political  one,  and  that  if  the  Japanese  felt 
their  treaty  rights  to  have  been  abridged,  they  might 
have  recourse  to  the  Federal  Courts.  This  did  not  sat- 
isfy the  Japanese  government  and  a  second  protest  was 
lodged  on  June  4.  This  doctmient  contained  the  sig- 
nificant statement  that  as  Japan  and  America  were 
"geographically  destined  to  be  permanent  neighbors," 
it  behooved  both  sides  to  adopt  an  attitude  of  concilia- 
tion and  cooperation  and  to  avoid  anything  that  nii^ 
hurt  the  feelings  of  the  other. 

On  July  16  the  Secretary  of  State  tendered  his  reply 
to  this  protest.  In  this  document  Mr.  Bryan  reiter- 
ated his  statement  that  the  difficulty  is  an  economic  one, 
not  a  racial  one,  and  pointed  out  the  similarity  of  the 
situation  with  the  working  of  Imperial  Ordinance  352,* 
designed  to  operate  against  the  Chinese  in  Japan.  The 
Japanese  standpoint  was  that  "the  separate  states  of 
the  United  States  are,  internationally  speaking,  wholly 
unknown  and  entirely  without  responsibility/'  the  cor- 

*  See  page  188. 


MICROCOPY  RESOLUTION  TEST  CHAW 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


'74  JAPANESE  E3CPANSI0N 

ollary  of  which  is  that  the  Federal  government  is  re- 
sponsible.  Mr.  Bryan,  however,  in  his  note,  recurred 
to  and  quoted  an  indiscreet  expression  of  opinion  whidi 
Baron  Uchida  had  made  to  Mr.  Knox  in  a  communica- 
tion  of  an  earlier  date.    In  it  Baron  Uchida  had  said: 
"  In  return  for  the  rights  of  land  ownership  which  are 
granted  Japanese  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States  (of 
which,  I  may  observe,  there  are  now  about  thirty)  the 
Imperial  Government  will,  by  liberal  interpretation  of 
the  law,  be  prepared  to  grant  land  ownership  to  Ameri- 
can citizens  from  all  the  States,  reserving  for  the  future, 
however,  the  right  of  maintaining  the  condition  of 
reciprocity  with  respect  to  the  separate  States."  [Tlie 
italics  are  Mr.  Bryan's.] 

As  there  seemed  no  possibility  of  getting  anywhere 
along  this  line,  the  Japanese  government  then  under- 
took to  arrange  a  new  treaty,  but  this  proposal  was 
withdrawn  after  a  time  and  has  not  been  made  public. 
At  last  account,  therefore,  the  discussion  had  again 
swung  round  to  what  diplomats  love  to  refer  to  as  the 
stcOus  quo. 

General  Considerations 
Along  with  the  negro  question  there  is  no  doubt  that 
the  problem  of  Oriental  immigration  into  America  is  one 
of  the  most  diflRcult  and  one  of  the  most  important  that 
we  have  ever  been  called  upon  to  face.  Faceitwemui^ 


THE  "YELLOW  PERIL" 


175 


however,  and  solve  it  with  whatever  of  political  wisdom 
we  may  be  able  to  develop.  It  is  difficult  to  judge  the 
facts  wholly  impersonally.  The  Califomian  is  to 
consider  the  subject  too  objectively,  the  Easterner  too 
academically.  It  is  wholly  unreasonable  for  one  to 
ignore  the  standpoint  of  the  other.  We  may  set  aside 
the  opinion  of  the  advocate  of  "  cheap  labor  to  properly 
develop  the  resources  of  the  State,"  regardless  of  the 
future,  as  we  may  also  that  of  the  Harvard  professor 
who  finds  that  radal  antipathies  are  "  the  childish  i^e- 
nomena  in  our  lives,  not  noble  phenomena."  We  are 
dealing  with  the  vital  problem  of  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  American  citizens  who  are  as  incapable  of 
prostituting  their  children's  inheritance  for  the  profit 
of  the  moment  as  they  are  of  ordering  their  lives  by 
the  subtle  tenets  of  psychological  analysis. 

We  hear  a  good  deal  about  opposition  to  Asiatic  im- 
migration  being  "  un-American  "  on  the  ground  that  our 
whole  population  is  an  immigrant  one.  But  this  igiK>re8 
the  important  fact  that  when  the  strong  tide  of  European 
immigration  began  to  set  toward  the  New  World,  it 
came  first  from  those  parts  of  Europe  that  had  drawn 
the  greater  part  of  our  original  settlement  population  and 
hence  were  most  easily  assimilated.  As  these  sources 
became  exhausted  and  a  larger  proportion  and  increas- 
ing numbers  began  to  come  from  Southern  Europe  and 


»^  JAPANE8B  WANSJOS 

Russia,  the  difficulty  of  assimilation  becamt  won 
marked  and  the  question  of  regulating  the  flow  caine  to 
the  fore.   But  all  the  people  of  Europe  are  of  one  great 
race  even  if  of  various  stocks  (unless  we  wish  to  except 
the  Jews),  and  all  have  the  same  social  heritage,  the 
same  common  historic  background  of  tradition  and  re- 
ligion.  Compared  with  the  Asiatic  in  assimilabUity  it 
is  as  if  Slav  and  Saxon,  Sicilian  and  Swede,  were  of  one 
family.   If  the  assimilation  of  the  "  wop  "  is  difficult, 
that  of  the  "  Jap  "  is  impossible.   It  is  vain  to  prove,  as 
Professor  Wigmore  does,  that  the  Japanese  are  not 
Mongolians.   Granted.   This  gains  nothing  except  per- 
haps the  technical  evasion  of  a  law. 

It  is  equally  beside  the  point  to  speak  of  men  like 
Kitasato,  Takamine,  Kawakami,  Okakura,  Nitobe. 
Asakawa.  and  scores  of  other  Japanese  who  have  gath' 
«red  laurels  in  Occidental  fields,  as  it  is  on  the  otiier 
land  to  mention  instances  of  individuals  without  any 
concqrtion  of  the  sacredness  of  contractual  obligations. 
No  one  who  knows  anything  about  the  Japanese  at  aU 
wffl  deny  them  their  full  meed  of  credit  and  praise  for 
tht  ponessloii  of  as  many  excellences  as  may  be  found 
in  any  people  of  Europe.   Particularly  is  this  true  of 
the  "common  people."  Nowhere  else  in  the  world  are 
the  peasanto  possessed  of  those  graces  of  manner  and 
famine  courtesy  that  we  continually  meet  in  interior 


THE  "YELLOW  PERIL" 


177 


Japan.  Many  a  time  have  I  travded  in  durd-data 

cars  and  put  up  at  third-class  inns  that  I  enjoy 
the  genial  companionship  of  tiw  tn^nvtentious  country 
folk.  PossiUy  this  was  because  I  was  deferred  to, 
which  always  makes  for  complacency!  But  because 
I  may  be  proud  to  know  a  man  like  Kitasato  or  count 
a  Mitsukuri  as  a  friend,  does  not  mean  that  I  should 
care  to  have  Hyakusho)ra  Gombei  for  my  next-door 
neighbor  in  California,  occupied  in  gaining  a  living. 
One  of  the  happiest  years  of  my  life  I  spent  in  a  little 
inland  village  in  Japan  of  less  than  two  thousand  inhab- 
itants as  the  "  paying  guest **  in  a  Japanese  family;  yet 
I  hate  to  think  what  my  experiences  might  have  been 
if  I  had  tried  to  operate  a  retail  shop  in  that  same  town. 
For  it  makes  all  the  difference  in  the  world  whether 
aliens  meet  one  another  as  guest  and  host  or  as  oom- 
petitors. 

Now  the  Japanese  scattered  throughout  colleges  in 
the  East  or  as  occasional  curio-shop  keepers  are  essen- 
tially guests,  and  the  Easterner's  relations  with  them 
are  those  of  hosts ;  moreover,  they  are  most  often  mem- 
bers of  the  gentry.  But  in  the  West  the  Japanese 
(almost  always  of  the  heimin  class)  are  competitors, 
and,  pulling  together  by  a  sort  of  racial  surface  tension, 
they  attain  a  solidarity  in  competition  that  is  not 
achieved  by  the  whites,  even  in  California.   And,  in 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

the  main,  it  is  a  successful  competition,  by  fair  means  or 
foul. 

Many  writers,  arguing  from  the  acknowledged  excel- 
lences of  the  Japanese  race  and  some  of  the  best-known 
deficiencies  of  our  own,  believe  that  the  admixture  of  a 
Japanese  element  would  be  a  good  thing  for  our  popu- 
lation; that  the  Japanese  would  become  good  Americans. 
This  is  bound  to  be  laigely  a  matter  of  opinion.  I 
beheve,  personally,  that  it  is  an  economical  and  a  bw- 
logical  impossibiUty  for  the  two  races  to  assimilate,  ex- 
cept perhaps  in  an  age-long  interval  of  time  that  is  now 
no  longer  avaihUe.   And  the  presence  of  an  undigested 
and  indigestible  alien  mass  in  California  cannot  be 
other  than  a  breeder  of  future  trouble. 

In  this  matter  Americans  win  do  weU  to  consider  the 
"  French  problem  "  in  portions  of  Canada,  eq>edany  is 
Ontario  and  Quebec   To  the  theorist,  theie  shotdd 

not  be  any  very  great  difficulty  experienced  by  the  Eng. 
lish  in  assimilating  a  people  so  intimately  connected 
with  them  through  centuries  of  history  as  the  French. 
A  rod  deal  of  the  difficult  is  at  bottom  rdigioos,  of 
course,  and  we  should  not  expect  a  great  amount  of 
intermarriage  between  atholics  and  Protestants,  eves 
in  twj  centuries  of  association.  But  there  teems  to  H 
something  more  fundamental  than  tiiii.  Durbg  aB 
these  years,  the  French  of  Canada  have 


THE  "  YELLOW  PERIL  " 


179 


French.  The  Gennins  in  the  United  Stttes,  on  the 
other  hand,  mdt  into  the  American  mixture,  as  a  mk, 
in  a  few  generations.  There  is  a  racial  solidarity  about 
the  French,  when  collected  in  groups,  that  resists  and 
reacts  against  the  attrition  of  another  race,  even  if  not 
a  very  alien  one. 

In  1912,  as  a  result  of  a  series  of  complaints,  the  Pro- 
vincial government  appointed  a  commission  to  inspect 
the  schools  of  Ontario.  They  found  the  Roman  Cath- 
olic catechism  taught  in  thirty  of  the  public  schools, 
contrary  to  the  rules.  French  was  mo.e  extensively 
used  than  English  and  the  teachers  in  many  schooU 
spoke  English  very  imperfectly. 

In  the  sumnKT  of  that  same  year  a  Congress  of  the 
French  language  was  held  —  the  avowed  purpose  of 
which  was  to  protect  "  the  French  life  and  the  unity  of 
the  French  race,"  which  "  depend  upon  the  preservation 
of  their  language."  Resolutions  were  adopted  stating, 
among  other  things,  that  the  French  in  Quebec  and 
Ontario  should  be  encouraged  to  migrate  to  other 
provinces  and  found  colonies;  that  Frenchmen  should 
insist  upon  a  better  status  for  the  French  language  in 
the  schools  there;  and  that  in  any  "bilingual  school " 
the  language  of  instruction  should  be  that  of  the  majority 
and  that  pupils  should  be  permitted  to  choose  the  lan- 
guage for  the  written  examinations.   It  will  be  seen  that 


JAPANE8B  EXPANSION 


dtirenship  has  nothing  to  do  with  this  situation,  in  fact 
increases  the  difficulty. 

The  racial  solidarity  of  the  French  is  as  nothing  com- 
pared with  that  of  the  Japanese,— one  of  the  most 
inbred  peoples  of  the  earth.   Let  us  imagine  the  Japa- 
nese admitted  to  citizenship  and  allowed  free  entrance 
to  Calif     I'a.    Will  they  scatter  generally  among  the 
whites      will  they  form  groups  of  their  own  kind? 
No  one  with  the  slightest  experience  of  the  situation 
can  be  doubtful  of  the  answer  to  tais  question.  The 
whites  themselves  has*-n  the  result  by  moving  away 
when  the  Japanese  be»-w»ne  numerous.   Will  they,  with 
their  love  of  home  and  country,  their  devotion  to  their 
nati<»ial  history  and  its  ideals,  be  more  likely  to  become 
more  English-speaking  or  less,  as  the  numbers  of  their 
own  kind  increase  in  a  given  locality  ?   German  officials 
are  reported  to  deplore  the  loss  to  the  f^'   rU  id  of 
Germans  who  emigrate  to  America.   Ti,  ittle 
question  that  this  race  is  the  most  easily  i..,.  miiated 
here  of  any  non-English  that  enter  our  country.  Yet 
the  writer  has  spent  days  in  towns  of  Missouri  and 
southern  HKnois,  settled  by  Germans  long  ago,  and  has 
never  heard  an  Englirii  word  spoken  during  his  stay. 

Siqipose  that  in  Solano  County  in  California,  the 
Japanese^  each  an  American  citizen  with  a  vote,  decide 
to  adopt  the  attitude  of  the  French  Canadian  with  regard 


THE  *'YELLOW  PBUL*' 


ffl 


to  his  native  tongue.  When  his  vote  is  one  of  a  majority 
in  that  county,  and  he  passes  the  same  regulation  that 
instruction  shall  be  in  the  language  of  the  majority  of 
the  citizens,  could  anything  more  effective  be  dcviNd 
for  the  peaceful  conquest  of  the  country? 

Those  who  pooh-pooh  the  Japanese  danger  fail  to 
distinguish  the  difference  between  individual  Japanese 
and  Japanese  in  the  mass.  The  dangerous  conse- 
quences arising  from  the  presence  of  the  latter  are 
due  in  the  main  to  the  good  qualities  of  the  race 
rather  than  otherwise, —  qualities  which  abstractly  we 
should  praise.* 

The  intermingling  of  Orientals  and  Occidentals  «i 
masse  is  something  like  the  admixture  of  oil  and  water. 
They  simply  do  not  form  a  stable  mixture  if  suddenly 
poured  into  one  another.  But  if  a  trace  of  alkali  be 
added  to  the  water,  the  result  is  an  emulsification  of  the 
oil  so  that  an  intimate  and  permanent  suspension  is 
produced.  And  the  housewife  knows  that  when  she 
makes  mayonnaise  dressing,  which  is  notJiing  but  a  thick 

iHow  persistent  racial  prejudices  are,  even  if  without  the  slight- 
est foundation  in  fact,  will  be  attested  by  any  one  who  haa  lived 
any  length  of  time  in  the  country  districts  of  Japan,  etpedally  in 
the  west.  It  is  a  deeply  rooted  belief  there,  that  curly  hair  always 
goes  with  a  treacherous  heart  (perhaps  a  relic  of  an  ancient 
Nigrito  experience).  And  many  a  young  Japanese  gM  hM  1 
her  life  fairbr  rained  on  account  of  a  itigjtA  waviaeaa  of  iMir. 


ii 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

emulsion  of  olive  oil,  she  must  add  the  oil,  drop  by  drop. 
To  do  otherwise  would  curdle  the  whole  mixture. 

I  have  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  if  Japanese  were  to 
be  very  slowly  added  to  our  body  politic  and,  instead  of 
aggregating  in  colonies,  were  to  diffuse  throughout  our 
population,  it  would  result  in  a  sort  of  racial  emulsifica- 
tion  that  would  be  of  permanent  advantage  to  both  sides. 
This  would  take  a  long  period  of  time  to  accomplish, 
however,  and  nothing  would  interfere  with  the  process 
so  much  as  hasty  and  iU-considered  exclusive  legislatioii. 

After  all,  it  is  a  practical  problem.  For  what  dif- 
ference does  it  make  whether  or  not  the  standpoint  of 
the  white  population  of  British  Columbia,  CaUfomis, 
and  Australia  is  logically  sound,  so  long  as  they  think 
alike  on  tiie  subject?  And  witii  a  few  conspicuous  ex- 
ceptions, they  do  think  alike.  If  tiie  eight  or  ten  milUoo 
whites  in  these  countries  were  possessed  of  heterodox 
notions  regarding  transubstantiation,  let  us  say,  to  the 
extent  that  tiicy  were  prepared  to  fight  for  their  opimous, 
no  rational  atiieist  could  afford  to  ignore  the  situation. 

The  Other  Side  of  the  Shield 
It  is  of  interest  to  discover  that  the  Japanese,  on  their 
part,  have  long  had  very  clearly  defined  ideas  on  this 
subject  and  understand  the  situation  and  its  impUcip 
tions  better  than  we  do. 


TTI 


THE  " YELLOW  PERIL" 


183 


In  1892  when  Japan  waa  taking  the  final  steps  in  the 
way  of  concluding  the  current  treaties  with  foreiga 
powers,  this  matter  of  the  alien  danger  perfaapi  to  be 
encountered  with  the  abolition  of  extraterritoriality 
greatly  agitated  her  stotesmen.   Mr.  (now  'Viscount) 
Kaneko  took  occasion  to  write  Herbert  Spencer,  who 
was  a  sort  of  oracle  on  such  things,  asking  his  advice. 
Spencer  answered  at  length.^   Among  other  things  he 
said :  "  The  Japanese  policy  should,  I  think,  be  that  of 
keeping  Americans  and  Europeans  as  much  as  possible 
at  arm's  length.    In  the  presence  of  the  more  powerful 
races,  your  position  is  one  of  chronic  danger  and  you 
should  take  every  precaution  to  give  as  little  foothold 
as  possible  to  foreigners.    It  seems  to  me  that  the  only 
forms  of  intercourse  which  you  may  with  advantage 
permit  are  those  which  are  indispensable  for  the  ex- 
change of  commodities  and  exchange  of  ideas.  No 
further  privileges  should  be  allowed  to  people  of  othe 
races,  and  especially  to  people  of  the  more  powerful 
races,  than  is  absolutely  needful  for  the  achievement  of 
these  ends.   Apparently  you  are  proposing,  by  revision 
of  the  treaty  powers  with  Europe  and  America,  to  open 
the  whole  Empire  to  foreigners  and  foreign  capital.  I 
regard  this  as  a  fatal  policy.  .  .  . 
"  In  pursuance  of  the  advice  thus  generally  mdicated, 
»"Life  and  Letters  of  Herbert  Spencer."  II,  14. 


i<4  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

I  should  say,  in  answer  to  your  first  question,  that  thcrt 
should  be,  not  only  a  prohibition  to  foreign  persons  to 
hold  property  in  land,  but  also  a  refusal  to  give  them 
leases  and  a  permission  only  to  reside  as  annual  tenants." 
"  To  your  remaining  question  respecting  the  intenntf- 
riage  of  foreigners  and  Japanese,  my  reply  is  that,  as 
rationally  answered,  there  is  no  difficulty  at  all.  .  .  . 
It  is  at  root  a  question  of  biology.  ...  If  you 
mix  the  constitutions  of  two  widely  divergent  varieties 
which  have  severally  become  adopted  to  widely  diver- 
gent modes  of  life,  you  get  a  constitution  which  is 
adapted  to  the  mode  of  life  of  neither  —  a  constitutiwi 
which  will  not  work  properly,  because  it  is  not  fitted  for 
any  set  of  conditions  whatever.  By  all  means,  there- 
fore, peremptorily  interdict  marriages  of  Japanese  with 
foreigners." 

"  I  have  for  the  reasons  indicated  entirely  approved 
of  the  regulations  which  have  been  established  in  Amer- 
ica for  restraining  the  Chinese  immigration,  and  had  I 
the  power,  would  restrict  them  to  the  smallest  possible 
•mount,  my  reasons  for  this  decision  being  that  one  of 
two  things  must  happen.  If  the  Chinese  are  allowed  to 
settle  extensively  in  America,  they  must  either,  if  they 
remain  unmixed,  form  a  subject  class  in  the  position, 
if  not  of  slaves,  yet  of  a  class  approaching  slaves;  or 
if  they  mix,  they  must  form  a  bad  hybrid.    In  either 


THE  "YELLOW  PERIL" 


lis 


case,  supp  osing  the  immigratkm  to  be  lirft,  ii 
iocial  mischief  must  arise  and  eventually  sodal  diaor- 
ganixatioQ.  The  same  thing  will  happen  if  there  fhonld 
be  any  considerable  mixture  of  the  EuropMn  or  Ameri- 
can races  with  the  Japanese." 

"  You  see,  therefore,  that  my  advice  i»  atrongly  con- 
servative  in  all  directions  and  I  end  b\  v. as  I  began 
—  keep  other  races  at  arm's  Itngth  Oi       tas  possible," 

Viscount  Kaneko  has  never  revealed  to  what  extent 
Spencer's  advice  was  followed.  But  Spencer  was  the 
great  vogue  in  Japan  in  the  '90's  and  it  must  have  had 
weight.  The  anxiety  concerning  mixed  marriaget  in 
Japan  seems  to  have  been  quite  unfounded. 

As  for  land  tenure  and  foreign  capital,  the  Japanese 
have  been  in  a  dilemma  that  was  not  understood  by 
Mr.  Spencer.  Above  all  things,  Japan  requires  capital 
to  develop  her  Indus  s,  and  in  the  alienee  of  a  large 
home  supply,  it  must  weeds  be  foreign  ^^utaL  Capi- 
tal is  anything:  but  altruistic  and  becomes  very  timid 
whei  r  is  imi-oasible  to  invest  it  in  physical  form. 
So  fearful  have  the  Japanese  been,  however,  that  thia, 
their  most  crying  need,  has  been  smothered  in  their 
anxiety  not  to  permit  a  foot  of  Japanese  territory  to 
pass  into  foreign  hands. 

In  the  earlier  days,  it  was  not  imusual  for  foreigners 
to  hold  buildings  and  grounds  in  the  names  of  Japanese 


i86  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


who  were  expected  to  function  as  dummies  or  in  some 
cases  as  trustees.  In  not  a  few  cases*  the  Japanese 
thus  chosen  failed  to  appreciate  the  obligations  of  trus- 
teeship and  converted  the  fiction  of  their  property  rights 
into  reality. 

Nowadays  foreigners  may  hold  land  under  tlie  legal 
fiction  of  "  juridical  persons."  A  juridical  person  may 
be  a  partnership  or  a  joint-stock  company,  but  not  an 
individual.  In  addition  foreigners  enjoy  the  right  to 
lease  land  ("  superficies  ",)  frequently  for  long  periods, 
but  these  substitutes  for  ownership  have  not  attracted 
capital. 

In  1910  the  Japanese  diet  passed  a  new  law  relating 
to  foreign  right  of  ownership  in  land.^  Apparently  the 
new  law  removes  the  restrictions.  According  to  it 
foreigners  may  own  land  if  the  reciprocal  privilege  is 
granted  to  Japanese  in  his  own  country.  He  must  ob- 
tain permission  of  the  Home  Office  so  to  do,  however, 
and  his  country  must  have  been  previously  designated 
by  Imperial  Ordinance.  The  law  does  not  apply 
to  (i)  Hokkaido,  (2)  Formosa,  (3)  Saghalien,  and 
(4)  "Districts  necessary  for  national  defense."  But 
foreigners  find  a  "joker"  in  Article  III  of  the  law, 
which  states  that  "  In  case  a  foreigner  or  a  foreign  jur- 

>  The  Ddshisha  school  troubles,  for  instance. 

'Tht  "Gwaikoku-jm  no  toeki  shoy»-ktn  ni  Kwm  awm  km.* 


THE  "  YELLOW  PERIL  " 


187. 


idical  person  owning  land  ceases  to  be  capable  of  enjoy- 
ing the  right  of  ownership  in  land,  the  ownership  of  soch 
land  shall  revert  to  the  National  Treasury  unless  he  dis- 
poses of  it  within  a  period  of  <mt  year."  In  case  the 
foreigner  withdraws  his  business  or  moves  away,  the 
above  period  shall  be  extended  to  five  years.  To  those 
who  appreciate  what  "  team  work  "  the  Japanese  are 
capable  of,  the  requirement  to  sell  within  a  year  appears 
to  amount  to  confiscation.  And  it  seems  to  be  left  en- 
tirely to  the  Japanese  authorities  to  determine  just  what 
conditions  may  be  under  which  the  foreigner  "  ceases  to 
be  capable  of  enjoying  the  right  of  ownership  in  land." 
It  may  well  be  that  such  a  privilege  would  depend  txpm. 
the  attitude  of  the  foreigner's  own  country  amnt  Japan. 
In  fact  the  whole  paragraph  appears  to  be  a  weapon  of 
retaliation  against  such  nations  as  may  in  the  future 
pass  laws  distasteful  to  Japanese  emigrants.  iUthough 
promulgated  April  13,  1910,  the  law  has  not  yet  been 
put  into  force  by  Imperial  Ordinance. 

In  connection  with  the  indignant  protests  of  the  Jap- 
anese government  regarding  the  Califomian  Exclusion 
Law  and  the  protracted  diplomatic  interchanges  between 
Washington  and  Tokyo  that  were  at  the  last  hearing 
still  "  unsatisfactory  "  to  the  latter,  it  is  of  a  great  deal 
of  interest  to  look  mto  Japan's  own  attitude  toward  the 
same  problem. 


JAFANE8B  KXPANSimr 

We  have  seen  the  Japanese  attitude  toward  foreign 
land  holding,  in  spite  of  the  great  need  for  foreign 
capital  which  the  present  laws  frighten  away.  We 
might  think  that  a  country  not  so  large  as  California 
with  a  population  half  that  of  the  whole  United  States 
need  not  fear  foreign  immigration,  particularly  of  la- 
borers.  The  idea  is  of  course  absurd  —  from  the  Occi- 
dental standpoint.   But  Japan  is  very  close  to  China. 
If  the  pressure  of  population  in  Japan  is  great,  in  Shan- 
tung it  is  greater,  and  between  the  two  a  sort  of  inter- 
national plasmolysis  may  very  well  occur  if  no  restric- 
tions be  erected.   If  the  Japanese  can  underlive  and 
undersea  the  American  in  his  own  land,  so  can  the 
Chmese  underlive  and  defeat  the  Japanese  if  he  has 
half  a  chance.   Fifteen  years  ago  Chinese  peddlers  be- 
gan to  be  numerous  in  Japan,  especially  in  the  south- 
ern and  central  parts.   They  traveled  aU  over  the  coun- 
try and  did  a  thriving  business.   Moreover,  after  the 
Russian  war,  Chinese  coolies  began  to  come  into  Japan, 
attracted  by  the  high  wages  there  to  be  had.   Thus  the 
Japanese  found  themselves  confronted  by  very  much 
Ae  same  problem  that  has  vexed  California,  British 
Columbia,  and  Australia,— native  labor  displaced  by 
*' cheap  foielin  labor." 

In  1899  «n  Imperial  Ordinance,  No.  352,  was  promtil- 
gated  regarding  the  residence  of  foreigners  outside  the 


THE  "  YVUXm  PEIUL  ** 


Il9 


"  treaty  ports,"  in  accordance  with  the  new  treaty  re- 
lations with  Europe  and  America.  At  this  time,  very 
likely  with  a  Chinese  invasion  in  mind,  of  which  the 
peddlers  were  the  advance  guard,  such  residence  was 
denied  to  laborers  except  by  permission  of  the  Home 
Office.  This  permission  can  be  revoked  by  any  provin- 
cial governor  at  his  own  discretion,  *'  Laborers  "  were, 
at  the  same  time,  defined  to  be  those  engaged  in  "  agri- 
cultural, fishing,  mining,  civil-engineering  work,  archi- 
tectural, manufacturing,  transporting,  carting,  steve- 
doring, and  other  miscellaneous  work."  Exception 
was  made  for  cooks  and  waiters. 

It  is  obvious  that  Occidentals  were  not  in  the  mind  of 
the  Home  Minister  when  he  drafted  this  regulation,  but 
as  it  is  a  general  law,  it  is  equally  obvious  that  it  is  ap- 
plicable to  Americans,  particularly  when  no  one  nation 
is  specified.  And  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  Ordi- 
nance would  be  promptly  invoked  should  American 
competition  begin  in  any  of  the  lines  cited  above.  Of 
course  the  American  tourist  or  student  is  welcomed 
(officially,  as  a  matter  of  fact)  as  the  Japanese  traveler 
is  in  this  country,  and  mfh  much  greater  reason,  as  the 
gold  the  globe-trotter  leaves  in  Ji^n  goes  a  IcMig  way, 
as  we  have  seen,  toward  offsetting  the  annual  unfavof* 
able  balance  of  tradt. 

In  1907  several  hundred  Chinese  were  deported  tnm 


'5°  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

Nagasaki  by  the  governor  of  the  province.  When  the 
Chinese  Minister  protested,  the  Home  Office  referred 
him  to  the  law  just  quoted  by  virtue  of  which  the  pre- 
fectural  governor  is  empowered  to  use  his  own  discit- 
tion  and  stated  that  it  could  not  interfere.  This  was 
"  states  rights  "  of  the  American  kind.  It  is  significant 
that  the  deported  Chinese  were  of  two  groups,  one  of  the 
groups  being  composed  of  coolies  and  the  other  of 
skiUed  artisans. 

SoluHou  of  the  Problem  in  Amerka 

He  would  be  a  wise  man,  not  to  say  a  presumptuous 
one,  who  should  attempt  to  outline  a  definite  and  con- 
elusive  solution  to  the  problem  indicated  in  the  preccd- 
jngpagcs.  Not  only  must  such  a  solution  rest  upon  an 
intelligent  and  disinterested  appreciation  of  numerous 
factors,  apparently  unrdated,  but  mmy  of  these  factors 
are  contmgent  upon  future  events,  the  outcome  of  which 
can  be  but  vaguely  predicted.  Nevertheless  certain  fun- 
damental  postubtcs  camiot  be  ignored  in  any  solution. 

First,  it  is  not  a  Califomian,  nor  a  r4wadian,  nor  an 
Australian  problem,  but  a  world  proMem.   The  white 

i^Wtants  of  these  cowitries  are  bttt  the  advance  guard 
of  the  spreading  army  of  migratkm  that  has  drded  the 
globe  from  East  to  West  mitil  it  has  come  fac*  to  face 
with  the  Farther  East  ITie  empty  places  of  the  earth 


THE  "YELLOW  PERIL" 


191 


are  filling  up.  Some  modus  vivendi  must  be  found 
along  the  2  Tne  in  which  East  meets  West.  The  conflict 
may  be  a  potential  one,  but  it  is  none  the  less  real 
Whether  it  be  allo«/ed  to  drift  into  a  military  or  an  eco- 
nomic conflict  will  depend  in  large  measure  upon  the  de- 
gree to  which  the  peoples  involved  avoid  false  steps. 
To  some  it  seems  better  to  avoid  z  onflict  and  to  leave 
the  Pacific  Ocean  like  a  boundary  fence  between  two  in- 
compatible neighbors.  Tliese  -  ihe  exdusionists  of 
one  sort  or  anotlier.  Naturally  the  instinct  of  self-pres- 
ervation places  the  dwellers  on  the  Pacific  shores  in  this 
class.  Others  with  no  personal  interests  at  stake  are 
willing  to  "  let  Nature  take  her  course,"  confident  that 
in  such  a  struggle  for  racial  existence  Occidental  civil- 
iza'tion  will  be  dominant  over  Oriental.  This  academic 
view,  which  holds  that  an  armrd  conflict  with  the  Orient 
is  inevitable  arl  hence  to  be  prepared  foir  (Hobson, 
Homer  Lea),  or  tb.it  it  is  desirable  and  hence  to  be  has- 
tened (Kaiser  Wilhelm),  is  obviously  directly  opposed 
to  that  of  the  first  standpoint  just  mentioned.  Yet  an 
exclusion  program  that  is  unintelligently  conceived  or 
injudiciously  administered  may  of  itself  lead  to  conflict. 

For  this  reason  it  ought  to  be  underst  that  the  con- 
trol of  Japanese  immigration  is  not  a  .state  affair  nor 
even  a  national  affair,  but  an  international  one. 

The  Japanese  contend,  and  with  justice,  that  they  do 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

a<*  iwih  to  paih  in  where  they  are  not  wanted  and  that 
they  are  not  pressing  for  the  right  to  emigrate  en  masse 
to  America,  where  their  presence  is  an  increasing  cause 
of  friction.   But  Aey  do  fed  themselves  the  equal  of 
any  other  nation  and  they  resent  being  treated  as  a  class 
apart   They  of  course  concede  the  right  of  any  nation 
to  determine  its  own  conditions  oi  hnmigration  and 
naturalization,  but  they  insist  that  all  aliens  shall  be 
treated  alike.   The  necessity  for  saving  Japan's  face  in 
this  matter  is  hardly  appreciated  enough  in  the  Occi- 
dent.  It  is  not  easy  to  believe  that  in  the  Far  East  the 
•hadow  is  sometimes  more  highly  valued  than  the  sub- 
stance.  But  any  kmd  of  an  exclusion  act  that  fails  to 
take  this  important  feature  into  account  is  certaw  to  be 
a  source  of  irritation  and  international  friction. 

The  only  plan  that  appears  to  the  writer  even  partially 
to  meet  the  difficulty  (in  tiie  way  of  immigration,  not 
in  the  side  issues  of  owning  land  or  of  doing  business)  is 
the  plan  proposed  by  Dr.  Sidney  L.  Gulick,*  as  w^ 
equipped  a  student  of  American-Japanese  questions  as 
there  is  in  either  hmd.  This  plan  bases  tiie  number  of 
immigrants  tiiat  may  be  admitted  to  this  country  in 
any  one  year  upon  our  capacity  to  assmUatt  them. 

-^J****  ^'J"  find  the  plan  discussed  in  deUU  in 

YoriJ  Japanese  Problem,"  bar  Sidn^  L.  Galick.  Nnr 


THE  "YELLOW  PERIL" 


193 


Since  this  tesk  must  fall  chiefly  upon  those  aliens  natu- 
ralized or  ready  tc  be  who  are  already  here  and  know 
both  languages,  Mr.  Gulick  finds  ready  at  hand  a  cri- 
terion by  which  to  determine  the  number  that  may  be 
safely  taken  in,  and  one  that  can  give  offense  to  no  on^ 
since  it  is  based  upon  purely  mechanical  considerations. 
From  North  Europe,  whence  our  most  valued  immigrar 
tion  has  come  in  the  past,  we  have  such  a  large  number 
of  naturalized  citizens  that  the  present  immigration 
falls  far  ftbott  of  the  proportion  that  uiigtit  be  allotted  to 
such  a  population  under  the  plan.  From  Southern 
Europe  and  Russia  the  allowable  number  would  be  much 
smaller,  which  would  be  highly  desirable.  From  the 
Far  East  it  would  be  negligible.  Yet  all  would  be 
treated  on  the  same  basis.  Various  objections  have 
been  offered  to  this  scheme  and  many  details  would  have 
to  be  worked  out.  Yet  it  is  becoming  increasingly  evi- 
dent that  the  whole  problem  of  immigration  into  Aiiier- 
ica  fron  the  East  as  well  as  from  the  West  is  in  need  of 
a  readjustment  based  uDon  a  broader  and  more  far- 
sighted  understanding  of  our  future  necessities  than  our 
present  laws  provide,  and  Dr.  GuHck's  plan  certainly 
marks  a  long  step  in  advance. 


CHAPTER  VII 


THS  CHANCBS  OF  WAS 

In  the  beginning  we  have  pointed  out  that  a  Japanese- 
American  war  may  be  inevitoblc,  probable,  or  merely 
possible,  according  to  the  temperament  of  the  prophet. 
Granting  that  anything  of  the  sort  is  possible,  the 
probabiUty  of  such  an  occurrence  or  its  inevitabUity 
rest  upon  somewhat  different  premises. 

Moreover,  it  makes  a  difference  which  side  is  to  be 
considered  the  aggressor.  Let  us  begin  by  assuming 
that  it  is  the  United  States.  What  grounds  may  be 
offered  for  declaring  war  against  Japan?  As  Japan 
is  many  thousands  of  mfles  away,  opportunities  for 
collision  are  not  very  numerous.  The  writer  can 
think  of  but  three.  First,  a  state  of  tension  may  arise 
that  would  lead  to  acts  of  hostility  against  Americans 
in  the  Orient,  which  we  could  not  ignore;  second,  we 
may  consider  the  academic  proposition  of  maintaimng 
the  "Open  Door*'  in  China;  and  third,  Japan  may 
assume  such  an  aggressive  attitude  toward  hdpless 
China  that  we  should  fed  called  upon  to  come  to  the 
defense  of  the  latter. 

>9« 


THE  CHANCES  OF  WAR 


19S 


The  last  wc  may  dismiss  without  discussion.  Wars 
are  not  made  in  America  at  the  whim  of  rulers,  and 
the  people  of  this  country  are  disinclined  to  interfere, 
least  of  all  by  arms,  with  the  affairs  of  another  and 
alien  people.  The  second  consideration  is  equally 
impossible.  American  interests  in  Mexico  today  are 
vastly  more  valuable  than  they  are  in  China  and  the 
temptation  to  interfere  infinitely  greater,  yet  as  a 
whole  the  American  people  are  steadfast  in  their  de- 
termination to  keep  out  of  Mexico  if  it  is  humanly 
possible  to  do  so.  The  idea  of  fighting  any  country 
for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  profits  of  trade 
little  likely  to  attract  a  foUowing  in  America.  We 
want  an  open  market  for  our  goods  in  China,  but 
to  pay  for  it  with  a  costly  war  would  be  the  worst  sort 
of  bad  business.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  sympathy 
for  China  would  be  very  keen  in  America,  particularly 
if  Japanese  ascendancy  there  meant  loss  of  American 
trade,  and  that  is  something  which  Japan  would  do 
well  to  keep  in  mind  as  a  possible  offset  to  any  assumed 
advantages  of  unnecessarily  harsh  measures  on  tlie 
continent. 

As  Japan  and  the  United  Stetes  rub  elbows  more  and 
more,  many  opportunities  may  arise  and  probably  will 
arise,  from  time  to  time,  to  mar  the  friendly  t<»e  of 
American- Japanese  relaticms.  Yet  the  diance  of  any 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

overt  hostile  act  being  committed  against  Americans  in 
Jhwi  i»  extremely  remote.  Almost  universally.  Amer- 
ican  residents  in  Japan  are  well  liked  and  American 
tourists  are  welcomed,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  ^e 
money  they  spend,  and  in  any  event  it  is  very  unlikely 
that  Japan  would  fail  to  make  full  reparation  for  any 
real  injury  due  to  the  acts  of  irresponsible  Japanese 
dtixens.  The  only  reason  that  she  might  fail  to  do  so 
would  be  that  she  would  desire  to  take  intentional  ad- 
vantage of  such  an  occasion  to  declare  her  hostility. 
And  this  brings  us  to  the  other  aspect  of  the  question: 
Japan  may  be  the  aggressor.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this 
ia  the  only  viewpoint  adopted  by  those  who  preach  the 
Japanese  danger. 

Again  let  us  try  to  analyze  the  possible  causes  for  a 
war  which  might  be  declared  by  Japan  against  the 
Umtcd  States.  The  responsibility  for  such  a  conflict 
may  rest  upon  our  own  unthinking  heads.  For  in- 
surcc.  conceding  that  we  are  foolish  enough  to  persist 
m  a  policy  of  irritation  such  as  we  have  toward  the 
Chinese,  with  respect  to  the  administration  of  the  im- 
migration  laws,  or  that  we  treat  Japanese  immigrants  in 
California  with  barbaric  harshness,  mob  them  or  lynch 
them,  why  then  it  is  quite  likely  that  we  may  goad 
Japan  or  force  her  into  a  false  position,  in  which,  under 
the  current  code  of  national  honor,  she  may  feel  that 


THE  CHANCES  OF  WAl  197 


she  has  to  fight  even  if  it  should  be  her  downfall.  But 
this  must  also  assume  that  America  will,  without  real 
reason,  go  back  on  her  long  record  of  friendship  for 
Japan,  and  likewise  that,  in  the  wrong,  we  shall  as  a 
nation  refuse  to  make  such  amends  as  one  gentleman 
may  m.ake  to  another.  We  are  a  mercurial  people, 
but  I  cannot  believe  that  we  are  in  any  danger  of 
acting  so  contrary  to  our  honorable  past  history.  The 
nation  that  followed  out  her  pledge  and  gave  Cuba 
back  her  independence,  or  that  stuck  to  the  letter  of 
her  bargain  in  regard  to  the  Panama  canal  tolls,  is 
not  likely  to  do  wrong  by  another  nation  and  refuse 
just  reparation.  What  other  motive  then  will  exist  for 
a  declaration  of  war  by  japan  upon  America?  There 
is  left  the  motive  of  national  aggrandizement.  And 
this  is  the  basic  motive  assimied  by  practically  all  the 
war  writers. 

The  author  possesses  no  secrets  of  the  Japanese 
government.  He  would  not  presume  to  say  that 
Japan  has  no  idea  of  going  to  war  with  America  for 
the  profit  to  be  made  out  of  it.  Nations  are  no  wiser 
than  their  leaders,  and  nations  have  been  foolish  in 
the  past.  But  the  profitableness  of  past  wars  for  Japan 
has  been  noted  on  a  previous  pnge.*  And  Japan's 
foreign  policy  has  long  been  pursued  with  an  astuteness 

*  See  page  44. 


198  JixPANESB  EXPANSION 


and  a  far-tiglitediicts  that  gives  no  hint  of  nich  itii- 
pendoof  folly  as  wonld  be  involved  in  the  calcidated 
bringfaig  on  of  war  against  a  power  like  America. 

Let  us  keep  the  conditions  clearly  in  mind.  Grant 
that  war  will  not  be  forced  upon  Japan  by  ourselves. 
Grant  that  if  Japan  becomes  so  incensed,  or  so  htnnili- 
ated,  that  her  national  honor  will  demand  war,  that 
the  responsibility  will  be  upon  our  own  sboukkn,  not 
hers;  then  the  only  other  motive  left  to  consider  win 
be  that  of  cold,  calculated  design,  the  hope  on  the  one 
hand  of  ruling  the  entire  domain  '^f  the  Pacific  by 
eliminating  the  last  great  rival  and  on  tiie  other  hand 
of  appropriating,  d  iSii  Rob  Roy,  the  riches  which  Amer- 
ica has  so  industriously  accumulated  and  nei^ccted  to 
guard. 

The  money  cost  of  modem  warfare  is  appalling.  To 
conduct  an  aggressive  campaign  a  nation  must  have 
either  an  enormous  gold  reserve  cm*  else  unlimited  credit 
Japan  has  neither.  It  is  computed  that  the  cost  of 
maintaining  a  soldier  in  the  field  is  at  the  least  $3.50 
a  day.  Five  hundred  thousand  is  the  very  kywest 
number  that  could  hope  to  effectivdy  occupy  axsy  por- 
tion of  the  west  coast  of  America.  This  would  mean 
$1,125,000  a  day,  to  which  must  be  added  the  enormous 
cost  of  transport  5000  miles  from  the  home  base.  The 
interest  on  foreign  debt  which  cripples  Japan  so  badly  at 


THE  CHANCES  OP  WAR  199 


present  is  but  $35,000,000  amnially,  enough  to  last,  let 

us  say,  three  weeks. 

It  has  often  been  said  that  the  lack  of  money  has 
never  yet  prevented  a  war  nor  deterred  a  nation  from 
declaring  war.  This  is  no  doubt  true,  but  it  does  not 
follow  that  the  lack  of  money  is  of  equally  little  con- 
sequence in  winning  a  war.  And  according  to  our  orig- 
inal premises,  if  an  anti-American  campaign  should  be 
inaugurated  by  Japan  for  her  own  gain,  it  could  onl) 
be  with  the  outcome  clearly  foreseen.  Either  (i) 
should  have  made  secret  agreements  with  other  pov  ■ « 
so  that  enormous  loans  to  finance  such  a  war  would  be 
obtainable,  or  (2)  she  would  depend  upon  striking 
quickly  and  paralyzing  the  American  defense  so  that 
our  prostrate  country  would  be  compelled  to  sue  for 
peace  and  to  pay  an  enormous  indemnity,  or  (3)  she 
might  seize  the  cjveted  Hawaii  and  the  Philippines 
with  their  boundle.:,  resources  and  make  them  her 
own,  or  (4)  having  done  so,  and  not  wishing  to  keep 
them,  she  might  turn  them  over  to  some  European 
power  for  a  large  cash  sum  and  thereby  realize  the 
equivalent  of  an  indemnity  without  even  attacking  con- 
tinental America.  All  these  possibilities  have  been  dis- 
cussed in  one  form  or  another  by  the  American  press 
and  war  experts.  Let  us  examine  them  a  little  r>ore 
closely. 


^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


First,  let  us  consider  the  financing  of  such  a  war  by 
a  European  (and  presumably  hostile)  power.  Assum- 
ing that  any  European  power  should  have  reason  for 
such  a  conspicuous  display  of  hostility,  or  particularly 
any  advantage  to  be  gained  by  it,  its  feasibility  would 
depend  primarily  upon  the  conviction  on  the  part  of 
such  European  power  that  Japan  would  surely  be  the 
victor  in  the  contest.  To  speak  not  too  bumptiously, 
that  would  be  a  "long  chance"  to  put  much  money 
upon.  But  let  us  be  more  specific.  What  powers  could 
finance  such  an  enormously  expensive  campaign? 
Would  it  be  Russia?  Russia  has  no  money  to  lend,  for 
one  thing,  and  some  who  are  weatherwise  have  even 
claimed  that  (at  least  until  August,  1914)  she  was  sav- 
ing her  pennies  to  retrieve  her  lost  prestige  of  1904. 
Would  it  be  Germany?  With  the  memory  of  Tsingtao 
in  mind,  that  sounds  like  irony.  Would  it  be  England? 
The  writer  cannot  conceive  of  any  situation  in  which  it 
would  be  possible,  for  no  other  nation  in  the  world 
would  lose  quite  so  much  by  the  humbling  of  the  United 
States  and  its  conquest  by  an  Oriental  power  as  Eng- 
land. The  defeat  of  the  United  States  at  the  hands 
of  an  Oriental  power  would  mean  the  break-up  of  the 
British  Empire.  There  is  left  France.  But  granting 
that  France  would  care  to  oppose  England  as  regards 
the  Far  East,  her  eggs  are  in  the  same  badcet  wiA 


THE  CHANCES  OF  WAR 


Germany's.  But  all  this  is  rather  academic,  men  of 
straw  whose  knocking  down  merely  rounds  out  the 
argument. 

The  second  consideration  mentioned  above  rests  on 
the  assumption  that  Japan  could  make  a  sudden  raid, 
seize  the  coast,  perhaps  bum  Los  Angeles,  San  Fran- 
cisco, Portland,  and  Seattle,  or  hold  them  for  ransom, 
and  that  the  United  States,  helpless  because  unpre- 
pared, would  be  forced  to  pay  a  heavy  indemnity  in 
order  to  make  the  Japanese  leave.  Such  a  campaign,  it 
is  thought,  would  be  comparatively  inexpensive  for  Ja- 
pan, and,  if  successful,  might  be  very  profitaUe.  That 
the  United  States  is  wholly  unprepared  to  resist  invasicm 
in  force  is  of  course  well  known.  (We  have  omitted 
any  consideration  of  the  American  fleet,  which  presum- 
ably might  justify  its  existence.)  Yet,  granting  every- 
thing, allowing  that  the  Japanese  expeditionary  forces 
have  landed  at  any  of  the  many  unprotected  localities 
pdntoi  out  by  the  experts,  what  then?  They  would 
seize  the  towns,  of  course,  but  the  coast  states  are  mainly 
agricultural.  Wealth  is  not  concentrated  as  it  is  in  in- 
dustrial communities,  and  moreover  the  greater  part  of 
the  country  is  roug^  and  mountainous. 

Any  oat  who  believes  tiiat  the  inhaHtants  of  tlwae 
Western  states,  whose  fathers  and  grandfathers  were 
the  pi<»Mers  that  subdued  the  wildermss  a  half  pentury 


«»  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

•go,  wUl  meekly  bow  the  head  to  the  invader  or  that 
the  nation  as  a  whole  would  do  so,  has  a  singular  con- 
ception  of  the  spirit  of  the  American  people.  These 
men  and  women  are  not  Flemish  peasants.   Grant  that 
our  militia  would  be  useless  and  the  Japanese  advance 
ateiost  undisputed,  yet  in  the  mountains  and  in  the 
districts  away  from  the  cities,  there  doubtless  would 
ensue  a  protracted  guerilla  warfare  that  could  last  indefi- 
nitely, and  the  longer  it  lasted  the  worse  off  Japan 
would  be.   Past  experience  teaches  that  even  savages 
can  keep  up  an  aknost  endless  warfare  of  this  sort  and 
one  that  is  very  expensive  for  the  invading  force.  Japan 
knows  something  about  this  from  her  twenty  years'  ex- 
perience in  trying  to  subdue  the  natives  of  Formosa.  At 
any  rate,  the  belief  that  because  we  have  no  large  army 
to  oppose  a  Japanese  invasion,  such  an  invasion  would 
speU  a  quick  victory  and  a  prompt  conclusion  of  hos, 
tilities  with  the  levying  of  a  crushing  indemnity,  is 
quite  without  justification.   Moreover,  the  wealth  of 
the  four  large  cities  named,  even  if  all  seized,  would 
not  be  a  drop  in  the  bucket  compared  with  the  expen- 
ditures required  to  take  it.   The  miUionaires  of  Pasa- 
dena would  not  linger  long  to  be  captured.   And  the 
Japanese  could  not  realize  much  more  except  by  har- 
vesting  the  crops  on  the  ranches,  which  is  their  ap- 
pointed task  in  times  of  peace.   In  short,  the  hope  of  a 


THE  CHANCES  OF  WAR 


ao3 


sudden  realization  of  profit  would  be  doomed  to  failure, 
and  Japan  would  be  in  for  a  long  and  ruinously  ex- 
pensive campaign.^ 

The  point  is,  not  that  Japan  could  not  invade  and  con- 
quer the  coast  states,  but  that,  having  done  so,  she  could 
not  stand  the  financial  and  economic  strain  of  holding 
them  for  a  long  time  under  a  necessarily  military  occu- 
pation. Hence  if  she  realizes  this,  there  will  be  no  mo- 
tive for  her  to  attempt  the  enterprise. 

The  third  consideration  is  one  that  has  received  more 
attention  than  any  of  the  others.  It  is  obvious  that 
we  could  not  protect  the  entire  Philippine  archipelago 
against  invasion  without  the  concentration  of  a  very 
strong  army  there.  Corregidor,  high  above  the  sea, 
might  hold  out  for  a  long  time,  but  in  the  end  an  at- 
tacking force  would  probably  prevail.  This,  of  course, 
on  the  assumption  that  it  had  the  freedom  of  the  sea,  on 
account  of  the  o-struction  of  the  American  fleet.  It 
has  been  pointed  out,  moreover,  that  Japan's  policy,  as 
exemplified  in  the  Russian  war,  is  to  strike  first  and 
issue  the  declaration  of  war  at  her  convenience. 

There  are  some  who  feel  that  Americans,  on  the 
whole,  would  be  glad  to  be  rid  of  the  Philippines,  and 
would  welcome  any  chance  to  transfer  the  responsibil- 

^  Ruinous  because  her  American  trade,  and  to  a  great  extent 
ihe  rest  of  her  uade,  would  be  aatomatiGaUy  destroyed. 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

ities  to  another  nation.  This  may  be  true,  if  it  could  be 
done  in  a  legislative  way,  but  to  lose  them  in  war,  to 
have  them  taken  by  force,  would  be  much  more  likely 
to  rouse  all  the  fighting  blood  in  the  American  people 
and  make  them  determined  to  keep  the  islands  at  all 
hazard ;  would,  in  fact,  commit  us  irrtvocably  to  the  pos- 
sessicm  of  them. 

However,  to  continue  our  former  assumption,— 
concede  that  Japan  by  a  sudden  coup  captures  the 
Philippines,  which  is  a  very  probable  contingency  in 
the  event  of  war.   Concede,  if  vou  will,  that  the  Amer- 
ican fleet  is  destroyed  so  that  we  are  helpless.  Assume 
even  that  we  have  been  forced  to  consent  to  an  in- 
glorious peace.  Japan  would  then  have  achieved  her 
design.   She  would  be  in  undisputed  possession  of  these 
treasure  islands  of  the  Pacific  at  the  cost  of  a  few 
bfoadsides.    (Whether  any  European  power  would  in- 
terfere at  this  stage  is  worthy  of  consideration,  but  we 
need  not  include  such  a  contingency  at  present.  )' 

Japan  would  then  have  on  her  hands  a  very  large 
group  of  tropical  islands  with  a  decidedly  mixed  popu- 
lation. Some  of  the  people  are  savage  or  part  savage; 
some  are  fanatical  Moros,  and  about  7,000,000,  or  one 
seventh  of  the  population  of  Japan,  are  various  sorts 
of  Filipinos  with  a  irfiysical  inheritance  Malay,  and 
a  spiritual  inheritance  Spanish;  that  is  to  say,  Ro- 


THE  CHANCES  OF  WAR  ^05 

man  Catholic  with  a  mediaeval  attitude  toward  the 
heathen. 

Japan  would  find  hendf  in  essentially  the  same 
position  in  which  we  were  at  the  close  of  the  Spanish 
war.  It  took  us  three  years  of  exasperating  guerilla 
warfare  before  opposition  to  our  presence  finally  dis- 
appeared. And  how  did  we  succeed  at  last?  By 
killing  off  as  many  of  the  population  as  possible? 
Hardly;  if  that  had  been  our  policy,  we  should  be 
doing  it  still  We  only  succeeded  when  we  convinced 
the  Filipinos  that  we  were  not  there  to  exploit  them. 
This  is  a  truth  that  no  one  acquainted  with  the  facts 
would  think  of  denying.  We  have  given  of  our  best 
as  only  a  very  wealthy  nation  can.  We  have  rejected 
the  religious  prejudices  of  our  new  wards,  whatever 
they  were.  In  the  personal  relations  we  have  treated 
them  with  unswerving  honesty  and  fair  dealing.  In 
short,  we  have  assumed  an  obligation  of  humanity, 
although  not  without  the  hope,  perhaps,  that  our 
bread  cast  upon  iht  Pacific  mij^t  return  after  not  too 
many  days. 

Now  iht  obvious  presumptions  are  against  Ja:p»n 
playing  that  sort  of  a  role.  We  have  alrea^  com- 
mented^ vtpoa  the  peculiar  difficulties  that  Japan 
would  be  called  i^on  to  face  in  the  event  of  an  occu- 
^Sw  pigt  ttn  ft. 


^     '         JAPANESB  EXPANSION  , 

patioa  of  the  ardiq^elago.  She  would  find  all  the  pop- 
tilation  anmyed  against  the  "  heathen  "  invader,  and  n 
remote  quarters  which  she  could  not  hope  to  subdue 
At  once  the  old  inter-tribal  feuds  would  break  out 
again.  In  short,  anarchy  would  reign  in  the  islands, 
mitigated  here  and  there  by  military  despotian.  Thit 
sort  of  occupation  would  cost  Japan  as  it  did  the  United 
States.^  Japanese  statesmen  mig^  then  begin  to  won- 
der when  the  profits  came  in.  The  potential  wealth 
of  the  I%ilipinnes,  as  we  have  seen,  is  encmnous;  but 
it  is  only  availaUe  under  conditions  of  protracted  peace. 
Metals,  hardwoods,  hemp,  rubber, — these  products  are 
only  transhtable  into  mmey  by  peaceful  commerce. 
The  first  gun  fired  at  ManiU  would  mean  the  total 
coUapse  of  all  the  monqr-nnking  machinoy  in  the  is- 
lands. Moreover,  ti»  devdqmient  of  commerce  tiberi 
waits  upon  the  investment  of  large  amounts  of  capital, 
tiiat  of  which  Japan  herself  is  so  gmtly  in  need,  and 
under  any  circumstances  the  wealth  of  a  country  is  m 
the  hands  of  the  peo^  who  make  it  and  it  would  be  a 
generation  before  Japan  as  a  nation  could  profit  by  oc- 
ciq»ying  the  Philippines.  It  would  be  much  better  busi- 
ness to  let  Uncle  Sam  make  the  investments  and  take 

*  In  August,  1911,  General  Leonard  Wood,  then  Chief  of  Staff,! 
stated  that  "For  the  past  ten  or  twelve  years  our  army  expense 
had  been  |i67,486yooo  m  tgcets  of  the  cost  of  maiotaidiig  an  amqr 
of  sin^r  size     ftb  avadsf." 


THE  CHANCES  OF  WAR  ao7 


the  responsttnlities  and  then  to  develop  a  peaceful  eon- 
merce  wttii  the  islands,  as  England  does.  Onthewkoki 
if  Jaipaaeait  statemen  have  ever  ccMitewplated  enfich* 
ing  their  nation  by  seizii^  the  Philippines,  it  would  be 
well  for  them  to  carefully  consider  the  debit  side  of  Uie 
account* 

The  fourth  consideration,  that  of  sdzing  the  islaiids 
for  the  purpose  of  turning  them  over  to  some  other 
power,  need  not  detain  us.  Any  otlwr  power  would 
have  afanost  the  same  difficulty  that  has  been  just  de- 
scribed. But  more  than  this,  the  hst  thing  in  the  world 
that  Japan  would  sedc  would  be  to  intrendi  a  rival 
power  in  the  Far  East  America  is  for  her  innocuoia» 
for  America  has  never  had  nor  ever  will  have  a^  i^ 
of  territorial  aggression  in  China.  So  far  as  Ji^>an 
is  concerned,  American  possession  of  the  Phil^piaes 
"neutralizes"  them  for  her.  This  would  not  be  the 
case  with  any  other  power.  To  taakt  this  dear—- al- 
though it  b  the  purest  peculation  of  course— kt  us 
conceive  of  a  situation  in  which  the  United  States  should 
be  at  war  with  another  power.  Just  as  was  the  case 
with  Spain,  we  should  be  vulnerable  to  attack  in  the 
Philippines.  We  can  believe  that  rather  dian  pennit 
any  other  power  to  take  the  Philippines  from  us,  Japan 
would  come  to  the  rescue  as  an  ally.  For  it  is  o|>- 
viously  so  much  to  her  advantage  that  we,  rather  ^aa 


^  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

a  European  nation,  should  hdd  the  islands,  that  war 
might  seem  to  her  justifiable  to  prevent  our  possession 
of  them  being  threatened. 

But  from  the  standpoint  of  national  profit,  there  is 
another  upcet  of  the  case  which  must  be  included. 
It  is  not  without  significance  that  America  is  the  only 
large  nation  that  buys  more  of  Japan  than  she  sells. 
The  declaration  of  war  would  put  an  end  to  this.  What 
Japan  makes  of  us  as  profit  in  a  year  ($31,000,000  in 
1913)  practically  pays  the  interest  on  her  national  debt 
abroad.   With  any  other  country  her  foreign 
might  cease  and,  temporarily,  Japan  would  be  the  g 
This  would  not  be  true  for  the  United  States.  Ihc 
$70,000,000  of  silk  and  tea  which  she  annually  sdls 
us  would  have  to  seek  (in  vain)  another  market  The 
American  cotton  which  she  requires  in  order  to  hoM 
the  Chinese  market  she  would  no  longer  have,  and  In- 
dian cotton,  if  hostilities  continued,  would  drive  th^ 
Japanese  from  the  Chinese  field. 

In  all  her  foreign  trade,  which  she  has  so  seduk)usly 
cultivated  for  many  years.  equaUy  hard  conditkms 
would  obtain ;  for  an  inspection  of  Japan's  foreign  trade 
summaries  reveals  the  interesting  fact,  that  with  the  ex- 
ception of  China,  the  great  bulk  of  her  exports  to  odier 
countries  are  luxuries  and  the  great  bulk  of  her  inqiorts 
are  necessities.  We  are  discovering  now  how  the  coo- 


THE  CHANCES  OP  WAR  aog 


fusion  of  war  affects  the  business  of  so  solvent  a  nation 
as  the  United  States,  far  from  any  active  campaigning. 
How  much  more  devastating  for  Japan  would  be  the 
eflFect  of  a  war  with  a  nation  with  which  she  is  so  inti- 
mately and  dependently  connected,  as  the  United  States ; 
always  keeping  in  mind,  of  course,  that  the  original  pre- 
mise was  based  upon  the  idea  that  such  a  war  would  be 
profitable. 

So  far,  in  order  not  to  complicate  the  argument,  we 
have  omitted  the  consideration  of  two  factors  which 
should  not  be  ignored.  First  of  these  is  the  United 
States  fleet  which,  now  that  the  Panama  canal  is  com- 
pleted, should  be  an  additional  hazard  to  be  taken  into 
account  by  Japan  if  she  contemplates  hostility.  Sec- 
ondly, we  have  dealt  with  only  the  two  nations,  Japan 
and  ourselves.  The  first  of  these  we  need  not  consider 
otherwise  than  to  mention  it,  since  we  are  not  con- 
cerned so  much  with  the  probable  course  of  a  conflict  as 
with  the  question  whether  Japan  will  bring  on  such  a 
conflict,  and  the  American  fleet  figures  in  such  a  discus- 
sion only  to  the  extent  to  which  it  enters  into  the  cal- 
culations of  the  Japanese.  As  to  this  we  know  nothing. 
It  is  likely,  however,  that  other  considerations  i^ould 
be  much  more  of  a  deterrent  than  the  opposition  of  a 
fleet  which  is  subject  always  to  the  possibility  of  elim- 
ination by  defeat.   The  second  point  is  more  significant 


JAPANB8I  BXFAN8I0N 


It  it  difficult,  almost  impossible,  to  conceive  of  such  a 
conflict  being  limited  to  the  two  powers  priirarily  in- 
volved. Just  as  in  Europe,  the  declaration  of  war  upon 
Servia  by  Austria  brought  the  whole  house  of  cards 
tumbling  down,  so  in  a  very  different  way  does  the 
Pteific  situation  involve  much  more  than  Japan  and  the 
United  States. 

We  may  decry  racial  antagonism  as  much  as  we 
please.  It  remains  an  historical  fact  that  has  been  the 
cause  of  much  woe  to  empire  builders  who  have  ignored 
it  Those  who  have  traveled  about  the  earth  and  who 
have  the  leisure  and  opportunity  to  read  and  observe 
may  reflect  that  men  are  pretty  much  alike  the  world 
over,  that  the  good  and  evil  in  different  races  balance 
off  rather  well  and  that  critidsm  of  a  foreigner's  char- 
acteristics is  bad  taste  in  one  who  rtalizes  by  comparison 
Iht  faults  in  his  own  kind.  But  the  mass  of  the  popu- 
latioii  in  any  country,  imbred  and  provincial,  whose 
wh(de  energy  is  exerted  in  gainmg  a  hard  living,  whose 
prejudices  become  devated  into  precepts,  and  whose 
peculiarities  are  exalted  to  virtues,  to  such  as  these,  a 
genial  cosmopolitanism  is  denied  Toward  the  strwger 
they  have  die  instinctive  antipathy  of  the  street  dog 
toward  the  stray  cur  who  has  wandered  out  of  his  usual 
orbit 

R«ce  prejudice  is  an  evil,  and  we  should  strive  by 


THB  CHANCn  Of  WAl  til 


every  possible  means  to  eradicate  it,  for  our  own  sake. 
But  we  cannot  ignore  it.  It  is  a  state  of  mind,  if  you 
like,  without  material  reason  for  being,  but  we  cannot 
cure  it,  as  we  can  some  personal  disorders,  by  ceasing  to 
think  about  it. 

Now  to  any  one  who  examines  the  facts,  the  most 
striking  characteristic  of  the  white  peoples  that  in- 
habit the  lands  bordering  the  Pacific  is  their  instinct  of 
racial  solidarity  against  the  Oriental.  I  should  not  call 
it  enmity,  for  it  is,  as  a  rule,  impersonal.  At  bottom, 
the  difficulty  is  an  economic  one,  and  for  that  reason  so 
fundamental  that  it  transcends  the  artificial  divisions 
of  nationalism. 

When  Japan  fought  Russia,  Germany  and  France 
did  not  view  the  situation  with  equanimity,  although 
they  did  not  interfere,  partly  because  of  th<  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  and  partly  because  the  battlefield  was 
many  thousand  miles  away.  Like  China,  Japan  has 
profited  by  the  mutual  jealousies  of  the  "Powers," 
and  the  rductance  of  any  of  them  to  offer  a  lead  to  any 
other. 

But  should  Japan  declare  war  against  the  United 
States,  particularly  on  the  plan  so  oftea  discusMd  in 
this  country,  the  situation  from  the  Etmjpcaa  stand- 
point would  be  very  nnidi  graver.  Were  tlie  mtagonist 
any  other  than  an  Oriental  one,  we  may  well  believe 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


that  a  food  many  European  natioiii  would  view  the 
thorough  troundng  of  Ue  United  States  with  coiih 
phuxncy.  But  the  defeat  of  any  leading  Occidental 
power  1^  would  be  a  cahunity  from  the  itand- 
point  of  any  nation  in  Europe.  England  would  with- 
out doubt  be  given  the  immediate  alternative  of  re- 
nouncing the  Japanese  alliance  or  of  losing  Canada  and 
Australia  from  the  Empire.  At  any  rate  it  is  mcon- 
oeivablc  that  England  should  be  anything  but  neutral 
in  a  matter  in  which  her  own  sdf-mterest  would  be  so 
much  concerned.  But  with  England  neutral,  that  is, 
witn  Japan  deprived  of  the  backing  of  the  En|^  alli- 
ance, both  Russia  and  Germany  would  appear  on  the 
scene  of  continental  Asia,  the  one  with  keen  recoQectkos 
ttf  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  and  the  other  with  equa^y 
keen  remembrance  of  Kiao-C3iau,  and  bc^  ready  to 
seize  the  long-deferred  chance  to  secure  themselves  in 
China  by  evicting  the  Japanese. 

Japan  would  find  herself  isohited,  beggared,  and  with 
all  the  delicate  structure  of  her  new  and  hardly  won 
economic  development  crumUing  to  ruins  about  bet. 
In  the  midst  of  a  world  of  enemies,  she  would  fij^  on, 
no  doubt,  indefinitely.  For  there  are  no  braver  fo& 
on  earth,  no  more  steadfast  and  k>yal  to  their  own,  than 
the  fifty  million  stout-hearted  people  who  fill  the  idands 
of  the  JapaiKse  Empire.  But  is  it  vny  reasoiable 


THE  CHANCBS  OF  WAR  MS 


that  she  should  deliberately  bring  on  all  this,  in  the  be- 
lief that  she  would  profit  thereby? 

There  are  some*  who  grant  that  there  ii  no  im- 
mediate danger  of  conflict  on  the  Pacific*  but  who,  tak- 
ing a  long-range  view,  looking  down  the  virta  of  the 
twentieth  century,  foresee  certain  trouble  from  ^  very 
fact  that  two  strong  powers  are  bound  to  rub  elbows 
with  one  another  in  the  Pacific 

It  is  very  difikult  to  conceive  of  what  the  next  two 
decades  will  bring  forth  in  any  part  of  the  worhL  The 
political  writer  who,  by  drawing  on  his  imagfaiatkxi, 
should  have  attempted  fifty  years  ago  to  describe  the 
war  of  1914,  with  its  submarines  and  its  airoplanei. 
its  siege  howitzers  and  its  wireless  tdegraphjr,  yes,  even 
its  automobiles  and  bicycles,  woidd  have  been  kughed 
into  oUivion  as  a  Jules  Verne  without  die  saving  grace 
of  probability.  Any  writer  of  18x5  who  sbouhl  have 
attemr -ed  to  foresee  the  probable  rdatioiis  that  would 
exist  between  England  and  the  United  States  at  the 
end  of  the  century  would  have  been  wide  of  the  mark 
in  just  the  degree  to  whidi  he  shouM  have  based  his 
predictions  upon  actual  knowledge  of  current  history  of 
that  time  and  an  understanding  of  the  trend  of  tiie  past 

The  belief  that  conflict  is  sure  to  come  in  the  course 
of  time  is  a  vicious  one;  ilk)gical  because  based  vpoa 
i    ,  Ham  n  ippwcotly  o£  tfus  sroiV*       PNt' s* 


214  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

no  data  that  may  be  relevant  to  the  future  and  im- 
politic because  a  persistent  fear  stimulates  the  feeling 
of  reprisal  and  aggression. 

'7e  owe  a  duty  to  our  grandchildren  not  to  place 
difficulties  in  their  way  by  inconsiderate  action  now, 
and  naturally,  we  should  shape  our  present  course  with 
as  intelligent  an  appreciation  of  future  conditions  as  is 
possible  to  get,  but  after  all,  instead  of  a  policy  based 
upon  specific  conditions  that  may,  or  may  not,  come  to 
pass,  our  best  legacy  to  posterity  will  be  the  record  of 
foreign  relations  carried  on  as  successful  business  is 
carried  on  between  individuals,  that  is,  based  upon  com- 
mon honesty  and  the  recognition  of  the  rights  of 
others. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


japan's  dilemma 

We  have  already  noted  the  small  amount  of  arable 
land  in  Japan  proper.  A  yearly  gross  increase  in  the 
population  of  682,000  creates  a  problem  that  is  diffi- 
cult of  solution.  It  is  nearly  the  number  of  all  the 
factory  operatives  in  the  country.  In  other  words,  the 
agricultural  limit  has  been  nearly  reached  on  the  one 
hand,  and  on  the  other,  no  imaginable  development  of 
industrialism  can  provide  work  indefinitely  for  so  many 
new  hands.  Migration  seems  to  be  the  only  relief, 
and  the  internal  pressure  of  population  will  seek  a  vent 
at  any  possible  outlet.  This  contingency  is  perhaps 
not  now  so  imminent  as  might  be  thought,  since  large 
areas  in  the  Hokkaidd  are  but  sparsely  inhabited. 
These  northern  provinces  arc  fertile,  but  the  winters 
are  severe  and  they  will  not  accoimiK)date  many  extra 
millions.  Sooner  or  later  the  pressure  cf  population 
will  be  fdt  throughout  the  Empire. 

A  glance  at  the  map  of  the  Pacific  will  reveal  the 
possibilities  for  Japanese  emigration.  Begiiming  with 
Alaska,  except  for  the  break  of  British  Columbia,  the 

ai5 


2i6  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

Pacific  is  bordered  by  the  territories  of  the  United 
States  down  to  the  thirty-second  parallel.  Then  comes 
Mexico,  Central  and  South  A.nerica;  next  Australia, 
the  Dutch  Indies,  and  the  Philippines;  then  China 
proper,  lastly  Manchu  'ia,  Korea,  and  Siberia. 

We  may  as  well  disregard  the  idea  of  extensive  Jap- 
anese colonization  of  North  America  or  Australia,  at 
least  for  the  present.  China  is  over-populated  already. 
Siberia  is  out  of  the  question,  for  the  Japanese  is  not 
the  type  of  the  hardy  pioneer.  The  Philippines  we 
have  already  considered.  There  is  left  South  America 
and  the  adjacent  Orient. 

Brazil,  Peru,  and  Chile,  it  is  understood,  have  made 
overtures  looking  to  Japanese  colonization.  They  would 
be  welcomed  in  those  scantily  settled  regions  as  they 
would  not  be  in  more  northern  states.  A  Japanese 
steamship  line  connects  Japan  with  South  America,  and 
it  may  be  that  sometime  in  the  future  we  shall  see  a 
considerable  immigration  into  the  more  temperate  parts 
of  the  southern  continent. 

Brazil,  seeking  cheap  labor  to  develop  her  industries, 
has  made  great  concessions  both  to  Germany  and  to 
Japan.  As  a  result  of  the  former  there  is  a  thriving 
German  colony  in  the  South  American  republic.  Brazil 
is  said  to  have  offered  a  free  grant  to  Japan  of  122,500 
acres  in  Sao  Paulo,  with  the  privilege  of  buying  more, 


JAPAN'S  DILEMMA 


217 


and  free  transportation  for  the  emigrants.  It  is  of- 
ficially stated  that  the  Japanese  population  in  Brazil  is 
but  10,000,  but  it  is  claimed  that  two  or  three  times  that 
number  are  under  contract  on  the  coffee  plantations. 

Peru,  like  Brazil,  has  welcomed  the  Japanese  and 
made  similar  concessions  to  them.  There  are  probably 
many  more  in  Peru  than  in  Brazil,  and  they  appear  to 
have  adapted  themselves  very  well. 

Mexico  in  turn  has  tried  to  turn  some  of  the  tide  her 
way,  but  the  political  conditions  in  Mexico  have  sufficed 
to  greatly  restrict  such  emigration. 

But  South  America,  particularly  its  eastern  portion, 
is  many  thousands  of  miles  from  Japan,  and  connection 
with  the  northern  country  would  always  be  rather 
tenuous  for  Oriental  colonists  there.  Moreover,  it  is 
the  avowed  policy  (as  well  as  the  logical  policy)  of  the 
government  to  direct  Japanese  immigration  toward 
adjacent  territory  rather  than  to  distant  parts  of  the 
earth.  Not  only  are  perplexing  social  and  economic 
problems  incident  to  contact  with  wholly  alien  races 
thus  avoided,  but  the  colonizing  Japanese  are  thereby 
concentrated  and  occupy  the  new  territory  far  more 
effectively  than  they  would  if  scattered  to  the  ends  of 
the  earth.  This  is  of  particular  significance  in  the 
practical  occupation  of  the  sparsely  settled  province  of 
South  Manchuria. 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


When  we  come  to  the  Orient,  Formosa  at  once  claims 
attention.  But  Formosa  has  proven  an  unexpected 
problem  for  Japan.  This  island,  ceded  to  her  as  a 
prize  of  war  at  the  conclusion  of  the  struggle  with 
China,  has  many  of  the  uperficial  aspects  of  the  Philip- 
pines. Its  area  is  about  15,000  square  miles,  but  it  is 
very  mountainous  and  wild  and  its  population  is  made 
up  of  a  number  of  fierce  and  uncivilized  tribes  who  are 
constantly  at  war.  The  climate  is  hot  and  the  Jap- 
anese cannot  endure  labor  in  the  open,  as  can  the  Chi- 
nese and  hillmen.  As  a  consequence,  they  mostly  con- 
gregate in  the  coast  cities.  Every  effort  has  been 
made  by  the  central  govprnment  to  stimulate  coloniza- 
tion and  induce  Japanese  to  migrate  to  Formosa,  but 
in  spite  of  subsidies  and  financial  aids  of  all  sorts,  in 
the  twenty  years  during  which  the  island  has  been  in 
the  possession  of  Japan,  less  than  100,000  Japanese 
have  been  induced  to  settle  there,  amid  three  and  a 
half  million  aborigines  and  Chinese.*  The  prospect  of 
any  considerable  percentage  of  surplus  population 
overflowing  into  Formosa  or  any  other  part  of  the 
tropics  does  not  seem  bright. 

^  In  1912  some  1750  farmers  in  family  groups  were  assisted  by 
the  govenunent  at  a  cost  of  $aoo,ooo.  These  are  settled  in  com- 
ninnities,  about  sixty  families  to  a  village,  the  paternal  government 
furnishing  houses  and  medical  and  educational  facilities.  Each 
fomily,  however,  had  to  have  $100  capital 


JAPAN'S  DILEMMA  3«9 

Manchuria  and  Korea,  on  the  other  hand,  are  much 
more  favorably  situated.  Either  is  accessible  now, 
within  a  few  hours'  steamer  and  rail  journey  from 
Japan. 

Korea  is  the  natural  outlet  for  Japan,  and  since  its 
annexation  in  191 1,  the  way  has  been  cleared  for  ex- 
tensive immigration.  The  area  of  Korea  is  86,CX)0 
square  miles  and  the  Korean  population  (1912)  is 
14,566,783,  or  about  173  to  the  square  mile.  Com- 
paring this  with  Japan  or  China,  it  will  be  ser,n  that 
there  is  room  for  many  Japanese,  in  spite  of  the 
40,000,000  acres  of  forests  and  mountains  in  the  pen- 
insula. As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  were  probably  not 
more  than  50,000  Japanese  in  Korea  ten  years  ago, 
whereas  there  are  now  more  than  200,000.  As  a  Japan- 
ese publicist  puts  it :  "  Each  square  mile  in  Japan  has 
contributed  six  persons  to  each  square  mile  in  Korea." 

Rice,  soy  beans,  and  barley  are  grown  in  Korea,  and 
there  may  be  a  future  for  upland  cotton,  which  would 
be  an  important  factor  in  the  development  of  Japanese 
industry.  Silk  is  also  an  important  product.  But  the 
most  striking  feature  of  Korea  is  the  opportunity  it 
affords  for  stock  raising.  If  the  Japanese  can  break 
away  from  their  conventional  point  of  view,  and,  in- 
stead of  producing  a  scant  crop  of  rice  at  the  expense 
of  infinite  labor,  devote  themselves  to  the  raising 


aao  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

of  cattle  and  hogs,  without  doubt  they  can  develop  a 
source  of  wealth  in  Korea  beside  which  the  gold  mines 
would  be  insignificant.  For  the  Japanese  have  a  fond- 
ness for  beef,  and  if  it  were  made  cheaper,  it  would  be 
of  vast  benefit  to  the  nation  to  introduce  it  more  ex- 
tensively into  the  national  diet.  The  by-products 
would  also  be  made  use  of  as  effectively  as  they  are  in 
America.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Chinese  are  fond  of 
pork,  and  hogs  raised  on  the  farms  and  pastures  of 
Korea  would  find  a  ready  market  near  at  hand.  The 
fisheries  also  provide  a  maintenance  for  great  numbers 
of  Japanese.  On  the  whole,  Korea  affords  a  congenial 
and  remunerative  field  for  Japanese  expansion.  Emi- 
grants cannot  make  money  so  fast,  nor  so  easily  there, 
as  they  can  in  California,  but  their  settling  stirs  up  no 
new  sources  of  trouble.  The  native  Korean  must  ac- 
commodate himself  as  best  he  can. 

Japan  had  a  foothold  in  Manchuria  before  Korea  was 
definitely  annexed,  and  of  course  annexation  could 
never  have  been  accomplished  so  long  as  Russian  in- 
fluence was  all  powerful  in  Manchuria.  There  is  little 
likelihood  that  Japan  will  relinquish  what  of  the  latter 
province  she  holds,  and  the  more  she  can  settle  her 
citizens  there,  the  stronger  will  be  her  claim  to  the 
whole  south  province.  The  problem  is  a  somewhat  diffi- 
cult one,  however.and  one  fraught  with  peculiar  dangers. 


JAPAN'S  DILEMMA 

To  those  who  have  been  accustomed  to  consider 
Manchuria  as  a  part  of  China  (as  it  still  is  in  diplomatic 
fiction)  a  comparison  of  the  relative  density  of  popu- 
lation between  this  province  and  the  other  eighteen 
provinces  of  China  is  startling.   The  area  of  China 
proper  is  1,588,000  square  miles,*  with  an  estimated 
population  of  407,518,750;  that  is,  a  concentration  of 
256  per  square  mile  throughout  the  Empire.   The  con- 
centration in  the  populous  coastal  provinces,  however, 
is  double  that.    (The  concentration  in  Japan  is  342  per 
square  mile,  exceeded  only  by  Great  Britain  and  Bel- 
gium.)  Manchuria  has  an  area  of  376,800  square 
miles  and  a  population  (before  the  Russian  war)  of 
8,500,000.   This  represents  a  concentration  of  22j4  per 
square  mile,  about  equal  to  that  of  Kansas  and  much 
less  than  that  of  Minnesota  and  Wisconsin.   The  al- 
most untouched  natural  resources  and  the  agricultural 
possibilities  of  this  country  are  sufficient  to  support  a 
population  many  times  greater  than  the  present  one, 
so  long  as  peace  is  maintained  and  industry  encouraged. 
Here  would  seem  to  be  a  natural  outlet  for  Japan's 
surplus  population,  and  mdeed,  since  the  Russian  war, 
the  national  government  has  made  every  endeavor  to 
induce  an  immigration  to  South  Mandmria,  now  under 

>These  figures  are  from  L.  Richard,  "Gcognphie  de  VEmskt 
de  Chme." 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

Japanese  control  The  stimulus  of  subsidized  railways 
and  stcttnship  lines,  of  freight  -^ad  customs  rebates, 
and  even  less  justifiable  means  have  been  used  in  the 
aid  of  Japanese  immigrants. 

One  reason  for  the  scanty  population  of  Manchuria, 
previous  to  the  buflding  of  the  raUway,  was  the  exist- 
ence of  wandering  brigands,  "  Hunghuntzies."  who 
terrorized  the  country.  The  new  government  of  the 
Japanese  is  stable,  if  arbitrary,*  and  under  its  agis, 
Chinese  are  attracted  as  well  as  Japanese.   This  may 
be  an  advantage  or  otherwise  to  the  Japanese,  according 
to  circumstances.   If  the  Chinese  supply  the  unskilled 
labor  necessary  to  develop  the  resources  of  the  country 
and  are  amenable  to  Japanese  control,  it  may  work  out 
to  the  great  advantage  of  the  hitter  settlers,  who  would 
thus  have  the  prestige  and  the  profits  of  employers, 
instead  of  being  employees.   If,  on  the  contrary,  the 
Chinese  assume  the  position  of  rivals  in  commerce  and 
industry,  it  may  not  work  out  that  way,  for  it  is  not  at 
all  certain  that  as  rivals  in  tht  same  field  the  more 
mercurial  Japanese  is  a  match  for  the  keen  and  mdus- 
trious  Chinese. 

»The  actual  legitimate  control  in  the  hands  of  the  Japuiese  is 
confined  to  the  Kuantung  district,  in  which  Port  Arthur  is  situ- 
ated, and  the  regions  contiguous  to  the  railway,  its  branches,  and 
ttieiBiiMt.  Thi^  however,  my  effectively  dominates  the  pionnce; 


japan's  dilemma  ^3 

We  have  already  mentioned  a  well-known  rule  in 
theoretical  finance  termed  Greaham's  law,  the  essence 
of  which  is  that  in  a  given  locality  a  baser  or  cheaper 
metal  coinage  will  drive  out  of  circulation  the  more 
valuable.  An  economist  has  attempted  recently  to 
apply  this  law  to  competing  races  in  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  and  claims  to  have  found  the  same  sort  of 
effect —"  cheap  "  labor  displacing  higher  priced  labor. 

It  will  be  of  much  interest  to  watch  the  interplay  of 
racial  influences  in  Manchuria  from  thir.  standpoint 
Before  the  Russians  came,  stable  government  seems 
hardly  to  have  existed  outside  the  large  cities,  and,  of 
course,  where  the  economic  motive  was  lacking,  settkrs 
stayed  away.  The  Russians  not  only  brought  order 
but  stimulated  industry  very  greatly  by  the  construc- 
tion of  the  raUway,  the  fiat  city  of  Dahiy,  the  works 
of  Port  Arthur,  etc  This  sthnulation  was  artificial 
and  was  bound  to  have  come  to  a  natural  end  soon  if 
the  rapid  progress  of  events  had  not  brought  it  to  an 
abrupt  close  by  war.  The  Chinese,  however,  prc^ted 
greatly  by  this  regime.  They  migrated  into  Man- 
churia from  Shantung  and  other  provinces,  and  as 
the  Russians  paid  good  wages  and  were  absolutely 
dependent  upon  this  sort  of  labor  for  the  canying  ottt 
of  their  plans,  things  were  in  a  very  satisfactory  state 
from  the  stand^int  of  the  Chinese.  A  peaceful  rule 


304  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

of  the  country,  even  if  in  the  hands  of  foreigners,  of- 
fered every  advantage  for  permanent  settlers,  and  the 
Chinese  part  of  the  population  increased  correspond- 
ingly. 

The  war,  of  course,  upset  things  considerably,  and 
for  a  year  or  so  after  the  Peace  of  Portsmouth  the 
Japanese  had  everything  their  own  way.   But  even 
the  army  men  understood  that  there  was  no  final  ad- 
vantage in  maintaining  a  military  rule  in  a  country 
whose  only  use  was  as  a  field  for  commercial  exploiu- 
tion.   And  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  and  the 
establishment  of  civil  law  again,  the  Chinese  once  more 
began  to  settle  down.   It  makes  no  practical  differ- 
ence to  a  Chinaman  whether  Manchuria,  on  the  map, 
be  Russian,  Japanese,  or  Chinese,  so  long  as  he  is  al- 
lowed to  take  his  profit  in  peace,*  and  it  camiot  be  too 
often  repeated  that  for  Manchuria  to  be  ceded  to  Ja- 
pan entirely  would  avail  the  latter  country  little,  so 
long  as  there  were  more  Chinese  than  Japanese  in  the 
province,  or  so  long  as  those  Chinese  that  are  there  arc 
able  to  compete  to  advantage  with  the  Japanese.  For 
Japan  to  attempt  to  exclude  Chinese  from  Manchuria, 

lit  is  true  that  in  the  throes  of  the  "rights-recovery*  fever  a 
few  years  ago  the  Chinese  made  the  occupation  of  Manchuria  one 
of  the  grounds  of  the  great  anti-Japanese  boycott,  yet  this  agita- 
tion was  most  conspicuous  in  Canton,  far  away.  Your  Shantung 
Chinaman  is  a  practical  man,  taking  the  world  as  he  finds  it 


I 


JAPAN'S  DILEMMA 


as  they  are  excluded  from  America,  would  be  practi- 
cally impossible,  but  if  they  continue  to  settle  in  this 
region  in  the  future  as  they  have  in  the  past,  one  of 
two  things  must  happen  if  Japan  is  to  reap  any  advan- 
tage from  the  possession  of  the  province.  Either  more 
Japanese  settlers  must  enter  the  province  than  Chinese 
or  else  those  that  are  there  must  prove  themselves 
more  efficient  and  more  successful  than  the  Chinese. 
The  latter  alternative  is  very  unlikely.  The  fonner 
is  the  problem  that  faces  the  government  of  Japan 
today. 

In  her  continental  ambitions,  Japan  has  two  serious 
obstacles  to  overcome,  apart  from  the  natural  reluc- 
tance of  her  people  to  uproot  themselves  and  settle  in 
a  new  country,  as  pawns  in  the  great  game  of  higher 
politics.  One  of  these  is  the  opposition  of  China  her- 
self, and  the  other  is  that  of  the  European  powers, 
Russia,  Germany,  England,  and  France,  who  for  many 
years  have  attempted  to  sap  their  way  into  the  terri- 
tory of  China,  dismember  that  country,  and  distribute 
the  pieces  among  themselves.  As  Japan  looks  to 
China  for  her  own  future  market,  such  an  eventuality 
would  probably  be  disastrous  to  her  interests.  On 
the  other  hand,  any  encroachment  upon  Chinese  terri- 
tory on  the  part  of  Japan  brings  that  nation  into  rivalry 
with  the  European  Powers.   In  the  keen  diplomatic 


Mi 


336  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

contest  that  ha»  been  waged  in  Pckin  for  many  years, 
the  Japanese  have  played  their  part  with  skill,  and 
when  fortune  and  an  audacious  opportunism  carried 
Russia  down  into  Manchuria  in  the  early  years  of  the 
century,  with  the  likelihood  of  dominating  Pekin  and 
the  certainty  of  dominating  Seoul,  Japan  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  change  the  game  from  a  diplomatic  to  a  military 
one.   It  was  because  Russia  utterly  failed  to  under- 
stand Japan's  real  interests  and  because  Alexieff  could 
not  believe  that  she  was  not  "bluffing"  that  the  Rus- 
sians aUowcd  themselves  to  be  dragged  into  that  unfor- 
tunate  and  unpopular  war. 

But  Russia  has  not  been  the  only  rival  of  Japan  in 
China.    England,  so  long  as  she  feared  the  Russian 
bear,  deluded  herself  with  the  notion  that  she  was 
protecting  her  interests  in  Asia  by  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance.   In  reality  it  was  Japan  that  profited  most, 
since  by  tying  the  hands  of  England  she  eliminated, 
temporarily,  another  rival.    For  the  natural  interests 
of  Great  Britain  — her  national  instinct,  one  might 
say  — places  her  in  the  opposition  to  Japan  in  all  that 
concerns  China.    England's  trade  along  the  China 
coast  led  all  the  rest  until  very  recently,  and  it  has 
chiefly  been  her  partner  in  the  alliance  that  has  played 
the  successful  rival  and  reduced  the  relative  miportance 
of  that  trade.   No  one  can  say  what  results  will  foBow 


JAPAN'S  DILEMMA  »7 

the  conclusion  of  the  Great  European  war.  It  is 
doubtful,  however,  if  Russia  is  ever  again  the  bugaboo 
to  England  that  she  has  been  in  the  past,  and  if  that 
is  so,  then  the  chief  motive  on  England's  part  for  main- 
taining the  Japanese  alliance  will  disappear,  and  her 
own  interests,  as  well  as  the  pressure  which  Canada 
and  Australia  will  exert,  will  force  her  into  the  other 
camp.  For  the  time  being,  however,  her  hands  are 
tied  and  the  recent  retrocession  of  Wei-hai-wd  to  China 
eliminates  her  from  further  participation  in  the  dis- 
membermen{  '^f  that  unhappy  country. 

The  thira  i  :  gerous  rival  has  also  but  lately  been 
eliminated.  This  is  Germany.  Germany's  activities  in 
East  Asia  have  been  so  startling  in  their  crude  aggres- 
siveness, her  frank  contempt  for  the  Oriental  and  his  in- 
stitutions, and  has  seemed  so  likely  to  make  fvAart  trou- 
ble, that  the  **  Peace  of  Asia  "  seems  a  great  deal  nearer 
realization  now  that  Kiao-Chau  has  been  captured  by 
the  Japanese.  German  trade  threatened  a  serious  ri- 
valry to  Japan's,  and  this  fact»  in  addition  to  the  strong 
influence  that  Germany  exerted  toward  the  dismember- 
ment of  China,  made  it  highly  advantageous  to  Japan 
that  this  power  be  eliminated  fromthe  stage  of  Far  East- 
em  politics.  Japanese  have  not  forgotten,  ei^er,  that 
it  was  Germany  who  in  1895  led  tiie  coalitkm  of  the 
Powers  Utat  cbedcnated  Japan's  fir^  move  in  the  game. 


aaS  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


What  Japan  will  do  with  Kiao-Chau  is  a  question 
that  may  be  foolish  to  speculate  upon  at  the  present 
writing.  Probably  Japan  herself  does  not  know  very 
definitely.  It  is  unlikely,  however,  that  she  will  give  the 
district  back  to  China,  preferring  rather  to  consider  her- 
self the  heir  of  the  ninety-nine-year  lease  granted  to 
Germany.  Port  Arthur  is  of  course  a  precedent  for 
such  a  stand.  Shantung,  however,  is  too  full  of  Chi- 
nese to  be  much  of  a  field  for  Japanese  colonization. 
The  actual  possession  of  the  province  would  entail 
heavy  expense  without  any  corresponding  profit,  and 
it  will  doubtless  appear  to  the  Japanese  officials  that 
eventually  more  is  to  be  gained  by  using  it  as  a  pledge 
to  exact  some  other  quid  pro  quo  from  China  than  by 
indefinitely  retaining  it.  The  same  consideration  would 
prevent  Japan  from  ever  conquering  or  controlling  to 
any  extent  any  of  the  populous  provinces  of  China 
proper.  The  possibilities  lying  before  such  an  enter- 
prise would  be  such  as  to  daunt  the  boldest  gamUer  in 
Japanese  politics. 

The  partition  of  China,  therefore,  has  become,  in 
recent  years,  an  apparently  remote  contingency  (unless 
Japan  herself  essays  the  ta^),  and  England,  Germany, 
and  Russia  no  longer  threaten  Japan's  dominaiKe  by 
territorial  possession. 

But  China  herself  is  a  factor  that  must  be  considered. 


JAPAN'S  DILEMMA 


This  huge  unwieldy  nation  has  undergone  some  startling 
changes  within  recent  years.  Some  of  these  changes 
may  be  more  superficial  than  the  casual  American 
might  believe.  The  individual  Chinaman,  except  for  a 
haircut,  is  doubtless  much  the  same  sort  of  a  man  that 
he  used  to  be.  But  one  transforming  change  has  been 
working  in  the  Middle  Kingdom  that  cannot  be  undone 
and  is  of  profound  significance.  The  Chinese  within 
the  last  decade  have  discovered  themselves,  in  other 
words  have  developed  a  national  self -consciousness  that 
previously  did  not  exist.  The  opening  up  of  communi- 
cations in  the  form  of  railways,  posts,  and  telegraphs, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  development  of  a  vernacular 
press  to  public  and  distribute  the  news  of  Asia  and  the 
world,  on  the  otiier  hand,  have  combined  to  transform 
a  group  of  detached  provinces  with  practically  nothing 
in  common  but  their  ancestry  and  their  ignorance  of 
one  another  into  a  unified  nation. 

In  the  past,  SouUi  China  has  been  indifferent  to  what 
European  Powers  were  doing  in  North  China.  Nowa- 
days, the  inhabitants  of  remote  parts  of  the  ^i^ire  are 
keenly  alive  to  any  such  encroachments  and,  further- 
more, a  vigorous  "  rights-recovery  "  agitati<m  has  been 
set  going,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  retrieve  the  losses 
of  the  past  This  movement  is  patriotic,  however  un- 
wise it  may  be. 


330  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


Naturally  the  new  spirit  in  China  does  not  look  with 
any  too  much  favor  upon  Japan's  activities  in  Man- 
churia, nor,  it  may  be  added,  in  Shantung  either.  What 
China  wants  is  for  Japan  to  keep  out  of  Chinese  terri- 
tory (including  Manchuria)  altogether.  Japan's  "  mani- 
fest destiny,"  to  say  nothing  of  her  pressing  necessity, 
on  account  of  the  pressure  of  population,  is  to  do  other- 
wise. And  as  Japan  has  the  army  and  navy,  there  is 
not  much  doubt  which  contention  will  prevail.  Yet 
complete  success  would  likely  be  a  Pyrrhic  victory  for 
her,  since  the  motive  for  her  whole  national  poUcy  is 
the  develo{«ient  of  an  industrial  system  with  particular 
reference  to  the  markets  of  Chma.  And  it  is  tdf- 
evident  that  profitable  trade  can  hardly  be  forced  at 
the  point  of  a  gun. 

China  is  an  adept  at  "playing  both  ends  against  the 
middle"  and  setting  rival  powers  by  the  ears.  Her 
safety  in  the  past  lay  in  the  number  of  her  enemies. 
For  the  mcnnent,  Japan  is  alone  and  mistress  of  the 
situation,  but  no  one  knows  how  long  this  will  last. 
She  may  have  to  pay  for  temerity,  and  it  is  the  fear 
of  such  retaliation  that  makes  her  so  feverishly  pile  up 
her  armaments,  with  no  enony  in  sight.  More  than  this, 
the  apparent  cahn  of  political  conditions  in  China  is 
notoriously  deceptive.  Any  day  an  expk>iion  may 
occur  that  will  throw  that  nation  mto  chaos.   In  wmh 


JAPAN'S  DILEMMA 


an  event,  Japanese  intervention  would  be  a  foregone 
conclusion,  if  only  to  prevent  the  worse  alternative  of 
European  intervention. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  appreciate  the  dilemma 
in  which  Japanese  statesmen  find  themselves.  On  the 
one  hand,  confronted  with  the  absolute  necessity  of 
transforming  their  nation  from  an  agricultural  into  an 
industrial  commonwealth;  on  the  other  hand,  faced 
with  the  necessity  of  finding  an  outlet  for  a  surplus 
population  that  increases  at  the  rate  of  three  quarters 
of  a  million  a  yea*-  In  seeking  such  an  outlet  they  find 
themselves  excluded  from  the  greater  part  of  the  earth's 
surface  and  in  the  most  likely  quarter,  confronted  with 
rivals  and  powerful  opponents.  To  contend  with  the 
latter  they  must  spend  the  bulk  of  their  revenues  for 
unproductive  war  madiinery  instead  of  putting  them 
into  profitable  industrial  machinery.  This  in^verishes 
the  people  and  necessitates  huge  foreign  loans.  It  is  a 
vicious  circle  and  there  seons  no  stopping  place.  It 
might  appear  as  if  every  penny  of  revenue  were  already 
extracted  from  a  long-suffering  people.  Yet  one  more 
asset  remains.  The  standing  of  Japanese  bonds  in- 
dicates that  the  borrowing  power  of  the  natioii  has 
been  nearly  reached.  If  the  Mancfaurian-Korean  situa- 
tion demands  more  expenditure  still,  then  the  only 
way  that  any  considerable  amount  of  monex  could  |ie 


^32  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


raised  abroad  would  be  to  hypothecate  national  assets 
such  as  some  of  the  monopolies,  or  the  customs,  and 
this  would  be  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  Japan,  as  a 
first-dass  power. 

American  readers,  it  is  hoped,  will  appreciate  that 
Japan's  armaments  are  necessitated  by  her  interests  in 
continental  Asia  and  that  to  use  them  in  another  quarter 
ii.e.  against  the  United  States)  would  be  to  incite  at- 
tack in  the  very  place  in  which  she  is  most  vulnerable 
and  which  is  of  tlw  most  consequence  to  her. 

Is  there  a  way  out  for  Japan  and  the  rest  of  the  world? 
Will  the  nations  ever  learn  that  the  attempt  to  grab 
everything  in  sight  simply  to  prevent  another  from 
grabbing  leads  to  complicated  ruin?  We  insist  upon 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  America.  Why  not  for  Japan 
in  Asia  ?  The  cautious  engineer  provides  a  safety  valve 
{of  his  own  protecticm,  not  primarily  for  that  of  his 
boiler.  Why  not  provide  a  safety  valve  for  Japan  and 
hdp  our  own  peace  of  mind? 

When  dreams  do  not  come  out  right,  we  sometimes 
fall  asleep  again  and  dream  them  over.  But  we  cannot 
roll  back  the  carpet  of  history.  Asia  can  never  again 
be  what  it  was  before  the  Cassini  convention.  Korea  is 
a  part  of  Japan  now  and  South  Manchuria  is  under  her 
control.  .Let  us  accept  the  situation.  China  may 
well  heed  Japan's  contention  that  ^  took  them,  not 


JAPAN'S  DILEMMA 


333 


from  her,  but  from  Russia,  against  whom  the  former 
was  helpless.  Japan's  needs  for  expansion  are  real 
and  obvious.  Manchuria  and  Korea  could  hold  the 
double  of  the  Japanese  population.  Why  try  to  "  head 
her  off"?  They  are  her  safety  valve.  If  the  stream 
flows  that  way,  it  will  not  flow  to  us,  nor  to  Canada  and 
Australia.  If  Japan  does  not  fear  aggression  in  Asia 
nor  opposition  in  her  natural  trends,  she  need  not  break 
her  back  with  the  enormous  burden  of  armament  and 
she  therefore  may  be  able  to  build  up  her  industrial 
system  as  she  wishes  to.  If  she  could  do  so,  and  could 
become  strong  and  wealthy,  instead  of  impoverished 
and  debt-burdened,  it  would  profit  Russia  more,  and 
Germany  and  England  more,  than  if  any  of  these  coun- 
tries "owned"  or  administered  any  territory  in  East 
Asia.  For  a  wealthy  Japan  means  a  bigger  market  for 
European  and  American  goods,  and  a  Japan  impover- 
ished by  the  necessities  of  armed  defense  means  the 
loss  of  such  a  market.  Why,  then,  cannot  the  white 
naticms  profit  themselves  by  assisting,  instead  of  try- 
ing to  block,  Japan?  For  this  seems  to  be  the  way 
out  for  her  and  for  us. 


Summary 

Japan,  with  a  rapidly  increasing  population,  has 
nearly  reached  the  limit  m  the  home  ooisntry.  In- 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


ternal  pressure  of  popuLtion  and  the  expanding  energy 
of  the  people  forced  her  to  seek  an  outlet.  Racial 
opposition,  dense  population,  or  climatic  conditions 
limit  the  field  of  such  expansion,  except  in  the  con- 
tiguous territories  of  Korea  and  Manchuria.  In  these 
provinces,  however,  Japan  has  encountered  the  an- 
tagonism both  of  China  and  of  various  European  Powers 
intent  upon  territorial  aggrandizement.  In  order  to 
control  the  situation,  Japan  has  been  compelled  to 
fight  two  wars  and  build  up  an  expensive  military 
equipment  that  is  breaking  her  down  financially.  So 
long  as  other  nations  threaten  Japan's  natural  expan- 
sion, she  will  be  compelled  to  maintain  this  armed 
preparedness.  In  the  writer's  opinion  it  would  profit 
the  other  Powers'  selfish  interest  to  no  longer  oppose 
this  movement,  on  the  ground  that  a  solvent  Japan  is 
of  more  value  to  them  than  a  bankrupt  Japan.  Japan's 
future  commercial  prosperity  depends  upon  the  in- 
tegrity of  China  and  her  interests  in  that  quarter  are 
consonant  with  those  of  America.  We  need  iK>t  fear 
that  Japan  wiU  ever  permanently  control  China  proper, 
even  as  the  restdt  of  a  successful  war.  There  are  too 
many  Chinese,  and  it  would  be  too  expensive  an  under- 
taking. 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE  ICONROK  DOCTRINS  EAST  AND  WEST 

In  the  previous  chapter  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
mentioned.  As  this  is  a  subject  that  touches  America 
very  nearly  it  may  be  profitable  to  examine  it  in  more 

detail. 

The  United  States  until  very  recently  can  hardly  claim 
to  have  had  a  foreign  policy,  in  the  European  sense. 
The  isolation  of  America,  due  to  the  two  oceans  that 
wash  her  shores,  has  rendered  unnecessary  the  careful 
consideration  of  "policy"  required  of  the  states  of 
Europe  whose  alien  peoples  are  separated  almost  en- 
tirely by  artificial  boundaries.  Moreover,  there  have 
been  in  America  no  dynastic  houses  the  perpetuation  and 
aggrandizement  of  which  would  have  been  the  occasion 
for  the  formulation  of  "  policies  "  unconnected  with  the 
economic  needs  of  the  people. 

In  Washington's  famous  "  Farewell  Address "  he 
warned  us  to  beware  of  "  entangling  alliances  "  and  we 
have  followed  that  injtmction  very  literally.  Whether 
we  can  continue  this  policy  much  longer  is  very  doubtful 
since  our  national  interests  are  now  no  longer  confined 
to  the  New  World  and  our  former  isolation  is  now  gone. 

235 


336  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


On  the  other  hand,  the  American  people  and  their 
leaders  have  cherished  one  dogma  with  a  reverence  that 
has  been  at  times  the  source  of  much  irritation  to  Europe. 
This  is  the  famous  Monroe  Doctrine. 

After  Napoleon  had  been  finally  disposed  of  at  Water- 
loo, a  reaction  set  in  in  Europe  that  aroused  great  fear 
in  the  hearts  of  American  statesmen, —  a  fear  that  was 
only  too  well  justified.  For  the  "  Holy  Alliance  "  of 
Russia,  Prussia,  Austria,  France,  and  Spain  was  or- 
ganized with  the  avowed  purpose  of  rooting  out,  once 
and  for  all,  the  growth  of  democratic  ideas  that  had 
made  such  headway  in  Europe  during  the  latter  half  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  The  weak  and  struggling  re- 
public of  the  United  States  had  eveiy  reason  to  fear  this 
comlunation,  for  one  of  the  objects  of  the  alliance  was 
to  retrieve  its  waning  influence  in  the  New  World,  to  re- 
store to  Spain  the  control  over  her  revolted  American 
colonies,  to  get  back  for  France  the  great  territories  in 
the  northern  continent  that  had  passed  from  her  hands, 
and  in  particular  to  block  off  any  further  expansion  of 
the  United  States.  And  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
liberal  tendencies  of  Great  Britain  forbade  her  to  join 
the  Holy  Alliance  the  people  of  the  United  States  had 
been  in  conflict  with  that  nation  so  recently  that  they 
feared  her  most  of  all. 

The  Spanish  cdonies  of  South  America  had  taken  ad- 


QTHB  MONKOE  OOCntlNE  EAST  AND  WEST  337 

vantage  of  the  collapse  of  Spanish  power  to  free  them- 
selves from  her  tyranny.  And  the  North  Americans,  so 
lately  become  independent,  could  not  help  but  look  with 
friendly  sympathy  upon  these  newer  states,  founded  on 
democratic  principles  and  modeled,  externally  at  least, 
after  their  own  government. 

Thus  the  New  World,  from  the  standpoint  of  ideals, 
was  sharply  opposed  to  Europe;  the  one,  the  center  of 
democracy;  the  other,  the  focus  of  reactionism  and  ab- 
solution. The  enunciation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was,  in  fact,  the  expression  of  the  instinct  of  self-preser- 
vation, than  which,  we  are  taught,  there  is  no  higher  law. 

The  events  of  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century 
amply  justified  this  point  of  view.  The  Spanish  claims 
to  the  whole  Pacific  Coast  and  their  refusal  to  cede 
Florida  to  the  United  States  altliough  themselves  unable 
to  control  that  province,  the  English  claims  to  the  North- 
west, the  sUrtlingly  rapid  extension  of  Russian  influence 
in  the  same  region,*  the  encroachment  of  all  the  Euro- 
pean Powers  upon  the  Latin-American  sUtes,  which  cul- 
minated in  the  attempt  of  the  French  to  seat  the  Aus- 
trian Maximilian,  as  Emperor,  upon  the  throne  of 
Mexico, —  such  a  succession  of  incidents  might  well  in- 

*In  1821,  the  Russian  goverament  forbade  any  foreign  vessel 
to  approach  within  100  miles  of  tbc  vrttt  .coMt  of  America  dowa 
to  the  51st  degree  of  Uthnde 


338  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


spirt  fear  in  the  youthful  republic.  It  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  the  energetic  pretensions  of  the  United  States 
prevented  both  South  and  North  America  from  being  por- 
tioned out  among  the  powers  of  Europeas  Africa  has  been 
and  as  Asia  is  likely  to  be.  And  this,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  it  has  been  the  menace  of  England  rather  than  our 
own  prowess  that  has  deterred  the  Continental  powers. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  thus  a  most  significant 
factor  in  our  short  national  life.  Even  if  we  should  as- 
sume that  our  great  territorial  expansion  was  not  ab- 
solutely necessary,  that  the  American  people  might  have 
worked  out  their  salvation  in  a  territory  limited,  let  us 
say,  by  the  Mississippi  River,  more  intensively  but 
equally  successfully,  it  would  still  remain  true  that  had 
the  rest  of  the  continent  been  the  si.«  ne  of  the  schemings 
and  dickering  of  European  powers,  with  "  spheres  of 
influence  "  and  a  finely  adjusted  "  balance  of  power  " 
the  nature  of  that  destiny  would  have  been  very  different. 
The  possibility  of  conflict  on  our  borders  would  have 
necessitated  a  large  army,  and  the  presence  of  many 
alien  powers  would  have  compelled  international  rela- 
tions and  obligations  from  which,  happily,  we  have  been 
free.  Americans  have  done  well  to  give  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  the  place  it  has  in  our  estimation,  notwithstand- 
ing the  United  States  is  no  longer  weak  and  that  she  has 
little  to  fear  nowadays  from  European  aggression. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  EAST  AND  WEST  239 

In  later  years  the  demand  of  this  country  has  been,  in 
substance,  that  the  rest  of  the  world  should  recognize 
both  American  continents  as  her  "  sphere  of  influence  " 
in  that  foreign  powers  shall  not  be  permitted  to  acquire 
any  part  of  the  New  World  as  vassal  territory  nor  even 
to  attempt  armed  intervention.  The  Monroe  Doctrine 
has  never  been  accepted  by  any  European  government 
except  very  recently  by  England  and  it  is  probable  that 
it  would  have  been  challenged  in  war  ere  this  had  not 
the  mutual  jealousies  of  the  challenging  powers,  nota  - 
bly Germany  and  England,  acted  as  a  restraint  upon 
one  another. 

^Uia  for  the  'AsiaHcs 

From  the  standpoint  of  modern  (European)'  civiliza- 
tion America  and  Japan  are  the  newest  nations  and  in 
their  relations  with  the  older  peoples  of  Europe  whose 
culture  has  in  varying  degree  been  transmitted  to  both 
of  them,  they  share  many  problems  in  common.  Each 
is  the  dominant  economic  and  military  power  in  a  large 
area  of  the  earth's  surface.  Each  is  the  object  of  the 
thinly  veiled  jealousy  of  the  "  Powers  "  of  Europe. 

Moreover,  the  attitude  of  the  Chinese  toward  the 
Japanese  is  strildngly  like  that  of  the  Latin-Americans 
toward  the  people  of  the  United  States:  a  blending  of 
Ttsftct  for  acknowledged  power,  on  the  one  hand,  and 


a40  JAPANESE  MXfANmON 


contempt  and  personal  aversion  on  the  othc  due  to 
fundamental  differences  in  racp  and  national  aditk  ns. 
Now  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  has  been  said,  is  tar  frofu 
being  an  unselfish  polic  ,  although  as  a  matter  of  fa^^ 
it  has  been  a  '.ninisfTcU  a  verv  altruistic  spirft  The 
North  American  has  no  par?  Mi  iriy  brot  .  b  interest 
in  the  Latin- Amerir  \n.  Primarily  f  r  tli  forrr  the 
pf 'icy  is  one  of  sei  protection ;  secon  irily  a  '>  ased 
on  the  belief  that  tl  .  pres>  rvation  of  me  natir  lal  t  st- 
ence  of  these  weaker  sister  states  will  be  ultimi  ei  .f 
greater  advantage  to  us  than  would  be  th  ca  :  '  ti  y 
tiecame  provinces  of  some  European  po^  ^f. 

Precisely  the  same  considerations  hold  v     re?  i 
China  from  the  standpoint  of  J' pan.    The  *'  Sr  sic-  s 
of  Clniia  "  and  the  parceling  out  of  her  ;    vinre  among 
the  Etiropean  Powers,  which  seemed  so  nm!     t  fif  icm 
years  ago,  tHreatens  the  same  daugc   to  fapuu  tr  * 
Miilar  parceling  out  of  America  would  have  threat 
to  the  United  States  seventy-fiv  years  ago.   The  i 
met  it  with  the  threat  or    uff  of  the  Monroe  Hocai' 
wh^,  fortunately.  ^  sr  far  h      eve-  '  ad  ^   back  up 
hy  fofte ;  Japan  has  had  t  defeii    ler  int=  rests  bv 
arms,  fe?.  in  the  Ru^an  war  of  iyo4  -  d  ^doly  %  Ae 
Tungtao  chi^er  of  ibt  gr^t  Eurc^ean  vvar.   it  tr 
nrfcd  that  in  both  cases  ,  ipan  has  substituted  h&^sd^ 
for  the  Kur(^ean  ^/»etnoi  and  that  her  policy  has  bees 


THE  ft^NltOE  IXXmiNE  E  »ST  AND  WEST  241 


une  of  aggrandizement  This  is  to  a  certain  degrae 
true,  but  we  must  not  pMS  too  hasty  a  judgment.  In 

fact,  without  any  inter  on  of  extending  our  own  domain 
'•y  conquest  we  have  done  precisely  the  same  thing  in 
he  Philippi  ics.    Nor  ca*  we  justly  claim  an  analogy  be- 
en    r»i*n's  occupancy  of  South  Manchuria  and  her 
i\     in  Shantung.   There  is  little  in  common 
lanchuria  and  5^  ntung.   The  lormer  was 
settl  i  province  c      hich  China  was  nwrely 
.0    tr    The  Russians,  and  after  thf  fie 
j  ,  occuj    I  it  as  Americans  occupied  California 

anr  xed  it  or  the  si^  ne  reason.  Shantung  is  in 
a  different  category.    1  To  ft  eign  nation  can  ever  eflfec- 


at   t  a 
jar 


lively  occupy  that  province 
men  there.    What  Jap; 
Furupean,  and  this  was  a 
ity  just  prior  to  the 
eva  uns,  and  dilly-dallying 


\  re  are  too  many  Chir 
done  is  to  displace  the 
mtter  to  hei  Russia's 
'  1904,  her  intrigues, 
apan.  particularly  her 


ubviou  j  designs  in  Masampht^,  left  no  doubt  in  any  one's 
"lind  what  fate  Japan  was  to  expect.  Since  Russia's 
"  set-back,"  Germany's  activities  in  the  Orient  have  been 
directed  t  >v\^rd  the  same  end.  A  her  the  retrocession  of 
Fort  Arthur,  Japan  would  have  bet  blind  indeed  to 
have  failed  to  see  the  consequences  to  her  of  Germany's 
avowed  policy  in  the  Orient. 
The  land-hungry  Eurofiean  has  ))een  a  real  menace 


242 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


to  Japan's  existence  as  an  Oriental  power.  Since  China 
has  been  impotent  to  protect  herself,  it  has  fallen  to 
Japan's  lot  to  come  to  her  rescue, —  not,  be  it  imder- 
stood,  from  altruistic  concern  for  China,  but  as  a  matter 
of  self-interest  and  protection  for  herself. 

The  American  with  his  nation's  history  in  mind 
and  the  importance  which  he  himself  attaches  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  ought  to  be  able  to  keenly  appreciate 
Japan's  position  in  this  difficulty  and  to  sympathize 
with  her  as  a  European  might  not  be  expected  to  do. 
Rightly  or  wrongly,  we  believe  that  much  of  our  national 
success  has  been  due  to  our  insistence  upon  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Believers,  as  we  are,  in  the  principle  of 
'*  Live  and  let  live,"  shall  we  not  grant  to  Japan  in  her 
greater  difficulty  the  same  freedom  that  we  have  de- 
manded for  oursdves? 

But  the  question  is  more  than  an  academic  cme. 
There  are  many  people  in  this  country  who  admire  Ja> 
pan  and  wish  her  welL  But  sndi  an  appeal  can  hardly  be 
made  to  the  majority  of  Americans,  particularly  to  the 
many  to  whom  Japan  kxnns  only  as  a  threatening  buga- 
boo. To  such  it  should  be  brought  home  that  our  omi 
sdf-interest  denumds  that  we  recc^ize  htr  claim  of  aa 
Asiatic  Momot  Doctrine.  National  pdicies  are  md 
should  be  those  of  enlightened  sdfishness.  A  bosiiKM 
nan  who  may  dispose  of  his  own  wealth  as  he  sees  fit 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  EAST  AND  WEST  H3 


is  bound  to  safeguard  to  the  extreme  the  property  of 
which  he  is  a  trustee.  Statesmen  and  governments  are 
the  trustees  of  a  nation  and  particularly  of  that  nation's 
future  generations.  We  must  consider  whether  it  is  for 
our  future  advantage  or  disadvantage  that  Japan  should 
be  supported  in  her  contention. 

It  reduces  to  the  question  of  whether  it  would  be  to 
our  own  advantage  or  contrariwise  that  China  should 
be  the  scene  of  the  pulling  and  hauling  diplomacy  so 
conspicuously  the  feature  of  the  past  two  decades* 
history,  or  whether  we  should  profit  most  by  the  elimina- 
tion of  the  European  Powers  (Russia,  England,  Gcr- 
nu.ny,  and  France)  from  political  control  of  Chinese 
territory  and  interference  in  Chinese  politics. 

We,  in  this  country,  wish  peace  in  the  Pacific  and  its 
shores.  We  wish  to  find  the  greatest  possible  market 
for  our  goods  in  both  Japan  and  China.  We  have  seen 
something  of  the  present  status  of  the  Oriental  trade. 
We  have  seen  that  the  greatest  current  market  at  present 
is  for  cotton  manufactures ;  secondly,  for  such  goods  as 
matches,  umbrellas,  cigarettes,  lamps,  oil,  etc.,  the  use 
of  which  is  easily  acquired  and  is  increasing  in  China. 
In  the  third  rank  are  the  manufactures,  the  use  of  which 
will  have  to  be  acquired  by  the  Chinese  as  their  scale  of 
living  changes, —  such  things  as  sewing  machines, 
electrical  appliances,  scientific  instruments,  pbtnK^apbs, 


344  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


household  conveniences,  plumbing  supplies.  We  may 
add  structural  iron  and  railway  equipment. 

The  market  for  these  at  present  is  embryonic  Now, 
of  the  first  class,  that  of  cotton  yams  and  cloths,  Japa- 
nese goods  are  attaining  a  startlingly  rapid  ascendancy 
in  the  Chinese  markets.  Neither  Europe  nor  America 
can  hope  to  compete  with  Japanese  cotton  mills,  em- 
ploying work  girls  at  fifteen  cents  a  day  and  running 
nineteen  to  twenty-three  hours  out  of  the  twenty-four.* 
But,  as  we  have  seen,  Japan  depends  to  a  great  extent 
upon  American  raw  cotton  to  supply  this  market,  since 
a  certain  admixture  is  necessary  to  bring  her  product  to 
the  proper  standard.  In  other  words,  since  the  Chinese 
customer  demands  the  best  he  can  afford,  if  Japan  should 
attempt  to  do  without  AnMrican  raw  cotton,  depending 
19011  that  from  China  and  India,  then  her  contrd  of  die 
maiicet  would  pass.  Here,  therefore,  Japan's  success  is 
really  Ameriot's  joint-iHX>fit  and  Europe  does  not  count 

In  tlw  second  dass,  all  essoitially  dieap  articks,  it  h 
likely  that  with  the  exception  of  kerosene  dl  the  trade 
will  abo  tend  to  settle  into  Japan's  hands,  although  in 
this  case  ui  certain  lines  her  competition  may  come  from 
Europe.  Oil  we  shaU  doubtless  ctmtinue  to  supply. 

It  is  in  the  third  group  of  manufactures  ^t  Afnerkui 
industry  has  its  greatest  opportunity.   The       tict  of 

>U.  S.  DepMtaentof  CooMMRt.  Spec.  Aft  Rtf*. 86b M,  1914 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  EA<^    AND  WEST  345 

American  workshops,  employing  the  highest  grade  of 
skilled  labor,  need  not  fear  competition  from  the  Japa- 
nese, at  least  not  for  many  years  to  come.  There  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  the  Chinese  demand  for  such 
products  will  grow  apace.  Our  competitors  here,  how- 
ever, will  be  Germany,  England,  and  France.  Again  we 
find  our  interests  are  not  threatened  by  Japan,  but  by 
those  powers  that  have  tried  to  establish  a  control  over 
large  portions  of  Chinese  territory,  and  have  been  op- 
posed by  Japan  in  that  attempt. 

Commercially,  therefore,  and  from  the  standpoint 
of  strict  national  selfishness,  it  is  to  our  advantage  to 
keep  Europe  out  of  East  Asia,  which  involves  the  ac- 
ceptance of  Japanese  dominance  in  Far  Eastern  affairs. 
Every  consideration  points  to  a  community  of  interest 
between  America  and  Japan  with  reference  to  the  de- 
velopment of  China's  trade,  provided  only  that  Japan 
does  not  make  the  mistake  of  attempting  to  xtmnopohzt 
the  whole  trade. 

Such  a  policy  on  her  part,  the  attempted  dosing  of 
the  "Open  Door,"  in  other  words,  in  the  long  run 
would  prove  fatal  to  her  best  interests,  for  it  would  not 
only  alienate  American  sympatny,  which  is  very  valuable 
to  her,  but  would  stifle  or  at  least  delay  China's  own  de- 
velopment, and  this  would  be  likewise  a  disadvantage 
to  her.  The  greater  purchasing  power  that  China  de- 


246  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


yclops,  the  more  goods  Japan  can  sell  to  her,  and  the 
development  of  this  purchasing  power  is  dependent  upon 
foreign  capital  which  Japan  is  unable  to  fumbh  and 
which  would  not  likely  be  furnished  by  any  other  power, 
if  Japan  should  seize  political  control. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  in  the  past  an  un- 
acceptable thesis  to  the  states  of  Europe.  But  in  1903 
Great  Britain  accepted  it  "unreservedly."  Without 
doubt  her  motives  were  not  entirely  unselfish.  She  was 
very  willing  to  block  Germany  from  acquiring  a  large 
slice  of  South  America,  which  has  been  the  avowed  in- 
tention of  the  latter.  But  on  the  other  hand,  while  thus 
protecting  herself,  she  has  greatly  profited  by  the  kindly 
feeling  and  the  more  intimate  relations  that  have  de- 
vekiped  between  herself  and  America.  May  we  not 
take  a  leaf  out  of  the  same  book?  If  we  accept  the 
Japanese  "Monroe  Doctrine"  with  respect  to  cqn- 
tinental  Asia,  we  shall  not  only  regain  the  food  will 
of  Japan  and  the  advantages  of  closer  and  more  friendly 
intercourse,  but  on  the  other  hand  we  shall  profit  our- 
sdves  by  assisthig  in  blocking  off  European  aggfcsiian 
(passively,  of  course,  but  none  the  less  effectively)  and 
keeping  the  QUnese  market  open  to  our  own  trade. 
Indeed  we  might  even  make  the  firm  estaMishmrat  of 
the  "  Open  Door  "  a  quid  fro  quo  in  exxdumge  for  tndi 
acknowledgment. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  EAST  AND  WEST  047 

To  repeat,  our  real  competitor  in  the  Chinese  market 
is  Europe,  not  Japan.  Nothing  could  suit  Europe's 
purpose  better  than  tc  divert  American  sentiment  from 
this  essential  point  by  stimulating  antagonistic  feeling 
between  the  Japanese  and  ourselves.  We  have  a  strate- 
gic advantage  over  Europe  in  the  contest  for  the  trade 
of  the  Pacific.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  we  shall 
be  fools  enough  to  waste  our  opportunity  antagooidng 
Japan  instead  of  dividing  the  field  with  her. 


w 

k 


li 


CHAPTER  X 


80MS  GUIS8B8  AS  TO  THB  FUTUSB 

The  writer  has  no  intention  of  plunging  into  proph 
ecy.  He  has  seen  too  many  prophets  in  Far  Easten 
matters  covered  with  confusion  by  the  real  progress  oi 
events,  to  have  much  faith  in  his  own  conjectures 
Prophecy,  except  at  long  range,  is  a  precarious  pastime 
in  any  quarter  of  the  globe.  But  prophecy  in  Orienta 
politics  should  be  left  to  the  trained  writer  of  romances 

Yet  we  must  concede  it  to  be  a  matter  of  momentouf 
significance,  that  the  decisions  which  America  shall  b< 
called  upon  to  make  in  the  near  future,  as  to  her  Oriental 
policy,  shall  be  wise  decisions;  that  they  shall  be  based 
up<Mi  all  the  knowledge  available  regarding  this  part  of 
the  world  and  our  place  in  it,  and  that  they  shall  b« 
illuminated  by  the  light  of  justice  and  fair-dealing  which 
lies  bade  of  any  ultimately  successful  diplomacy.  Manjf 
of  us  as  schoolboys  learned  the  stirring  oration  of  Pat- 
rick Henry  in  which  occurs  the  phrase : "  I  have  no  light 
to  guide  my  footsteps  save  the  lamp  of  experience." 
We  may  well  ask  what  our  own  brief  history  has  to  teach 
us  regarding  our  Oriental  policy,  and  with  what  measofc 
of  success  it  is  likely  to  be  attended. 

348 


SOME  GUESSES  AS  TO  THE  FUTt'KE  ^49 

To  this  end,  I  shall  briefly  review  some  of  the  features 
of  our  long  intercourse  with  England,  with  which  power 
our  international  relations  hav-  been  perhaps  more 
conflicting  than  with  any  othe-  :he  hope  of  discover- 
ing some  parallels  between  them  .aid  the  situation  with 
regard  to  Japan. 

We  are  just  getting  far  enough  away  from  the  nine- 
teenth century  to  begin  to  get  a  perspective,  to  hold  it 
off  at  arm's  length,  as  it  were,  and  appreciate  the  real 
significance  of  various  incidents  and  the  trend  of  events, 
and  to  determine  the  causes  of  important  effects  whose 
nearness  has  made  us  hardly  conscious  of  their  existence. 
When  we  do  so,  one  of  the  most  striking  things  that  we 
discover  is  the  fact  that  while,  in  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century  the  United  States,  speaking  generally, 
looked  upon  England  with  suspicion  and  distrust,  env> 
and  fear,  and  England  in  turn  looked  upon  us  with  con- 
tempt not  unmixed  with  exasperation,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century,  the 
relations  between  the  two  nations  had  grown  so  cordial 
and  so  firmly  grounded  in  reality  as  to  cause  the  opinion 
to  be  universally  expressed  in  both  countries  that  war 
between  them  is  unthinkable. 

What  has  wrought  this  wondrous  change?  Why  have 
the  two  nations  come  to  a  cordial  understanding  instead 
of  drifting  apart  io  the  course  of  a  centuiy?   It  ;s  of 


»SO  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 


coane  oontnuy  to  an  humaii  escperience  that  people 
recently  at  war  with  one  another  should  forget  thi 
hatreds  engendered  by  conflict  and  the  disaster  wrough 
m  battle  as  soon  as  a  treaty  of  peace  is  sigced.  Thi 
Revolutionary  War  was  fought  out  oo  American  soil 
and  it  is  uevitaUe  that  Americans  should  long  cherisi 
the  ancient  grudge,  not  only  against  the  mother  countrj 
whMe  stufHd  poliqr  had  made  her  a  tyrannica]  opprcsm 
in  the  eyes  of  the  colonists,  but  also  against  tiie  colonis] 
Tories  who  had  taken  sides  against  them  and  who  coS' 
centrated  across  the  border  m  Canada.  On  the  otha 
hand,  Engbnd's  hiterests  were  all  directed  toward 
European  affaki,  and  she  thought  of  her  former  mib- 
jects,  whcMver  At  did  think  of  tiwm,  as  prcsumptuon 
upstarts  whose  atten^ts  at  startmg  a  democracy  wcic 
foredoomed  to  failure.  Eng^  was  mistress  of  the 
seas  and  the  dominant  power  in  the  worid.  Thisposhkn 
made  her  unperious  and  arbitrary,  and  led  to  such  acts 
as  the  enforcement  of  the  right  of  seardi  on  American 
vessels  and  the  impressment  of  seamen,  which  cuhninated 
intfacMcondwarof  z8ia,  a  war  that  renewed  all  the  vin- 
dictive feelings  toward  Great  Britahi  inherited  from  the 
previous  conflict.  The  treaty  of  CHient,  at  the  conefai- 
sion  of  this  war,  did  not  d^xide  the  real  issues,  altiiougii 
the  return  of  Napoleon  from  Elba  diverted  all  attentkn 
m  Europe  from  affairs  across  the  octaa.  The  treaty  of 


SOME  GUESSES  AS  TO  THE  FUTU«E  asi 
Ohent  "  did  not  wetka  tht  coovfction  in  the  Bind,  of 
n..ny  Americans  that ,  tadi,,  frinOfk  of  Brituh  policy 
was  to  bully  and  drnooi.  the  United  Stite.  into  .  condi- 
t.on  of  dependence  a<  near  „  posdM,  to  flat  which  l»d 
been  thrown  off  in  i7;6;  it  did  not  caingniih  tte  far 
among  the  English  in  Can«Ja  that  the  United  State,  mu 
resolutely  bent  on  conquering  and  aanedw  Oem  •  it  did 
not  qualify  the  belief  wid.^  ti.nili.4ari.. 
.ocracy  in  England  that  the  America,  danooa^wM  a 
barbarous,  brawling  political  otgarization  who.,  powth 
was  to  be  restricted  by  all  possible  n«„.  i„  the  i™ 
0  av,l..at.on.   For  ^otO^,^  uBef.  the., 
was  not  lacking  a  certain  foundation  hi  fict"  « 

Following  the  war  of  18,2  we  have  had  no  other 
armed  conflict  with  Great  Britata,  bnt  w.  h«I  h«l  «. 
astomshmg  succession  of  ^,pcT^  contro»er»e. 
both  w,th  England  and  with  cJTZ,  enfy  p^f 
the  century  was  the  periodof  .a  ext,««Un.,ye««^,„ 
on  oar  part  and  conquest  of  territory,  .ome  of  whid,  ha. 
only  r««,tly  become  adequately  Mded.  Enriand  fdt 
.t  her  duty  to  obstruct  us  so  far  as  po«ible  fa.  .a  Oi.. 
in  nonda,  m  Oregon,  in  Califonria,  and  fa.  Ten,  Ae 
mdeavored  to  prevent  us  from  assuming  coottol  f '  Jk 
■»»  .erritories.  Although  she  faiW  n.  aO  ««pt  the 
northern  part  of  Oregon,  yet  the  di*«*  M 


'  111  ! 


in] 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

engendered  in  America  by  her  policy  fanned  the  old 
flame  and  kept  it  alive.  Moreover,  she  maintained 
the  right  of  search  "  which  the  United  States  could  not 
concede,  on  the  ground  that  it  impaired  her  sovereignty. 
And  it  waa  not  until  1858  that  England  finaUy  acceded 
to  the  American  point  of  view. 

The  Civa  War,  to  the  European  soothsayer,  marked 
the  end  of  the  extraordinary  experiment  of  democracy. 
The  ultimate  success  of  the  Southern  cause  was  never 
questioned  in  England,  and  her  decision  to  maintain 
strict  neutrality  (which  involved  the  right  to  sell  ships 
and  arms  to  whomsoever  she  pleased)  had  the  result 
of  exciting  anger  and  resentment  on  the  part  of  both 
beUigerents,  each  of  whom  ascribed  a  large  share  of  its 
troubles  to  her  attitude.   It  is  not  strictly  true  that 
England  favored  the  Confederate  cause,  in  spite  of  the 
notorious  case  of  the  Alabama,  but  it  would  have  been 
impossiWe  to  convince  a  Northerner  of  that  fact. 

In  1847  and  1848  the  terrible  famine  in  Ireland  drove 
hordes  of  starving  Irish  to  America,  and  the  immigration 
increased  untU  the  Irish  element  of  our  population  be- 
came an  important  one.  The  average  Celt  has  two 
characteristics  that  are  of  great  significance  in  con- 
sidering  him  as  an  ^ment  of  the  American  population. 
These  are  his  fondness  for  politics  and  his  hatred  of 
England  and  all  her  works.   The  former  gave  him  a 


SOME  GUESSES  AS  TO  THE  ftJTURE  Vi 
chance  to  play  „  taport.^  p.rt     our  dmocnc, 
and  the  latter  beam,  an  ,>«|«ible  ««,te  of 
■n  .h.  hands  of  political  l«d.r.  iat^ 
<h.-  r,sh  vote.    In  cons«,„«Ke,  no  grfc»«Ke  ,g,i,J[ 
England  was  ever  aUowed  to  die  down,  but  "hrittin. 
•he  hon-s  tail  "  became  recognized  S;;^ 
weapon  m  political  campaigning.   AB  tK.  torfed  to 
keep  al,ve  the  anti-Enjliri.  feding,  ««il,  ^. 
done,  It  lost  its  effect. 

The  climax  of  all  this  sentiment  came  wiU,  tbt  f«m», 
Venezuela  mcdent  of  President  Clevdurf',  M,^^ 
t.on.  The  English  were  whoHjr  mMt  to  coniprehad 
he  Amencan  attitude  in  a  matter  in  which 
they  might  be  expected  to  have  scant  intettM.  The  «- 
Planation  seems  to  be  that  unconsdoudy,  or  wbcon- 
sconsly,  «,e  American  people  were  looking  for  .  dunce 
to  demonstrate  their  coming-of-age  politidly,  ^  a^, 
nght  to  a  voice  in  the  settling  of  the  worid'.  ,8^ 
England  conceded  this  point  then,  and  from  flat  time 
t"^'™*"  have  been  reUtirdr  tan- 

q™  When  the  throw  of  the  dice  nad.  of  the  United 
States  a  colonizing  power,  far  from  opporing  Eng. 
hnd  c„„„„,„„y  „.<,^  ^pp,^^^^  knowmgtt.t 
m  shouldenng  the  "  white  man'.  bimlB. »  we  hiniBrfe 
her  cause  our  own. 

England's  miiusters  have  oftai  lieen  notwlfor  thdr 


354  JAPANESE  E3CPAN8ION 


lack  of  tact,  but  rarely  for  a  lack  of  good  sense.  They 
have  long  realized  that  war  between  England  and 
America  would  be  economically  so  disastrous  for  her 
tliat  no  possible  gain  in  territory  or  in  prestige  could 
compensate  for  it.  They  have  waited  with  a  greater  or 
less  degree  of  calmness  until  we  should  mature  suflB- 
ciently  to  realize  the  same  fact. 

In  the  earlier  decades  of  our  national  existence  we 
were  not  unlike  an  overgrown  boy  with  his  first  pair  of 
long  trousers,  clumsy,  crude,  obstrepcrc  js,  and  bel- 
ligerent In  the  middle  of  the  century  we  mighi  ue  said 
to  bear  a  resemblance  to  the  same  youth  in  his  late  teens, 
when  he  acquires  the  use  of  cigarettes  and  tilts  his  hat 
over  one  ear.  Now  at  last,  having  passed  the  hobblede- 
hoy period,  we  have  reached  maturity  and  are  ready  to 
take  a  hand  in  the  wortd's  business.  And  England,  like 
an  anxious  but  not  always  tactful  parent,  is  more  than 
willing  to  forget  the  irritations  of  the  past  and  to  take 
us  into  the  firm.  What  lessom  can  we  read  in  all  diis 
tlttt  may  help  us  to  understand  Japan? 

In  the  beginning  we  must  confess  that  nothing  like 
the  occasians  for  disagreement  between  England  and 
ourselves  have  occurred  between  Japan  and  ourselves. 
Of  course  the  century  is  young,  and  no  one  knows  what 
the  next  several  decades  will  bring  forth.  But  we  have 
no  stii^g  memories  of  conflict  to  stir  up  Mttenms. 


iOME  GUESSES   ^  TO  THE  FUTURE  255 

Even  the  worst  jingo  in  .^inerka  has  no  hatrid  of  the 
Japanese.  He  merdy  itan  or  mistiiisti  them,  or  ebe 

looks  down  upon  them  with  a  toplofty  tolerance  infi- 
nitely more  galling  than  hatred.  The  "Jap  ia  cocky." 
"  He  is  dishonest  and  tricky."  "  He  knows  not  the  sanc- 
tity of  contract."  "  He  has  no  morals  or  home  life." 
These,  after  aU,  are  mild  aspersions  compared  with  the 
English  view  of  an  American  a  half  century  ago. 
"  Swagger  and  ferocity,  built  on  a  foundatkm  of  vul- 
f;arity  and  cowardice,"  arc  the  characteristics  of  "an 
ideal  Yankee,"  said  the  London  Tinut  discussing  the 
Mason  and  Slidell  affair  in  i86i.> 

England  has  forgotten  these  brave  words  and  many 
li'cc  them  and  so  has  America,  though  more  sbwly, 
'  r  fjGihing  lingers  quite  so  long  in  the  mind  as  the  sttQg 
:    intemptuous  speech.   But  how  much  better  it 
i  :»ave  been  if  they  had  never  been  said.  And 
tan  we  not  take  a  les'nn  frr  m  our  own  experience  and 
refrain  from  the  same  i..nii  of  utterance,  knowing  how 
useless  it  is  and  hov  productive  of  ill  feeling. 

Th:  Japanese  uay  h.,  expected  to  overlook  the 
he£le<i  language  of  the  man  in  the  street  or  of  the  editor 
of  a  yeUow  newspaper  (the  Japanese  themselves  have  a 
press  of  W  iiVh  the  hues  of  saffron  exceed  anything 
known  in  this  r  ;untry)';  but  the  speeches  of  members 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

of  Congress  and  of  Senators  are  on  a  different  status. 
As  a  nation  we  have  discarded  the  bumptious  pnctice  of 
"  twisting  the  Uoo's  taiL"  But  there  is  danger  that  in 
seeking  an  ouUct  for  our  energies  we  may  grow  too  much 
accustomed  to  airing  our  suspicions  of  the  motives  of 
our  Oriental  neighbors.  We  are  in  danger  of  getting 
the  "  Japanese  haWt,"  as  some  one  has  called  it 

The  "certain  condescension  in  foreigners,"  partic- 
ularly Englisiimen,  the  tacit  assumption  of  superiority, 
the  unmerited  satires  of  Dickens,  Mrs.  Trollope,  and  tiie' 
rest,— the  older  generation  among  us  still  recaU  how 
productive  of  ill  feeling  they  were,  and  how  really  sig. 
nificant  in  postponing  a  settlement  of  diffei-ences  and  the 
establishment  of  cordial  relations  between  ourselves  and 
Great  Britain.  With  this  recollection  so  fresh  in  our 
minds,  may  we  not  appreciate  the  advisabUity  of  not 
doing  "  as  we  have  been  done  by  "  anent  Japan? 

For  many  years  the  irreconciUible  diffeience  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  was  the  former's 
insistence  upon  the  right  of  search,— a  smaU  matter  to 
insist  upon,  we  thmk  to-day,  and  one  that  might  have 
been  conceded  the  new  republic  without  damaging  the 
prestige  of  the  British  Empire.  Suggestive  of  amdogy 
is  the  Japanese  contention  that  our  bws,  whether  tocal 
ones  regarding  schools  or  state  ones  regarding  land- 
ownership,  should  recognize  the  Japanese  as  on  a  par 


SOME  GUESSES  AS  TO  THE  FUTURE  257, 
with  the  European  and  America,  a  contention  which 
every  one  with  enough  knowledge  of  the  subject  to  be 
entiUed  to  an  opinion  knows  to  be  just  In  this  case  it  is 
we  that  win  not  concede  the  pomt;  but  shaU  we  a"ow  it 
to  muddy  the  water  for  years  as  England  did  the  former 
question,  to  no  profit  to  ourselves,  but  rather  to  the  detri- 
ment of  cordial  international  relations?  This  of  course 
does  not  imply  unlunited  immigration. 

Japan  is  passmg  through  her  own  hobbledehoy  period. 
Her  cockiness,  her  bumptiousness,  her  exaggerated  sense 
of  dignity,  her  concern  to  be  recognixed  as  an  interna- 
tional  power ;  aU  these  phenomena  we  ourselm  have  di». 
played  in  our  time  and  with  far  greater  crudity.  Itwaa 
a  passing  phase  with  ua  and  it  wiU  be  with  the  newer 
nation  if  we  do  not  take  it  too  seriously.  At  any  rate 
nothmg  is  so  futile,  so  stupid,  as  Internationa]  recrinriwi. 
tions.   We  have  mudi  to  gain  Iqr  retaining  Japan's  per- 
sonal friendship,  we  have  everything  to  tese  ty  k)dng  it 
England's  attempts  to  Umit  our  expanskm  to  the  Fk- 
cific  were  based  upon  o  pHori  consideratwns.  not  on  her 
own  desires  for  that  territoiy.  The  United  States  ex- 
panded  through  its  own  exubennt  enefgy  rather  than 
through  necessity  or  pressure  of  popalatkm,  and  En^ 
land's  attempts  at  hindrance  roused  the  fieitcit  raeot- 
ment.'  Japan's  present-day  expanskm  is  alio  pwt^y  4 


JAPANm  EXPANSION 

phenomenon  of  national  vigor  as  well  as  of  economic 
pressure,  and  the  attempts  of  foreign  nations  to  curb  it 
exdte  the  same  resentment  that  we  ourselves  have 
penenced.   Again,  have  we  any  call  to  put  ounelvw  m 
the  side  of  Japan's  opponents  ? 

To  summarize :  During  the  past  century,  we  have  had 
many  acrimonious  disputes  with  England  and  our  self- 
love  has  suffered  from  her  affronts.   Our  Irish  con- 
tingent has  constantly  kept  the  kettle  boiling  until  we 
teamed  to  think  of  her  as  our  hereditary  enemy.  In 
the  end,  we  havt  outgrown  these  feelings  and  have  come 
to  realize  the  value  of  an  international  friendship  with 
Great  Britain.    How  much  more  reasonable  seems  the 
hope  that  strained  relations  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States  shall  cease  to  exist ;  two  nations  that  have 
never  been  at  war  with  one  another,  whose  territories 
are  not  adjacent  and  whose  past  history  has  been  untfl 
very  recently  one  of  uninterrupted  friendship.   If  the 
one  difficulty  has  been  solved,  shaU  the  other,  so  much 
WHijrfer  one,  long  vex  us  ? 

Many  statesmen  from  Seward  to  Roosevelt  have 
looked  westward  to  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  have  visioned 
it  as  the  scene  of  the  world's  greatest  events  in  the 
immediate  future.  As  international  activities  in  the 
pait  have  been  concerned  chiefly  with  war,  it  is  not 


SOME  GUESSES  AS  TO  THE  FUTURE  a59 

unnatural  to  think  of  the  PWfic  as  the  sta«  for  a 

great  conflict 

But  busiae«  men  h«e  fc^^  th«  cooperation 

brmgs  more  success  than  cut-Af«t  competition.  The 
nations  most  interested  in  the  Pacific  we  thoee  irtioae 
shores  are  washed  by  its  water..  The  interests  of 
America.  Japan,  and  China  are  m  diverse,  and  at  the 
same  t.me  so  interrelated,  that  if  the  three  nations  can 
work  m  harmony,  each  will  profit  vastly  more  thtt  if 
each  attempts  to  shape  it.  future  'md^prndrntiy  or  h, 
conflict  with  the  others. 

America  wishes  the  «  Open  Door Chi«, 
wishes  the  equivalent  of  a  Monroe  Doctroe  fbrT 
East.   If  America  supports  Japan's  contention,  aurf 
Jaoan,  America's.  Europe  will  be  forced  to  ^^r-ntrr 
and  peace  in  the  Pacific  will  be  usured. 

In  a  word,  we  must  abandon,  once  and  for  all.  the 
anti-Japanese  policy  inaugurated  by  Kooa;  «ore  than 
hat,  we  must  abandon  the  iaisse^-faire  i«iCerent  noUey 
that  many  advocate  tOKlay.  Rather  our  policy  sho^ 
one  of  active  cooperation,  an  alliance,  if  you  wiU.  OKWfh 
not  necessarily  one  in  the  conv«tk)naI  ttifitary  iesT^ 

A3  a  first  step  toward  such  a  consunmmkm.  an  k 
national  conference  on  Pacific  proUenis  aight'be 
to  be  participated  in  by  accredited  rrpmumi 
the  United  Stotes,  Canada.  Ji^  CKna, 


a6o  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

and  perii^is  Chile  and  Peru.  The  discussicms  of  such 
a  conference  mti^t  deal  with  such  subjects  as : 

Traat-Pad&  trade  relations  and  tariff  redinroctty. 

Immigntion  and  naturalization. 

The  sapgfy  of  capital  for  the  development  of  Oriental 
industry. 

Fiscal  reform  of  China. 

Publicity  bureaus,  planned  to  facilitate  the  exchange 
of  information  between  East  and  West,  increase 
facilities  for  tourista,  de\  se  a  basis  for  visiting  or 
exchange  professors  and  students,  nullify  canards 
and  disseminate  true  information. 
The  reports  of  such  a  conference  might  be  made 
the  basis  for  international  conventions  that  would 
insure  peaM  and  protperity  on  the  Pacific  for  decades 
to  come. 

But  the  skeptical  ones,  while  granting  of  course  the 
highest  measure  of  disinterestedness  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  will  concede  to  Japan  no  such  far-seeing 
motives.  They  believe  that  Japan  is  trying  to  supplant 
all  the  European  aggressors  in  China  and  seize  huge 
slices  of  Chinese  territory  for  herself.  And  they  point 
to  results  in  South  Manchuria  and  Korea  and  later  in 
Kiao-Chau  as  confirmatory  evidence. 

We  have  already  discussed  the  essential  difference 
between  the  Japanese  occupation  of  Manchuria  and 


SOME  GUESSES  AS  TO  THE  FUTURE  ail 
Korei  and  that  of  Chiiia  proper.  But  let  m  astutiie 

that  does  fttlfitt  the  prophedet  of  thcM  eriUcs  and 
attempta  to  i^ipropnate  Cbmese  territory  and  adnte- 
isteritaafaerows.  How  would  it  work  out? 

We  learn,  for  inataact,  that  the  Genams  had  de- 
veloped a  considerable  industry  in  strawbraid  in  the 
Kiao-Chau  province,  of  which  they  were  just  iribout  to 
reap  the  advantage,  and  that  tlM  Japanese  have  fallen 
heir  to  this  industry.  Of  course  the  people  who  profit 
by  such  an  industry,  in  the  &rst  instance,  are  the  Chinese 
who  make  the  strawbraid.  The  Japanese  may  take  their 
profits  also  as  entrepreneurs.  Well  and  good.  Tbit  is 
legitimate.  But  if  they  tmui  chjirge  off  against  the  other 
side  of  their  ledger  the  heavy  eoat  of  mili^  occupatM», 
these  projits  are  going  to  dwmdle  to  the  vi^Mibg  point. 

The  Chinese  of  course  are  easy  to  conquer  b  a  military 
way.  We  can  easUy  believe  that  if  the  oecaskm  de- 
manded it,  Japan  might  seixe  half  Ae  Empire  and  by 
quartering  enough  troops  9^  strategk  pohits  might  main- 
tain that  condition,  perhaps  not  iadefNttly,  but  for  a 
considerable  length  of  time.  Having  done  so,  she  must 
reap  some  very  great  economic  advantage  to  compensirte 
for  the  great  expense.  She  could  of  course  setae  the  nat- 
ural resources,  the  coal,  iron,  and  copper,  but  she  coukl 
hardly  choose  a  more  expensive  and  unprofitable  way  of 
acquiring  them.  Let  us  assume  then  that  abt  woi^  try 


2(a  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

to  control  the  channels  of  trade,  to  give  her  own  gooda 
a  dear  field  by  excluding  foreign  oon^etition.  The 
easiest  way  to  do  this  would  be  by  a  preferential  Urii!. 

This  has  been  done  before  in  various  parts  of  the  world 
(by  the  French  in  Madagascar,  for  instance),  but  never 
with  a  large  and  proq)eroti8  nation  against  the  will  of 
that  nation.  If  Japanese  goods  already  have  a  good 
market  (cotton  yarns,  for  instance),  they  need  no  such 
bulwark  to  protect  them;  they  beat  their  competitors 
in  the  open  market.  If,  on  the  othei-  hand,  they  are 
inferior  in  quality  or  higher  in  price,  and  the  Chinese  is 
prevented  from  buying  in  the  most  favoraUe  market,— • 
and  this  is  the  only  way  in  which  it  is  conceivable  that  a 
military  occiq>ation  could  be  made  profitable, —  then 
the  Chmese  would  discover  that  he  ytSLS  being  exploited 
in  the  interest  of  his  enemy,  and  there  is  littk  questicm 
as  to  what  he  would  do. 

He  has,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  a  far  more  effective 
weapon  than  any  manufactured  by  Krupps.  This  is  the 
boycott  Whether  any  other  nation  could  successfully 
carry  through  a  national  boycott  or  not  is  hard  to  say. 
The  Chinese  are  the  only  ones  who  have  done  so.  And 
it  is  a  weapon  that  they  have  employed  with  increasing 
frequency  as  their  contact  with  foreign  powers  has 
grown  more  intimate  and  disagreeable. 

The  long  record  of  grievances  against  the  United 


80MB  OUS88IB  M  10  THB  fDTUU  ^63 
Sttttt  aaniiiitod  in  1904.  and  the  first  great  boycott 
im  iiii«iiir«ted  «gdnft  OS.   This  lost  us  maiions  of 
<Whri  in  tnde  Md  w«  hiTt  never  recovered  the  old 
JH!^     wen.  hM  been  the  victim  more  than 
once.  The  Mmdiuriin  program,  particularly  the  Muk- 
den-Aate^  Railway  controversy,  the  affair  of  the  Tatsu 
Mam,  a  Japaneie  thip  that  carried  arms  to  the  Chinese 
«bels,      aumemu.  other  subjects  of  difference  aroused 
«ic  natioiial  adf^wiscloasness  of  the  Chinese  and  kept  a 
toj^  ffDiag  to  the  veor  great  loss  of  the  Japanese 
^  Nwneroo.  other  minor  boycotts  have  been 
inaugurated  hi  recent  years,  enough  to  show  that  the 
weapon  »  a  veiy  effective  one,  and  one  that  the  Chinese 
are  ready  touse.   It  i.  reported  that  a  very  active  boy- 
cott was  institnted  m  Shanghai  against  Japan  on  account 

1  ChJ"^  by  that 

nation  (February,  ,91s).  It  it  significant  that  the  most 
miportant  and  farteacWng  of  these  boycotts  have  been 
b^sed  upon  academic  grounds,  and  moreover  have 
onginated,  .ml  have  been  maintafaied  with  greatest 
fervor,  m  Cwton  and  the  ««them  provhices.  even  the 
one  due  to  the  Manchurian  controversies. 

Now  it  is  muiiMx  imposrible  for  even  the  wildest 
Japanese  jmgo  to  thhik  of  holding  all  the  eighteen 
provmc^  of  China,  with  their  w.ooow>  hU»bitants, 
by  »«nil«taiy  occupation.  The  most  she  could  do  would 


a64  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

be  to  hold  tome  of  the  populous  districts  of  the  north  or 
the  Yang^  Valley.  If,  however,  the  analogy  of  past 
evenu  ha»  any  wdght,  such  a  condition  would  result 
in  the  mort  active  boycott  that  the  south  and  west  have 
ever  known.  And  Japan  could  not  make  enough  from 
the  conquered  provtnoea  to  compensate  the  k)sses  from 
thereat 

But  the  whole  thing  is  the  dream  of  a  madman. 
Japan's  future  success  must  be  an  industrial  and  com- 
mercial one.  Her  greatest,  her  most  vital  market  is 
China.  The  tradesman  does  not  try  to  stimulate  busi- 
ness by  affronting  and  antagonizing  his  prospective 
customers. 

More  than  this,  the  tradesman,  if  he  be  wise,  knows 
that  his  greatest  prosperity  lies  in  the  prosperity  of 
his  neighbors;  that  the  green-grocer  cannot  buy  of 
the  baker  unless  he  himself  sells  his  own  wares.  As 
Japan  looks  to  China  for  her  future  trade,  more  than  to 
other  parts  of  the  world,  as  the  Chinese  trade  is  more 
vital  to  her  than  to  other  nations,  so  an  impoverished 
and  humiliated  China  must  mean  loss  to  her,  whereas 
an  independent  and  prosperous  China  would  mean  her 
own  national  success.   These  considerations  are  so 
obvious  that  we  can  iiarJly  believe  that  Japan's  future 
policy  in  China  will  take  permanentiy  any  other  direc- 
tion. 


INDEX 


Afuinaldo,  79^  ^ 
Aino,  ij. 

AUiaiice,  Anglo-Japanete,  44, 
American  aaautsfu.. t.Jir 


American  astutaace  in  Japu.  ^l. 


Am^cui  poUcgr  Is 

American  Tobacco  Co,  6s. 
Anglo- Japaaeie  AlUnct.  44. 
Annexation  of  KotmlIs!  ^ 
ArtK)biects.  JapMi««^ 
Assiniilation^of  J^Hm 


art.. 


assimilation  of  itaa^M  tva 
Australian  Fleet,  ^ 

^Unce^f 

Biddle,  Commodore,  17 
Bilingual  Khooli,  179^ 
Birth  rate  In  Japan,  iia 
foxer  indemnity.  27. 
Boxer  outbreak,  so. 
«Vcott,  Anti-AmericwL  i6i. 


Chinda,  YlMOnaf.  m. 
CbmeM  cultur«>  in  JapM.  tj. 
deported  from  JipiTli* 

In  Manclniria^?' ^ 

Modem  tcadcnciea.  xn. 
Chlno-JapaneM  WarJ^uT 
Oan  ipirit,  14.  ^ 
Cl«relia<L  PresFdent.  353 
**™«>fwalizing  Japanese 

Competitori,  Japanese  as.  m. 
Conference,  InteraatloiML  a«L 
Controlof  theswTS: 

lumbia,  1^ 


Co- 


from 

f:*»"»»w»  te«t,"  151. 
Uilanm^^apanese.  ai*. 
DisfwiKhisement  of  Japanese  ia 

Dutchi  Rela%ns  witlv  15. 


a66 


INDEX 


Exwtithre  qMlHkt  of  JtVMMtt. 

IIS 

Exports,  Japanese,  125. 
ExtratamlorkkUtyt  30k 

Factories  n  Japan,  113. 
Feodalism  in  Japan,  11  a. 
Fil^ioo,  AtUtodt  toward  JapMi. 

Finances,  Japanese,  I34> 

Financing      war,  300. 

Fishing  in  British  Columbia,  158. 

Fleet,  Australian,  151. 

Forc«ii  trade.  J^ancse,  lift  ao8. 

Formon.  JapiMM  cdlontiatkwi, 

t04,  9I& 

Frtnch  problem  in  Canada,  17& 

Geary  Act,  164  _ 
Gentleman  s  Agreement.  10$ 

Germans  in  Kiao-Cbau.  261 
in  U.  S.,  i8a 

Germany  in  East  Asia,  227. 

Gold  reserve,  141. 

Government  patronage  in  Japan, 
113. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  Tour  of,  ag. 
Gresham'i  Law,  168,  223. 
Gulick,  Sidney,  quoted,  192. 

Harris,  Townseod.  91, 3i> 
Hearmg  on  Nayal  Affairs,  97. 

Heimin,  12. 

Hemp  in  Philippines,  88. 

Henry,  Patrick,  quoted,  24& 

Hobson,  Mr,,  quoted,  3. 

"  Holy  Alliance,"  236. 

Home  production  in  Japan,  117 • 

ImmigTAtion,  Character  of  Amer- 
ican, I4S- 
into  Australia,  149. 
Indemnity,  Levied  by  U.  as. 

FaSure  of  Japanese,  fo. 
Industrialism  in  Jai»n.  11 1 
Industrial  revobition,  107. 


Inonyt,  Cowl,  39.  ,^ 
Intercourse  with  Occident,  15. 
International  conference, 
lavaiioo,  Javaaeae,  mk 
Irish  fa  AMrica,  4S«> 
Iwalatfa  snihiiiy,  33. 

Japan  an  agriedlaral 

IQ& 

Japau,  Birth  rate,  iia 

industrialism,  iii. 

Foreign  trade,  lift 

Poverty  of,  140 

Wealth  of,  137. 
Japanese  castes,  la. 

-Chinese  trade,  13a, 

clan  spirit,  14. 

dishonesty,  ft 

etiquette,  aa 

factories,  113. 

fcwlalism.  iia. 

finances,  134. 

in  California,  165. 

fai  Philippines,  103. 

Origin  01,  li. 

proficiency  in  arms,  sa 

-Russian  entente^  1^. 

workmen,  115, 
Juridical  persons,  186. 
Justice,  sense  of,  in  Oriental,  27. 

Kaempfer,  quoted,  19 
Kiao-Chau,  47,  51.  ^ 
Kin-chau-Aigun  Railway,  68. 
Knox,  P.  Q.,  64.  67. 
Komagata  Maru,  161. 
Korea.  Annexation,  63. 

Early  relations  with  Japan,  42. 

Japanese    immigration  into, 
lift 

Labor  in  Philippines.  92. 
Land  ownership  by  Japanese  in 
U.  S.,  169. 
in  Japan,  186. 
Lea,  Homer.  4 
hegu^  Mignil  de.  84. 
Literacy  ttst  in  AnstfaHa,  SS& 


INDEX 


>6f 


Maini,  blown  ttp^  7. 
McKinley,  quoted.  6a. 
Manchuria.  Am  and  fwflrtwi 

of,  aai. 
Japanese  in,  65. 
Mann,  Jamei  R.,  quoted,  a. 
Market,  China  as  a,  ija 
Masiery  of  the  Pacific,  gdt 
Maximilian,  337. 
Missionaries  in  japtn,  35. 
Monopolies,  Govenunaot,  ij& 
Monroe  Doctnoe,  tja^ 

Neutraliiation  achoM  (Knos't), 

07. 

New  Orleans  lyncbiagi,  a6. 

Occident,  Intercourse  with,  li 
Oil,  Kerosene,  125. 
Okuma,  Failure  of,  4a 
Open  Door.  345. 
OrdinuKe  No  3s«ii8B»  173. 

Pacific,  Problem  of,  7$. 
Panama  Canal,  124. 
Pearson,  Dr.,  quoted,  155. 
Peasantry,  Character  oi  Jm- 

aneije,  177. 
Perry.  Commoduie^  \6,  ai. 
FMv.  Japanese  hi,  317. 
Philippines.  Cost  to  U.  &,  li. 
History,  g4.  ^ 

Japanese  invasioa  of ,  aos,  ao& 
feeds,  90. 
Japanese  in,  103. 
Peoples  of,  &L 
Protectorate  for,  wi. 
Resources,  87. 
Roads  io,  9X 
Sale  of,  loi. 

Population  of  North  Australia, 

Port  i&thur,  43,  46,  49. 
*orttHiouth  treaty,  224. 
PWtofor  Japaocsetn  Philip< 
fioa^,  ZQ5. 


*«*ww«Mi«i  of  Fart  Atthw, 

Ucih  Iivertad  iMe  PhUlp^iiHs. 

Increased  cost  kk  Jafwi,  MR 

Richardsoo,  Cut  down,  04. 
Riots,  Anti<<3Un«si^  164. 
Japanese  in  British  Cobmbia. 


•7- ?^  47' 
in  Manchuna,  53. 

Rttssian-JapanMc  entente,  7a 
•Jafaaast  war,  58L 

St  Louis  FUr,  Chhese  at,  164. 

Salt  OMMK^wly.  136. 

Sand-lot  agiution,  163. 

fftooooseki  affair,  34. 

ShindBff.  Japanese,  134. 

Sbiioku,  u. 

Silk,  Japanese,  127. 

South  Africa.  Orientals  In,  ij& 

South  America,  Japanese  in,  ai7. 

Spanish  policy  In  Philippines.  77. 

Standard  Od  Co..  65. 
Straw  matthif,  118, 
Subsidies  for  Japanese  ships,  96. 
Successful  wars,  44.  ' 
Sugar  in  Philippines,  89. 
^nparacMi^  VBo> 

_fa%^pp^es,  Qi. 
Tax.  Land.  134. 

Income.  135. 
Tea  m  Japan.  ia6. 
Tientsin  affair,  26. 
Tobacco  in  Philippines,  Sol 

monopoly  in  Japan,  13& 
Togo,  Admiral,  quoted,  i. 
Tourist  disbursements,  i2iB. 
Toys,  Japanese  ^^d^  u& 
Trade  balance^  laS 

i^S^oSSn^  a4S> 


MICROCOPY  RESOIUTION  TfST  CHAIT 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


^    APPLIED  IIVMGF 


'653  East  Man  Street 
Rochester.  Ne«  York      1 4609 
(716)  W  -  OMO  -  Phone 
(716)  288  -  5989  -  Fox 


a68 


INDEX 


Tradesmen,  Stitus  of,  in  Japan, 

Udiida,  Baron,  qnoled,  174. 

Venezuela  incident,  253.  ' 
TOO  Bu^N^  quoted  4& 
Ton  Tifpitz,  quoted^  i. 

Wages  of  Japanese  workmen, 

War,%iances  of,  194. 

Russo-Japanese,  58. 
Ward,  Premier,  quoted,  153. 


Wealth  of  Japan,  iXT. 
Webb  Act,  171. 
Wei-Hai-Wet  ^ 
Wheat  hi  Japan,  iia 
White  Australia  Axtrine^  14BL 
Wood,  Generat  qtMJtad,  5. 
Womnen,  Japanese,  115. 
Worcester,  Dcaa  C,  quoted,  y6, 

Xavier,  St  Francis,  15. 
Yellow  peril,  45,55, 95. 


Printed  i0  the  United  StatM  of  rtatrlM 


'jpHE  forming  pages  contain  idmdaementt  of 
MKmiUin  bo^  <»  Undred  aabjeetk 


The  Japanese  Problem  in  the  United  Statei 

Br  H.  A.  MILUS 
Mmw  <f  iBMOiriei  b  lli  IMMnky  of  KavM 

-The  book  reveals  careful,  painstaking,  and  consden- 
Hons  investigation,  and  forms  a  valuable  addition  to  the 
concrete  studies  of  alien  races  in  the  United  States." 

^Awurktm  EconomU  Xtvuw. 

"An  interesting  and  useful  book.  It  presents  in  brief 
compass  and  readable  form  the  essential  facts  about  Japa- 
nese  settlement  in  this  country,  and  reduces  to  definite 
outline  and  proper  perspective  a  problem  which  is,  for  the 
most  part,  revealed  to  us  only  in  lurid  and  terrifying 
glimpses  through  the  vapors  of  popular  agitation." 

**A  conscientious  and  valuable  document." 

"A  most  important  contribution  to  our  knowledge  of 
that  vital  problem —our  national  attitude  toward  the 
AOaticr-^Pfovidenet  Journal. 

"One  of  die  best  expositions  of  the  Japanese  question 
that  has  yet  appear«L  It  is  thorough  and  exact" 

—BfrnokfynDmifyBtiih. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


The  New  American  Goverament  and  Ito  WeA 


By  JAMES  T.  YOUNG 
n ufcMiif  nf  nitilln  fl mnlBtrrr"—  *-  ^-  — ^  •*  "    '  I '  ' 

This  book,  iniended  for  that  growing  circle  of  readers  who  are  inters 
ested  not  only  in  political  form  and  .<rnicture,  but  also  more  especially 
in  IVMai  tht  GavemmMt  IsDmngand  IVfy,  ii  chanusterized  by  dm 
IbUonHngfei^iiiei: 

1.  It  {daoei  greater  mp^iyt^  dum  usual  on  the  work  of  the  goven* 
ment. 

2.  It  pays  more  attention  to  present  problems,  especially  to  the 
P$iUic  Regulation  of  Busiiuss. 

3.  It  applici  to  every  aspect  of  gomnmait  the  test  of  RtaiiU-^ 
whether  the  ralqect  be  the  powers  of  the  Prendent,  the  election  laws, 
or  the  Sherman  Act— for  the  value  of  a  court,  a  statute,  or  a  political 
institution  should  be  known  by  its  output. 

4.  It  depicts  the  Governmeni  As  It  Is,  and  as  it  has  developed. 
Oar  system  is  not  a  fidshed  crystal,  vox  an  andnt  historical  maan- 
aci^  bttt  a  growth.  And  it  is  stiU  growing. 

5.  It  includes  the  interpretation  of  the  'onstitution  and  the  chief 
regulative  laws,  in  the  most  recent  Decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court.  It 
is  this  that  gives  clear,  definite  meaning  to  the  discussion  of  govern- 
ment forms  and  activities. 

6.  It  presents  an  AA«/.  It  (toes  not  hesitate  to  point  ont  the  moial 
defects,  and  the  social  cost  of  politiGal  weakness  and  ineffidenqr  bat  its 
Ttnt\M  OpHmMe. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
MHMsn       M-M  flftt  Atmm       lew  Tsek 


The  Govemmeiit  o^  American  Gtiet 


By  Profbssoii  WILLIAM  B.  MUNRO 
OfHuwd  Unhrenitjr 

Here  Prolesior  Munro  presents  with  fiumess  and  impartiality 
all  the  aspects  of  such  subjects  as  Commission  Crovemment, 
The  Initiative,  The  Referendum,  The  Recall.  Other  phases  of 
municipal  government  in  this  country  are  also  considered,  so 
that  tbe  woA  may  be  described  as  a  comprehensive  survey  of 
present  conditions  in  our  cities.  The  book  is  found  even  more 
interesting  and  stimulating  than  the  author's  "  The  Government 
of  European  Cities." 


The  Opendon  of  the  hidative. 
Referendum  and  Recall  in  Oregon 

By  JAMES  D.  BARNETT 
PNtamr  of  PolMoal  SdtBoe  In  die  Unhmitjr  of  Oregon 

This  book  is  a  valuable  and  significant  record  of  the  actual 

operation  of  tiie  Initiative,  Referendum  and  Recall.  Professor 
Bamett  is  a  careful  observer,  and  well  trained  in  his  field ;  he 
has  analyzed  the  theoretical  phases  of  the  political  machinery, 
and  disctissed  the  problems  they  present  in  the  light  d  actual 
results  obtained.  There  is  no  vague  generalizing  in  his  pages, 
but  specific,  detailed  information  on  the  Initiative,  Referendum 
and  Re  .all  in  a  state  where  these  measures  have  been  in  opera- 
tion. Tlie  bode  forms  an  admirable  text  for  courses  in  Govern- 
ment, Folitical  Science,  etc 


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Towaids  Intematioiial  Government 

By  JOHN  A.  HOBSON 


Towards  InUmaiianal  Govtmmemi  is  a  plea  for 

universal  peace.  Written  with  Mr.  Hobson's  usual 
vivacity  and  force  of  argument,  the  book  urg*-  i 
federation  of  the  world's  nations*  based  on  a  desire 
for  international  harmony  and  assured  by  a  plan  of 
forced  arbitration  and  appeal  to  an  international 
congress  and  executive.  He  rests  his  case  on  the 
needs  and  demands  of  the  great  majority  of  people, 
especially  those  ot  the  working  classes,  and  he  aims 
well-deserved  blows  at  military  governments  and  the 
methods  of  modem  democracy.  Mr.  Hobson*s  book 
is  with  the  trend  ol  the  times — for  the  overthrow  ol 
militarism  and  the  extension  of  the  influence  of  the 
democratic  ideal. 


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Amencan  Municipal  PiogMM 

By  CHARLES  ZUEBLIN 
Nm  EaUon,  EtiUnly  RmritUn  md  GnaOy  &ilarpd 

Professor  Zueblin's  work  has  a  message  for  all  who  live  in 
either  a  great  metropolis  or  a  small,  progressive  town.  It  is 
not  so  much  a  new  and  revised  edition  of  Mr.  Zueblin's  earlier 
work  as  it  is  a  new  volume.  The  development  of  the  cities  and 
the  growth  of  the  social  conscience  in  the  past  decade  have 
made  neoesMuy  a  larfer  treatment,  aad  die  author,  hihon^i 
using  tile  earlier  work  as  a  nucleus  lor  die  new,  haa  afauoet 
doubled  its  pages,  and  at  Uie  same  time  has  added  to  its  vahie 
with  many  illustrations. 

The  book  takes  up  in  detail  such  problems  as  public  utilities, 
schools,  libraries,  children's  playgrounds,  parks,  public  baths 
and  -  "mnasiums ;  also  such  questions  as  those  of  rapid 

tran:"  aon  and  the  care  of  streets ;  the  latest  experiments 

in  munt^pal  ownmhip  and  municipal  administratian  are  re- 
cord The  diacusiioii  is  from  the  standpoint  of  imbHc  welfare^ 
and  is  based  on  repeated  persomU  investigaticMis  in  tiie  kadiof 
cities  of  the  United  States.  Despite  its  large  interest  for  the 
general  reader,  its  comprehensiveness  makes  it  valuable  to  the 
research  student  as  well,  and  its  exhaustive  bibliography  is  in- 
valuable to  the  specialist.  The  work  is  imique  and  will  be 
found  a  complete  guide  in  many  unfamiliar  paths. 


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